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THE POLITICS OF CHOICE & ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTIONS 
JESSICA KAPLAN  
Abstract: This thesis asks how egalitarians can theorise economic-distributive issues 
in ways sensitive to structural injustices of race, gender, and class. Drawing on real-
world political problems and debates, I illustrate the contemporary urgency of an 
intersectional approach to economic-distributive justice. And I argue that any such 
approach must adopt repoliticised, critical conceptions of choice and the economy.  
 
Political philosophy on distributive justice is dominated by theories centrally 
animated by the concept of choice. These theories, I argue, risk mistakenly sweeping 
structural injustices under the carpet of victims’ own ‘bad choices’. To diagnose this 
problematic tendency, I reveal the hidden ethico-political dimensions of attributing 
certain outcomes to certain choices. Choice, I show, cannot provide a pre-political 
foundation for theories of distributive justice. Accordingly, I then turn to prominent 
egalitarian paradigms not centrally animated by choice. I suggest relational 
egalitarianism fares better for its less individualist, more social-structuralist 
approach. But relational egalitarians are not always clear about how economic-
distributive issues relate to equal political relationships and socio-political status 
hierarchies. I argue that this sometimes leads them to understate the importance of 
distributive justice.  
 
Nancy Fraser’s ‘perspectival dualism’ looks a promising corrective to this under-
emphasis, as it is designed to integrate left economic-redistributive projects with 
feminist and anti-racist cultural-recognitive projects. However, I argue that Fraser’s 
underlying economy-culture dualism means she struggles to capture important 
features of the intersections of race, class, and gender. Tracing this problematic 
economy-culture dualism through contemporary ‘class versus identity politics’ 
debates, I propose an alternative approach. I suggest we be non-dualists, viewing 
economic distributions and cultural representations as importantly co-constitutive.  
 
To end, I outline a non-dualist analysis of the economy. Our dominant 
understanding of the economy, I argue, is an ideological objectification of certain 
practices – an objectification which harmfully helps naturalise relations of raced, 
classed, and gendered domination. I suggest a counter-hegemonic understanding 
informed by anti-racist, feminist, and socialist rethinkings of which practices 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The motivation for this thesis arose from certain political experiences I had and the 
tensions and gaps that they revealed in my political-theoretical framework. My first 
job out of university was in a community centre two minutes’ walk from the base of 
Grenfell Tower. I was hired to support long-term unemployed people from the area 
– one of the poorest in the UK and extremely ethnically diverse1 – to help them find 
work or training. Fresh out of a Philosophy Masters, I was often struck by how 
utterly unhelpful my political-philosophical tools seemed for analysing the grinding 
unfairness this community was accustomed to: living on wages too low to stretch to 
a bus fare; losing jobs with each wobble and dip of the economy; providing ongoing 
unpaid care to family and friends while being berated by state agencies for their lack 
of formal work; navigating an increasingly sparse and incredibly complex benefits 
regime; and trying to access basic public services – including housing support and 
mental and physical healthcare systems – which no longer had the capacity to help 
them.  
 
The Grenfell Tower fire forced us all to reckon with how class and race still so 
powerfully determine whose lives are worthy of protection, sustenance, and 
‘grievability.’2 This community – like many others around the country – has been 
deemed less worthy of these goods for decades, creating the conditions for the 
catastrophic fire as well as for many more invisible, personal catastrophes over the 
 
1 Barr (2017). 
2 Butler (2012: 148). 
2 
 
years. The experiences of that job made concrete what, up until then, I had mostly 
only known in theory: that racism, sexism, and classism were alive and well in the 
UK, and that progress on these fronts could be lost as well as gained.3  
 
My next job required that I start every day by reading all the major national 
newspapers, from the Sun and Daily Mail to the Times and Guardian.4 A few years 
of this routine transposed over my experience at the community centre convinced 
me that contemporary racism, sexism, and classism were increasingly hidden under 
a justificatory veneer directing political attention to individuals’ choices. Over and 
over, these papers decried the choices and actions of lazy, greedy, or reckless 
individuals, and the resulting damage these people did to the nation through their 
endangering and draining of economic resources.  
 
Predictable repetitions within these stories suggested that these reckless, lazy 
individuals were being presented as architypes of various social groups.5 Favourite 
(overlapping) architypes include ‘benefits cheats’ and ‘chavs’ – who, in these news 
stories, come to represent working class people, especially single working-class 
mothers – and ‘illegal immigrants’ and ‘bogus asylum seekers’ – coming to represent 
migrants. As Imogen Tyler argues, these archetypical ‘national abjects’ are mobilized 
as technologies of social control, deployed to generate consent for the steady erosion 
of the UK’s welfare state.6 The figurations of these groups serve to naturalise and 
legitimate the poverty of some of the most socially and economically disadvantaged 
people. The threat these groups apparently posed was very often portrayed as 
 
3 I worked here during the aftermath of the 2008 recession, when the first round of Conservative 
cuts to public spending and services were taking effect.  
4 I was a press officer.  
5 For example, headlines labelled Mike Philpott, who murdered his children, as a ‘Vile Product of 
Welfare UK’ (Dolan & Bentley 2013) and the ‘perfect parable’, illustrating the ‘pervasiveness of 
evil born out of welfare dependency’ (Wilson 2013). 
6 Tyler (2013) 
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economic: as the cheating of money, jobs, and housing from honest, hardworking 
British families.7   
 
I had read political philosophy on individual choice and distributive justice, but 
much of it theorised the moral significance of choice from an idealised, initially equal 
baseline. The significance of such work for understanding the profoundly unequal 
real world remained entirely opaque to me. Much of the feminist political 
philosophy I had read focused on the ‘public/private’ distinction.8 Since women have 
increasingly entered the formal workforce, the contemporary significance of these 
debates also remained unclear to me.  
 
Of course, I was late to the party: political argument had appealed to individual 
choice and ‘the economy’ for decades. But these years were the heyday of 
neoliberalism, when politics seemed to revolve around these concepts with ever-
increasing fervour. Now, living through what look to be significant ruptures of this 
neoliberal paradigm, it is helpful to take stock of why and how the concepts of 
choice and the economy function as they do, and to investigate how their centrality 
might have contributed to and shaped our current political moment. Ruptures in 
political paradigms are good times to take stock and consider alternatives.  
 
To these ends, in this thesis I explore how the concepts of choice and the economy 
interact with our dominant political conception of personhood, our sense of what we 
owe each other, and our perception of whose lives and labours count as valuable. I 
examine how dominant political-philosophical approaches to economic-distributive 
 
7 E.g. Riley (2018, 2019); Dathan (2016); Slack (2012). Public perception of how much money was 
lost to benefit fraud was 34 times higher than the reality – see Sacks-Jones (2014). For an 
overview of news reporting on migrants, see Greenslade (2016). For analysis of public and news 
discourses around working class mothers, see Tyler (2008). 
8 E.g. Okin (1989). Pateman (1983: 281) argues that ‘the dichotomy between the private and the 
public is central to almost two centuries of feminist writing and political struggle; it is, 
ultimately, what the feminist movement is about.’  
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justice have confronted or failed to confront these issues. And I consider how an 
egalitarianism which takes the elimination of structural injustices like those of race, 
gender, and class as a primary aim might approach these issues differently.  
 
Argument Outline: 
I present an egalitarian case for repoliticised, critical understandings of the concepts 
of choice and the economy. I propose a de-centring of choice and a counter-
hegemonic understanding of ‘the economy.’ The first part of the thesis focuses on the 
concept of choice. The second part draws on my arguments about the politics of 
choice and responsible agency to explore how economic distributions co-constitute 
cultural, ‘recognitive’ understandings and identities. My argument goes as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 sets the political and philosophical scene, explaining why the concept of 
choice warrants critical egalitarian attention. I suggest that choice is central to our 
dominant political conception of agents, and I introduce the importance of social 
context in assessing the values and costs of choice. I argue that in our current 
inegalitarian social context, political discourse about the importance and value of 
choice works to perpetuate and reinforce structural inequalities. The instrumental 
and representative costs of choice – the costly results choices can bring and the 
negative things those results are taken to show about us – systematically fall to 
oppressed groups due to harmful social norms and unequal access to sources of 
social and material wellbeing. Dominant political narratives then excuse the 
resulting injustices by appeal to our symbolic formal equality as active choosers.  
 
Chapter 2 aims to deromanticize ‘choice’ in order to help balance a discipline much 
enamoured with the power and moral significance of the concept. Taking my cue 
from feminist and post-structuralist work on choice and agency, I aim to widen their 
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net.9 I show how idealised choice narratives obscure race and class injustices (as well 
as gendered ones) and illustrate these narratives’ importance to economic-
distributive matters. To do this, I introduce the concept of ‘responsibilisation’: the 
political practice of holding individuals normatively and practically responsible for 
their own survival and wellbeing and attributing any failures to individual bad 
choices and character, rather than to structural injustice.10 The idea of 
responsibilisation runs through the whole thesis.   
 
In inegalitarian contexts, then, political emphasis on the value of choice can help 
reinforce structural injustices of race, gender, and class. Given this, Chapters 3-6 ask: 
first, how the concept of choice allows for such problematic results; and second, 
whether there are ways egalitarians can use the concept without risking sweeping 
structural injustices under the carpet of victims’ own agency? I argue that 
egalitarians can still use the concept if they wish but that they must draw on it in 
careful and critical ways, and I suggest how this is possible.  
 
To make my argument, I analyse the philosophical term of art, ‘agent responsibility’, 
since it is the most prominent philosophical attempt to systematically unpack and 
carefully articulate the fuzzy concept of ‘choice.’ In Chapter 3, I introduce the 
concept and outline standard political philosophical theorisations of how to 
determine who is agent responsible for what. I focus on one standard model of agent 
responsibility which states that agent x choses outcome y if and only if x’s intentional 
actions were causally responsible for y and x could reasonably have foreseen that y 
would follow from x. 
 
I explore how responsibility-sensitive egalitarians – who give this concept pride of 
place in their theories of distributive justice – tend to handle structural injustices (or 
 
9 E.g. Bartky (1988); Chambers (2010); Lépinard (2011); Foucault (2012b). 
10 I adapt this understanding of responsibilisation from Rose (1996) and Brown (2016: 4). 
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avoid handling them, as is often the case). I suggest that race-, gender-, and class-
neutral analyses of exactly who is agent responsible for what are not as 
straightforward as they first appear. Certainly, the standard model of agent 
responsibility looks ill-equipped to provide such analyses and cannot be remedied 
by any shallow, quick fix.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 explore what deeper reforms to this standard model are necessary 
in order to understand how and why we attribute responsibility in the ways that we 
do, and how to adjudicate debates involving conflicting authorship attributions. 
These chapters focus on three cases: choices leading up to sexual assault, choices to 
perform unpaid carework, and choices determining the distribution of housing.11   
 
In Chapter 4, I identify three indeterminacies in the standard model and outline how 
we unthinkingly resolve these indeterminacies when we make intuitive agent 
responsibility attributions – as we so often do. First, I show that instinctive 
judgements about what agents capable of agent responsibility exist within the 
political sphere rely on a common-sense ‘political ontology.’ I explain why 
egalitarian political philosophers can and should challenge the dominant 
individualist ontology at work in both neoliberal political discourse and much 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian thought.  
 
Second, I explain how agent responsibility’s causal requirement functions, linking it 
to the concept of ‘actual causation.’ Striking a match, for example, counts as an 
actual cause of a fire, whereas the presence of oxygen is normally consigned to a 
mere background enabling condition – causally necessary, of course, but nonetheless 
not a proper cause. Drawing on philosophical accounts of actual causation I suggest 
 
11 Though not obviously an issue of distributive justice, I use the case of sexual assault because 
feminists have done an excellent job of politicising the sexist focus on women’s choices in this 
context; I re-work these arguments to show their potential application to more traditionally 
‘distributive’ issues like unpaid carework and housing.  
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that this is because ‘the presence of oxygen’ will be a useless answer to the question, 
‘what caused the fire?’ in all but very limited circumstances; to give it therefore 
impermissibly draws attention to causal background that simply does not matter for 
almost all purposes.   
 
Philosophical and empirical work suggests that judgements of actual causation are 
informed by prescriptive and statistical norms; in other words, our instinctive views 
on which actions are actual causes and which merely background enabling 
conditions are informed by common-sense ideas about which actions ought/ought 
not to result in which outcomes, and about how often a certain action precedes a 
certain outcome.  
 
In cases of sexual assault, for example, the victim’s actions of wearing provocative 
clothing or drinking alcohol are often deemed actual causes of assaults because these 
actions are deemed ones that matter to the production of assault outcomes. Common-
sense suggests either that these actions often precede assault, or that women ought 
to avoid these actions, or both.  
 
In turn, judgements of actual causation guide our common-sense agent 
responsibility attributions. For example, the standard model of agent responsibility 
(and many public discussions of assault) implies that victims who knowingly 
undertake these ‘risky’ behaviours co-author the assault outcome to some degree. 
And common-sense judgements of actual causation are similarly at work in 
attributions of agent responsibility for homelessness and poverty arising from doing 
unpaid carework.   
 
Importantly, I do not endorse the common-sense responsibility attributions that I 
explain in Chapter 4; I attempt to clarify their basis in order to challenge them. Just 
as there are good reasons for egalitarians to challenge our dominant individualist 
8 
 
political ontology, in Chapter 5 I show that there are good reasons for us to challenge 
dominant maps of actual causation too. These maps enshrine sexist, conservative, 
and neoliberal norms that egalitarians need not and should not accept.  
 
Instead I argue that egalitarians should replace the common-sense judgements 
underlying agent responsibility ascriptions with egalitarian ‘good sense’ 
judgements. We can do this because the concept of actual causation functions as it 
does in order to single out what matters for normal purposes. And what matters for 
the normal purposes of normative political debates – about how our society should 
function, what public services are justified, and how we collectively ought to 
understand and value social activities, for example – are the right prescriptive norms, 
not common-sense prescriptive norms nor current statistical norms.  
 
For example, drawing attention to a woman’s choice to drink alone as an actual 
cause of assault impermissibly draws our attention to the wrong thing; her actions 
should be understood as mere causal background, not an actual cause of any sexual 
assault. It is the correct prescriptive norm that matters in this case, and this states 
that assault ought not follow from drinking alone while female. Our victim is not 
obligated to avoid sexual violence at the cost of her basic liberties; rather, her 
political community are collectively obligated to protect her basic liberties and 
safety, and everyone in this community is obligated not to commit assault. 
Therefore, I argue, our woman is not ‘agent responsible’ – she did not ‘co-author’ 
any assault.  
 
Extending this analysis to the cases of unpaid carework and homelessness, I show 
how political appeals to responsibility attributions rest on the conclusions to 
paradigmatic ethico-political debates. In particular, they rest on debates about what 
political obligations we hold to one another, and how to classify the political-
economic value of various social activities and practices. Choice cannot serve as an 
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apolitical foundation on which to build theories of distributive justice since 
normative political judgements play an essential role in responsibility attributions 
used in this context. 
 
Together, Chapters 3-5 tie arguments about causation from the philosophy of social 
science to feminist and socialist political theory. And they bring insights from 
traditional feminist arguments to bear on the neoliberal responsibilisation of access 
to public goods like housing. In the process, I explain how and why the concepts of 
‘choice’ and ‘agent responsibility’ are able to play such central and persuasive roles 
in inegalitarian and conservative political thought. I also outline how issues of 
epistemic justice and ideology are entwined with the puzzle of who choses what 
outcomes, suggesting that theorists of distributive justice must take these topics 
seriously.  
 
In Chapter 6, I suggest we need to look beyond responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism for the theoretical tools necessary for an approach to distributive 
justice that aims to eliminate structural injustices. Responsibility-sensitive 
approaches tend to be so centrally animated by the concept of choice that they 
seldom develop other conceptual apparatuses more useful for discussing the 
underlying normative debates upon which judgements of ‘choice’ rest.  
 
Accordingly, I then turn to theorisations of economic-distributive justice not 
centrally animated by choice. I first look to responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism’s 
main theoretical competitor: relational egalitarianism. I argue that one of the best-
known and most widely read elaborations of relational egalitarianism – Elizabeth 
Anderson’s earlier work – is not always clear about how economic distributions 
relate to equal political relationships or socio-political status hierarchies. I trace parts 
of Anderson’s framing of this issue back to Nancy Fraser’s influential ‘perspectival 
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dualism’ – a theory of how to understand and integrate left economic-redistributive 
projects with feminist and anti-racist cultural ‘recognitive’ projects.  
 
Perspectival dualism looks extremely promising: it is framed around the need to 
combat racism, sexism, and classism, it takes its cue from real-world political 
problems, and it explicitly theorises the political role and significance of the 
economic-distributive realm. And it cautions against theorising economic-
distributive justice in complete isolation from theorisations of cultural-recognitive 
justice. Furthermore, Fraser shaped perspectival dualism in response to accusations 
that the left has sidelined concerns about economic inequality and class in favour of 
putting ‘identity politics’ centre-stage; in the wake of popular votes for Brexit and 
Trump, such accusations have again become popular. She argues that the left must 
find a way to theorise both recognitive ‘identity’ issues and economic-distributive 
issues. Fraser’s theory therefore looks helpful for our current political moment. 
 
However, in Chapter 7 I argue that perspectival dualism is not the best way to 
theorise economic-distributive issues. I do so by focusing on raced distributions, and 
by showing how perspectival dualism struggles to capture certain important 
features of the intersection of race and class. Here I return to the concept of 
responsibilisation, discussing how racist cultural representations claim to explain 
raced economic distributions by attributing them to the bad choices or character of 
people of colour. In turn, I argue, these racist representations help reproduce the 
systematic exclusion of people of colour from the economic goods, services, and 
opportunities enjoyed by their white counterparts. In this way, ideas of 
choice/responsible agency mediate the relationships between distributions and 
representations. 
 
In Chapter 8, I look to Jodi Dean’s recent restaging of the ‘class vs identity politics’ 
debate. Dean is a prominent political commentator and a leading left political 
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theorist.12 I analyse the economy-culture dualism underlying Dean’s position and 
argue that Dean’s work suffers from similar problems to Perspectival Dualism. 
Building on lessons learned from Fraser and Dean, I propose we be ‘non-dualists’ 
instead, viewing economic distributions and cultural representations as importantly 
co-constitutive.  
 
I call for this move away from economy-culture dualism because distributions of 
economic goods like wealth and secure housing importantly affect and are affected 
by dominant recognitive understandings of women, racialised groups, and the 
working classes. The Grenfell community lived and understood this well before the 
fire forced others to acknowledge it. And, as Tilley and Shilliam remark, ‘the 
residential conditions of Grenfell Tower are broadly representative of a global reality 
in which the racialised “Others of Europe” remain largely impoverished, spatially 
marginalised and excluded from dignified housing.’13 Insisting on the co-constitution 
of economic distributions and raced ‘recognition’, I argue, best helps us theorise why 
and how these contemporary racialised distributions are reproduced.  
 
However, if we cannot understand the economic-distributive through a dualist 
contrast with the cultural-recognitive, how are we to understand the economy? To 
answer this, I propose a non-dualist analysis of the economy. I start by suggesting 
that the term picks out and groups together certain social practices and then 
objectifies this group as a thing, ‘the economy’.  More specifically, I argue that our 
dominant understanding of the economy is an ideological objectification of certain 
practices – an objectification which harmfully helps naturalise relations of raced, 
classed and gendered domination. It does this through the logic it uses to draw the 
line between the economy and the non-economic: by overvaluing certain labour 
 
12 See, e.g. Jodi Dean (2016b). Jonathan Dean (2015) discusses Jodi Dean’s position within 
contemporary political theory. Thousands of people attended Dean’s recent ‘Mark Fisher 
Memorial Lecture’ (Barnett 2019).  
13 Tilley & Shilliam (2017: 1–2) 
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practices while undervaluing or ignoring others, and by drawing on calculations of 
public value that overvalue the interests of certain populations while excluding or 
minimising the interests of other exploited, excluded, and oppressed groups.14  
 
In Chapter 2 I outline the centrality of choice to our dominant political conception of 
agents; in Chapter 8 I build on this by suggesting that the mould of homo-
economicus has deeply shaped our conception of respectable or ‘proper’ human 
agents. I connect this to the dehumanisation and violence suffered by groups 
excluded from full economic participation because of their gender, race, class, or 
nationality.   
 
Building on insights from social reproduction theory, I suggest the possibility of a 
counter-hegemonic understanding of the economy – one which focuses on the 
practices and resources important to the production and distribution of the means of 
life (shifting away from a focus on those practices important to the production and 
distribution of financial value). This understanding, I argue, must be informed by 
anti-racist, feminist, and socialist rethinkings of which practices constitute labour 
and who constitutes the ‘public’ within economic imaginaries of public value. I end 
by considering the implications of this critical redrawing of the economy for 
relational egalitarianism.  
 
Main Claims of the Thesis: 
 
1. Egalitarians should re-politicise the concept of choice (and its philosophical 
counterpart, ‘agent responsibility’) and decentre it from their approaches to 
distributive justice.    
 
 
14 By ‘our’ I mean Euro-Atlantic political communities, though the thesis draws primarily on data 
and examples from the UK and the USA.  
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2. Choice and responsible agency importantly mediate the co-constitutive 
relationship between distributions and representations (including ‘identity’ 
categories). 
 
3. The economy should not be separated from ‘culture’, but rather understood 
as an objectification of certain practices – which always have a cultural 
dimension – commonly picked out according to certain ideological logics.   
A Note on Methodology: 
This thesis attempts to put political philosophers and critical theorists in 
conversation. Though political philosophy can sometimes seem either irrelevant to 
real world politics or overly friendly to co-option by inegalitarian public political 
conversations, neither of these need be the case. To the contrary, I believe there is 
much work within the discipline useful both for understanding our current political 
moment and thinking through how we might try to change it.  
 
As already hinted at, however, I do view political philosophy’s prevailing 
methodology of ‘ideal theory’ as potentially problematic. Loosely, ideal theories are 
theories constructed under idealised assumptions – assumptions which render social 
reality simpler and better than it actually is.15 Chapters 2-5 can be read as a case 
study illustrating the potential pitfalls of this methodology; they aim to show how 
and why much ideal theorising about choice can be not simply uninformative 
regarding real world political problems, but harmfully obfuscatory.16 Motivated by 
this, the thesis attempts to steer clear of ideal theory’s methodology, keeping my 
philosophical feet firmly ‘in the mud’, as Ingrid Robeyns puts it.17  
 
 
15 I take this definition from Valentini (2009: 332); see also Mills (2005: 168).  
16 I say ‘potentially’ because an argument that ideal theory, tout court, is problematic, is far 
beyond the scope of this thesis. I make the more limited claim (over Chapters 2-4) that dominant 
modes of ideal theorising about choice and distributive justice are problematic.  
17 Robeyns (2018) 
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Nor am I alone in this. Non-ideal theory continues to gain prominence within 
political philosophy (though to a lesser degree within the fairly traditional topic of 
distributive justice, perhaps).18 Non-ideal theorists are characterised by the belief that 
the ‘natural and most illuminating starting point is the actual conditions’ of women, 
people of colour, and the working class – a starting point which makes ‘theoretically 
central the existence and functioning of the actual non-ideal structures.’19  
 
Understood in this way, non-ideal political philosophy has important commonalities 
with critical theory. For example, Amy Allen suggests that what distinguishes 
critical theory from ‘mere normative philosophy’ is the inclusion of an ‘explanatory-
diagnostic’ dimension – an attempt to observe and analyse the workings, 
contradictions, and limitations of existing social systems – alongside its 
‘anticipatory-utopian’ dimension.20  
 
Feminists are almost always non-ideal theorists, given that they start from the all too 
real problems of gender inequality. Unsurprisingly, then, many of the theoretical 
tools, arguments, interests, and approaches of this thesis are inspired by feminist 
work of one kind or another, whether it be feminist political economy, political 
sociology, metaphysics, political philosophy, critical theory, black feminist work on 
intersectionality (and its intellectual legacy), or socialist feminist thought. 21  
 
 
18 Some prominent examples of non-ideal theorising from within political philosophy include the 
work of Elizabeth Anderson (1999, 2004b, 2010, 2019), work on epistemic injustice – e.g. Fricker 
(2007) – work on the social metaphysics of race and gender – e.g. Haslanger (2012e) – and 
feminist work on agency – e.g. Chambers (2010); Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000). Examples of non-
ideal theorising about distributive justice include Anderson (2010); Gosseries (2005); O’Neill 
(2017); O’Neill and White (2019). 
19 Mills (2005: 170). 
20 Allen (2015: 514). 
21 E.g. Folbre (1991, 1994, 1995); Skeggs (2003, 2014, 2019); Haslanger (2017, 2012f); Chambers 
(2010); Bartky (1988); Fraser (2003); Carby (1982); Combahee River Collective (2005); Federici 
(2012); Bhattacharyya (2018), Camfield (2016), and Fraser et al. (2018).  
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So, non-ideal theory starts with its feet in the mud. Because of this, it often has an 
epistemic dimension: it recognises that our theoretical tools arise from an 
‘intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing 
perspectives’ that reflect the experiences and interests of the privileged.22 Here, too, it 
shares important ground with critical theory since, as Raymond Geuss puts it, ‘the 
heart of the critical theory of society is its criticism of ideology.’23 Critical theory so 
often involves ideology critique because proponents understand their theorising to 
be always bound up with the social context within which it is formulated; they 
therefore try to be self-conscious about, and critical of, how unjust social contexts 
might inform our theories, concepts, narratives, and attitudes.  
 
Just as I try to avoid idealising away political injustices, I also attempt to explore 
how our theoretical tools are shaped by unequal power relations; this approach 
informs my critical examination of the concepts of choice and the economy. I aim the 
arguments of this thesis at egalitarian political philosophers interested in their 
discipline’s relationship with (and application to) real world political inequalities, 
especially those of race, gender, and class.  
 
22 Mills (2005: 175). Cf. Swift (2008: 369) who defends the contribution of ‘“pure”, context-
independent philosophy.’ 






2.  THE COSTS OF CHOICE 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Choice holds pride of place within much liberal political philosophy. John Rawls, the 
patriarch of contemporary political philosophy, is often interpreted as prioritising 
people’s ability to self-direct their lives through choice above much else.24 Still, 
‘responsibility-sensitive egalitarians’ think Rawls did not go far enough to enshrine 
the significance of choice; they think the distinction between chosen and unchosen 
inequalities constitutes the very core of distributive justice.25 Libertarians likewise 
 
24 See Chambers (2010: 117); G. Dworkin (1982: 48–49); Kymlicka (2002: 74). Rawls’ 
communitarian critics take issue with the idea that ‘our conceptions of the good carry weight… 
simply in virtue of our having chosen them’ (Sandel 1992: 20); to this Rawls (1985: 243–244) 
replies that what is most morally weighty is rather our capacity to assume responsibility for our 
life choices.  
25 See, e.g., Knight and Stemplowska (2011b). Or Vallentyne (2008: 62), who writes that, ‘choices 
are the basic object of normative assessment.’ It is possible for responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarians (or ‘luck egalitarians’) to build their theory around the aim of nullifying luck rather 
than a belief in the importance of choice. But many luck egalitarians’ anti-luckism goes ‘hand in 
hand’ with their ‘pro-choicism’ (I take these terms from Stemplowska (2012: 390) who 
characterises pro-choicism as one of luck egalitarianism’s three core elements (2012: 389)). 
Stemplowska (2012: 392) suggests one reason these aspects often go hand in hand: 
understanding luck as ‘simply the inverse correlate of choice’ helps sidestep the deep difficulties 
otherwise faced in satisfactorily defining luck. I interpret both Cohen and Dworkin as adopting 
this complementary pro-choicist and anti-luckist approach, for example. Though Cohen 
sometimes emphasises luck above choice (e.g. 1989: 931), his theory invokes the concept of 
‘genuine choice’ at a key juncture (1989: 934), he advocates a ‘proper insistence on the centrality 
of choice’ (1989: 933) and he praises Dworkin for performing the ‘considerable service of 
incorporating within [egalitarianism] the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian 
right: the idea of choice and responsibility’ (1989: 933). Cohen treats choice as the inverse 
correlate of luck (1989: 907-908). Dworkin is similarly both pro-choicist and anti-luck: he writes 
that his theory is animated by two fundamental principles, first that people’s fates are not 
dictated by brute luck and, second, that their fates are ‘sensitive to the choices they have made’ 
(Dworkin 2002: 6). He too treats luck as the inverse correlate of choice (e.g. Dworkin 2002: 287). 
Though Dworkin and Cohen put choice at the heart of their distributive theories, neither draws 
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put choice at the heart of politics, though they disregard the responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarian insistence on equal starting points; Robert Nozick’s mantra reads, ‘From 
each as they choose, to each as they are chosen.’26 The central importance of choice is 
often assumed in political philosophy but, within this context, Thomas Scanlon 
provides perhaps the best known attempt to articulate exactly why choice is so 
valuable and important.27  
 
I do not argue that choice has no value or moral significance. To the contrary, I 
believe it has both, though I do not discuss this here. Instead, I am interested in what 
becomes visible if we focus on the current costs of choice, how these costs interact 
with one another, and who tends to bear them. But I do not attempt some kind of 
abstract cost-benefit analysis; I focus on just a few cases in an attempt to explore the 
pitfalls of using our current understandings and practices of choice as a proxy for 
autonomy. I suspect that egalitarians cannot do without robust conceptualisations of 
agency and autonomy, but I argue that our currently dominant practices and 
understandings of choice are profoundly ill-suited to this role.28  
 
 
on Scanlon’s value of choice account to justify this. Accordingly, this chapter is not a direct attack 
on their luck egalitarianism (though chapters 3-6 build on this exploratory work to argue that 
egalitarians have good reason to promote different ‘choice practices’ than the ones highlighted 
here). Cohen spends little time exploring why choice ought to have pride of place in 
egalitarianism. Dworkin does touch on this: he suggests the distinction between choice and 
circumstance is ‘essential’ to first person ethics and therefore must be to political philosophy too 
(2002: 323), and that ‘each person has a special responsibility for his own life, a responsibility that 
includes deciding what kind of life is appropriate to him’ (2002: 324). But a full analysis of the 
value and importance of choice is never Dworkin’s focus; perhaps as a result, his account 
remains partial and less convincing than Scanlon’s (for criticism of Dworkin on this point see 
Armstrong 2005: 467-470). 
26 Nozick (1974: 160). 
27 Scanlon (2000: Ch.6; 2013b).  
28 I am persuaded by Allen (2011: 45) that, ‘to be truly critical, to articulate the struggles and 
wishes of our age, critical theory must analyse power relations in all their depth and complexity, 
including the role they play in constituting modes of subjectivity, but it must do so without 
undermining or giving up on the possibility of theorising the subject’s capacities for critical 
reflection and self-transformation.’ 
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We have serious reason to worry about how the values and costs of choice are 
currently distributed. To illustrate this, I discuss how choice within contexts marked 
by unjust norms, practices and material conditions can serve to reproduce and 
perpetuate these injustices. Yet our currently dominant conceptualisation of what it 
means to be a political agent attaches profound importance to our symbolic equality 
as choosers; to remove someone’s ‘free choice’ in the marketplace of ideas, values, 
and goods is to deeply disrespect their equal standing. Worse, the representative 
function of choice helps cast oppressed groups as either defective or naturally suited 
to their marginalised positions. These functions of choice thus work together to 
naturalise and cement serious inequalities, resulting in a harmful politics of 
‘responsibilisation’ – a politics that sweeps serious structural injustices under the rug 
of ‘failures of personal choice and character.’29  
 
Given the predominance of political philosophy that assumes or extols the positive 
value and moral significance of choice (almost always in idealised circumstances), 
the emergence of work using ideas of social construction to complicate this discourse 
is welcome. Clare Chambers, for example, holds that even if someone chooses an 
outcome, this does not necessarily make the outcome just. In contexts of entrenched 
power inequalities, she argues, people can internalise harmful social norms which 
lead them to make harmful choices.30 Such arguments rightly destabilise the liberal 
choice/circumstance distinction and, though they play an important role in this 
paper, I do not aim to replicate them. Instead, I ‘zoom in’ on the different kinds of 
costs choice can bring in our current political context, illustrating how these arise 
and interact with one another, in order to outline how ‘choice’ functions in our 
deeply inegalitarian societies and why it is given such central place in contemporary 
political discourse. Moreover, whereas Chambers focuses on gender-based injustices, 
 
29 Rose (1996).  
30 Chambers (2010).  
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I build on her work by suggesting that the politics of responsibilisation is at play far 
more widely.  
 
To do this, I start by inverting Scanlon’s taxonomy of the values of choice, altering 
and supplementing it as I go. I begin with his framework, first, because it is well 
suited to this kind of ‘zoomed in’ project, designed as it is for just such micro-level 
unpicking. Second, his is one of the most prominent contemporary accounts of the 
value of choice; turning it on its head is intended as friendly provocation to the 
rather hegemonic ‘value of choice’ narratives within liberal political philosophy. 
Third, and related, his account captures much of the richness and complexity of our 
attachments to the ideals and practices of choice. It thus helps highlight the role 
these attachments play in reproducing the status quo.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to explore how Scanlon’s account is tested by application to 
the non-ideal. I argue that non-ideal contexts – marked by gender, race, and class 
inequalities – both reveal important but previously overlooked functions of choice, 
and productively challenge standard understanding of functions already noted. 
Non-ideal applications also demand that we examine closely how the various 
functions of choice interact with and reinforce one another; again, this is not often 
discussed in analyses of choice in idealised circumstances.31     
 
I start by outlining Scanlon’s account of the values of choice before discussing the 
importance of context in determining whether these values manifest. I describe our 
current socio-political context as one marked by serious, stubborn inequalities along 
the lines of race, gender and class. I then address Scanlon’s three values of choice in 
turn. I argue that the instrumental function of choice means that oppressed groups 
 
31 For example, Voorhoeve (2008), Stemplowska (2013a), and Scanlon (2013b) focus primarily on 




face two kinds of greater costs, and that privileged groups often benefit from these 
inequalities. I then argue that the symbolic function of choice works to mark us all as 
‘equal choosers’. This sense of formal equality is bolstered by stories of individual 
triumph against the odds - stories that paint success as available to all who make the 
right decisions and try hard enough. Finally, I address the representative function of 
choice, arguing that the position of oppressed groups is often naturalised through 
their representation as either bad or defective choosers, or simply naturally suited to 
their positions. I end by discussing the political and emotional isolation that such a 
politics of responsibilisation engenders.  
 
2.2. Scanlon: Three Values of Choice 
Scanlon argues that choice has three kinds of value.32 It has instrumental value when 
choosing lets us arrive at an outcome that best serves our desires or needs; my being 
able to choose what to eat for lunch has instrumental value because I know better 
than anyone else what I will most enjoy. It has symbolic value when having a certain 
choice is a sign of respect, in that it marks us as a member of equal standing in a 
wider and valued community of choosers. For example, being enfranchised can be 
valuable because (among other things) it signals to others that I am respected as a 
full member of my polity. Third, it has representative value when choosing allows us 
to express something about ourselves and our relation to the world. Scanlon 
suggests that this is why we like to choose what presents to buy for our loved ones, 
for example.33 
 
Scanlon thinks it ‘not necessary that our choices be free in a strong sense that entails 
complete independence from outside causes’ to have these values.34 This seems 
plausible and reflects our use of choice in non-philosophical discourse. For example, 
 
32 Scanlon (2013b; 2000: Ch.6). 
33 Scanlon (2013b: 12). 
34 Scanlon (2013b). 
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even if someone’s decision was influenced by the food advert they saw on the way 
to work, we do not tend to say that they did not actually chose their lunch or that the 
choice was meaningless.  
 
Scanlon mentions that choice can carry corresponding disvalues. He notes that if I do 
not understand the language of my lunch menu, my choosing what to eat may 
actually carry instrumental costs – I may end up with something I won’t enjoy. He 
also recognises that choices can have negative representative value. As he says, ‘it 
was not a good thing for Sophie to have her famous choice.’35 And, conceivably, 
though he does not mention it, choices may also have negative symbolic value. Just 
as the right to vote valuably signals your status as a respected citizen, having the 
choice to wear a dress without social sanction might signal that others view you as a 
woman – a group membership that still carries some important symbolic disvalues.  
 
But though Scanlon gives passing mention to some of these possibilities, they are not 
his focus. Rather, his work primarily attempts to explain ‘why people have good 
reason to insist on moral principles and social arrangements that make outcomes 
depend on their choices.’36 Yet he does recognise the role of context in determining 
whether the values of choice manifest and to what extent: ‘the value [of a choice] 
depends on the conditions under which the choice is made.’37 So it is to context I turn 
first. 
 
35 Scanlon (2013b: 13). Sophie is a fictional character forced to choose which of her two children 
will die in order for the other to survive.  
36 Scanlon (2013b: 13). 




2.3. Choice in what Context?  
 
Every family should have the right to spend their money, after tax, as they 
wish, and not as the government dictates. Let us extend choice, extend the will 
to choose and the chance to choose. – Margaret Thatcher38 
 
The examples of relevant context Scanlon gives are often individualised and either 
fairly narrow – being too drunk to choose your own food well, for example – or 
extreme and rare, as in the case of Sophie’s choice.39 I focus instead on the far more 
general (and diffuse) socio-political context of contemporary Euro-Atlantic societies, 
as this is the context within which we (as members of those societies conducting 
normative political work about them) most urgently need to know the values and 
costs of choice.40 For want of a better term, I characterise this context as ‘neoliberal’. I 
briefly outline some of this context’s main characteristics before turning to examine 
the costs of choice within it.  
 
‘Neoliberalism’ is a concept I will use to describe a loose system of action and a 
corresponding, mutually reinforcing system of thought. 41 I call the system of thought 
our neoliberal ‘schema’, and the system of action, neoliberal ‘practices’. 
Neoliberalism is broadly unified, first, through its push towards practices of 
 
38 Thatcher (1975). 
39 Scanlon (2013b: 13). Though see footnote 40 for context.  
40 This shift in focus is not at odds with Scanlon’s project since he constructs accounts of choice 
and responsibility meant to take seriously the social conditions our choices are made under 
(specifically, whether others have discharged ‘what they owe to us’), rather than only the fact of 
our individual choices. His ‘value of choice’ account therefore has an important social element 
(even if the examples in Scanlon (2013b) do not always reflect this). This social dimension comes 
out most clearly in his hazardous waste example, in which the relevant context is neither 
individualised nor narrow (Scanlon 1986: 190–196).  
41 Rose and Miller (2010); Brown (2015); Rose (1996); Hall (2011). There has recently been much 
talk of ‘the death of neoliberalism’ (Jacques 2016). The truth of such claims remains unclear; 
though nationalist sentiment is on the rise, there are some signs this will not straightforwardly 
usurp but rather reconfigure the pre-eminence of ‘free trade’ and ‘free markets’ (see e.g. Elgot 
2016). I take the notion of a ‘schema’ from Haslanger (2012c). 
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marketization, and second, through its conceptualisation of the subject of 
government as that of an active chooser – a perpetually self-enterprising subject. 
 
Before I explain these characterisations more fully, a few preliminaries. First, some 
background on the idea of a ‘political schema’ – the ‘system of thought’ element of 
neoliberalism – will prove useful. Notice that we could list uncountable facts about 
any given situation, and uncountable causes for any given event. A schema is a 
framework which helps us pick relevant facts and causes from this morass, 
characterise them in certain ways, and conceptualise their relation to other relevant 
facts. A political schema, then, is a framework for making reality ‘thinkable’ in order 
to govern it.42 Importantly, it helps us conceive of the persons who are to be 
governed: are they conceptualised as God’s subjects, or as secular citizens enmeshed 
in and emerging from community networks, sustained through various 
dependencies and driven by various needs, or as actively choosing individual 
subjects, rationally pursuing their goals across all spheres of life?   
 
A dominant political schema will rationalise, reinforce and naturalise dominant 
political practices, and vice versa. As Michel Foucault suggests, the form of power 
driving this dynamism between how we think of things and the practices we 
participate in is predominantly ‘creative’.43 Unlike ‘repressive power’, which works 
through stopping certain outcomes through force or violence, creative power works 
by generating and shaping our tastes, desires, and habits through frequent repetition 
– through small, mundane drills which soon come to be repeated without thought.44 
In aggregate, these processes come to shape our very sense of ourselves as 
individuals. Creative power governs behaviour primarily through norms, rather 
than laws, since behavioural norms, with their intricate systems of rewards and 
 
42 Rose (1996: 147). 
43 See Foucault (2012a; 2012b).  
44 Foucault (2012a). 
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sanctions, shape us daily, on a micro-level. As we conform to such norms, they can 
become invisible to us – we do not feel subject to any kind of external power, since 
the internalised norm is now ‘just what we do’.   
 
Sandra Bartky, for example, enumerates the long list of practices that women are 
expected to undertake daily to achieve ‘femininity’.45 Women are expected to comply 
with a whole host of norms, from dieting, to sitting with their legs together, to 
applying make-up in certain ways, right down to the expectation that they smile at 
appropriate times. Women voluntarily adhere to these practices because they make 
them feel normal (feminine) and may well come to take real pleasure from this 
adherence. Women’s choices, rather than symbolising the absence of patriarchal 
power, instead become essential to its smooth operation.  
 
With this background in place I now characterise our political context with a 
necessarily over-brief account of why we might describe it as ‘neoliberal’. A 
neoliberal push towards marketization and the formation of self-enterprising 
subjects always interacts with local conditions to produce somewhat differentiated 
national results; I tell the story of the UK to give a flavour of the kind of 
transformations neoliberalism can bring (rather than to imply that these 
transformations will happen in exactly the same ways everywhere).46  
 
In the UK during the 1970’s and early 1980’s, the ‘post-war consensus’, with its 
widespread support for a mixed economy and a welfare state, came under sustained 
attack. Economists deemed the welfare sector an unsustainable, ‘unproductive’ drain 
 
45 Bartky (1988). 
46 On neoliberalism as a migratory set of practices with global reach but local instantiations see 
Ong (2007). For an argument about neoliberalism’s origins see Foucault (2010).  
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on the economy47, and theorists argued that individual freedom, not collectivism, 
was both the reason for past progress and the route to continued advancement.48 
Furthermore, it was argued that well-intentioned attempts to help the disadvantaged 
had in fact created a culture of passive dependency.49 In contrast, capitalist market 
mechanisms could maximise individual freedom and social responsibility and 
secure productivity.  
 
To expand market mechanisms into new areas, goods and activities first had to be 
‘monetized’: re-characterised so that their value could be given in monetary terms, 
thus rendering them allocable through markets. Though these shifts in systems of 
action (towards marketized practices of evaluation and exchange) and systems of 
thought (towards reconceptualising the value of an increasing range of goods and 
services as equalling their monetary value in a market transaction) began to gain 
pace a few decades ago, you can spot their continued march today. Take recent 
attempts to re-characterise higher education to further marketize the sector. The 
latest UK Government’s White Paper paints higher education as a ‘marketplace’ and 
universities as ‘assets’, within which fees capture the value of courses as set by the 
wider ‘knowledge economy’. 50  
 
As marketization and monetisation have slowly and patchily transformed 
understandings and practices, our conceptualisations of ourselves – the people who 
make up our polity and are governed within it – have altered in tandem, helping to 
rationalise and solidify these transformations. During the earlier state-welfare 
period, the subject to be governed was conceptualised as one of various needs, 
attitudes and social relationships, ‘a subject who was to be embraced within, and 
 
47 For example, Bacon & Eltis (1976). Hadjimatheou and Skouras (1979: 392) report that Bacon 
and Eltis’ argument ‘had an immediate popular appeal that soon established it as part of the 
accepted political wisdom.’ 
48 See Rose (1996), especially p.153. 
49 E.g. Mead (1993). 
50 Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills (2016: 5-6). 
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governed through, a nexus of collective solidarities and dependencies.’51 In contrast, 
the subject to be governed is now conceptualised as an active citizen-consumer of 
various marketized goods and services. In 1992 the World Bank illustrated this shift 
nicely, stating that, ‘Women must not be regarded as mere recipients of public 
support. They are, first and foremost, economic agents.’52  
 
Political subjects thus come to be specified as ‘active individuals seeking to 
‘enterprise themselves’, to maximise their quality of life through acts of choice, 
according their life a meaning and value to the extent that it can be rationalised as 
the outcome of choices made or choices to be made.’53 Unemployed people become 
‘jobseekers’ and homeless people become ‘rough sleepers’, as people come to be 
characterised through their perceived actions rather than their perceived needs.54 
Those applying for state support now visit ‘customer centres’ to do so, and benefits 
are increasingly conditional – in other words, supposedly sensitive to claimants’ 
choices – rather than inalienable.55 Students likewise become ‘consumers’ within an 
educational marketplace.56 A certain understanding of the value and importance of 
individual choice lies at the heart of this characterisation of human agents.  
 
Some have prospered within this period, but this prosperity has remained 
stubbornly unequal. In the UK, for example, economic inequality has risen markedly 
since the 1980s57 and remains divided along lines of race and gender. Women in the 
 
51 Rose (1996: 146). 
52 As quoted in Kingfisher (2002: 3). 
53 Rose (1996). See also Peters' (1982: 10) famous neoliberal ‘manifesto’ in which he writes that 
‘our hero is the risk-taking entrepreneur’.  
54 Rose (1996: 59). 
55 Lambeth Council (n.d.). On welfare conditionality in the UK, see Dwyer (2004); Chapters 3 and 
4 explore how the language of choice works so successfully to legitimise such benefits changes.   
56 ‘Competition between providers in any market incentivises them to raise their game, offering 
consumers a greater choice of more innovative and better quality products and services at lower 
cost. Higher education is no exception’ – Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills (2016: 
8).  
57 Cribb (2013). 
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UK are more likely to be employed in low paid, part-time work, to have fewer 
financial assets, to live in poverty, to head a single parent household58, and to 
shoulder a greater burden of unpaid care work59. People of Black and 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi origins in the UK, particularly men, have had much lower 
employment rates in the last thirty years, and their employment levels took the 
hardest hits during each of the recessions within this period. These ethnic groups 
remain nearly twice as likely to be unemployed as white people.60 Unsurprisingly, 
given this, the poverty rate is twice as high for Black and Minority Ethnic (‘BAME’) 
groups as for white groups.61 More generally, most BAME groups do less well, 
economically, than the white majority, especially Black, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi 
people.62  
 
This, then, sets our context. Political subjects are understood as actively choosing 
citizens, working to efficiently maximise their preference satisfaction through their 
individual choices within a marketplace of goods, ideas and services. Meanwhile, 
economic inequalities along class, race and gender lines are either remaining stable 
or worsening. It is sometimes said that neoliberal subjects are ‘governed through 
choice’; what follows is an attempt to explain how this might happen, and why the 
costs fall where they do.63 
 
58 Reis (2018); Fawcett Society (2019). 
59 Coote and Himmelweit (2013).  
60 Li (2014). 
61 Weekes-Bernard (2017). 
62 Fisher and Nandi (2015: 8). 




2.4. The Costs of Choice  
2.4.1. Instrumental costs 
 
It's the 21st century. It's the age of ‘people know best’. Parents know best 
what works for their kids. Doctors and nurses know best how to improve the 
NHS and give patients great healthcare. Residents know best how to make 
their neighbourhoods better places to live. – David Cameron64 
 
The instrumental value of choice is often illustrated through the example of choosing 
one’s own food. Since presumably I know best what I most want and need for lunch, 
I best fulfil these needs and desires if I choose what to eat myself. My choosing 
facilitates my achieving some other good - being happily fed, in this instance - hence 
the instrumental nature of this value.  
 
Though Scanlon does not make the distinction himself, I want to distinguish two 
kinds of instrumental value. I call outcome values/costs those instrumental values or 
disvalues attached to the outcome of a choice, and input values/costs those 
instrumental values or disvalues attached to the process of choosing. By choosing 
my own lunch, I may maximise my outcome value by selecting what I most need 
and want. As mentioned, much discussion of Scanlon’s account focuses on just such 
values.65 But choosing my own lunch might also minimise my input costs; I need not 
describe my tastes and inclinations to a third party who then assesses these in light 
of my options and decides for me. Input value is instrumental because, like outcome 
value, it lets us best serve some other goal – for example, choosing lunch with 
minimum time and effort. I will argue that we should not overlook the input values 
and costs of choice. But, because outcome costs and values remain important and are 
more commonly discussed, I start here.  
 
64 Cameron (2007). 
65 See footnote 31 (p.20).   




Many feminist philosophers draw on ideas of ‘social construction’, arguing that 
people and their choices are deeply formed and shaped by their social 
environment.66 This has been used to problematize the moral significance of choice 
and to highlight how the outcome costs of choices often accrue unequally in the 
context of unequal power relations, falling disproportionately on oppressed groups. 
For example, Chambers calls attention to the choice some women make to forsake 
paid work to do unpaid care work in the home.67 Such choices are (to borrow Rose’s 
framing) enwrapped in a web of incitements68, immediate sanctions69, and 
forebodings of future sanctions70. In forsaking income, these women tend to become 
financially dependent on others in ways extremely hard to reverse. In other words, 
these choices carry serious and resilient outcome costs.71  
 
Chambers notes that these choices often directly benefit men, who can remain in 
paid employment knowing that someone else - almost always a woman - will step 
up to take on the necessary unpaid carework. They remain financially independent, 
professionally connected and experienced, and hold a large amount of control over 
the family’s income. Social norms are generative – they shape people’s behaviour 
and regulate their choices through becoming internalised, at which point the 
unthinking repetition of actions that reinforce the norm works to solidify its hold. 
 
66 See Bartky (1988); Chambers (2010); Allen (2011).  
67 Chambers (2010: 121-125). 
68 Pook, ‘Giving up work was best thing I did’, as quoted in Chambers (2010: 125). 
69 Abrams, ‘Nurseries are safe and secure - but are they bad for your baby?’ as quoted in 
Chambers (2010: 125). 
70 Bentham, ‘Working Mothers damage children’s education’ as quoted in Chambers (2010: 125). 
71 In Chapters 4 and 5, I argue that the bundle of costs and benefits attached to a choice depends 
on our wider practices of valuing certain inputs above others, viewing certain outcomes as 
internal to choices and others as external, and selecting relevant agents from all of those involved 
in producing the outcome. As I here aim to make visible the costs of our current understandings 
and practices of choice, I try to observe the contours of our current dominant practices of 
delimiting the consequences of choice. Current political-economic arrangements do not 
reimburse women for choosing to provide informal carework, for example. 
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Because of these gendered carework norms and practices heralding women as 
primary unpaid caregivers, then, men as a group tend to gain outcome benefits and 
women suffer outcome costs from this set of choices.72 
 
Our neoliberal political schema, like its liberal predecessor, easily overlooks such 
unpaid carework since it occurs outside of the market. Wendy Brown sums up the 
consequences of this: ‘women disproportionately remain the invisible infrastructure 
for all developing, mature, and worn-out human capital – children, adults, disabled, 
and elderly.’73 Brown argues that the shrinking of public infrastructure that supports 
families, children and the elderly that has occurred in the last few decades intensifies 
these inequalities since women again disproportionately step into the breach.74  
 
Gendered social norms are far from the only source of unequal outcome costs.75 
Scanlon’s favoured ‘food choice’ example presents another case, for food choice is 
currently a source of severe and unequal outcome costs. Obesity is a high cost to pay 
for one’s food choices - and a highly visible one, in terms of its socio-political stigma. 
In the US, where obesity rates are some of the highest in the world, Black and 
Hispanic youth are exposed to more food marketing that promotes foods high in 
sugar, saturated fat and salt than white youth are.76 These groups receive a ‘double 
 
72 Here and throughout, by stating that a cost of choice accrues disproportionately to an 
oppressed social group, I do not mean to suggest that we can attribute their situation solely to 
such effects.  
73 Brown (2015: 105). 
74 Brown (2015: 105). Such costs do not fall on all women equally since better-off families can 
employ others to help shoulder their care burden. This is one of the many places where the need 
to view class, race and gender inequalities together becomes apparent. For further discussion on 
how contemporary practices of unpaid and low-paid carework are raced and classed, see 
Chapter 7, Section 3.3.  
75 Take evidence that university choices are affected by norms about which social class and race 
‘belong’ at which institutions (Reay et al. 2001; Boliver 2013). These choices likely carry long-term 
instrumental costs for working class applicants and applicants of colour (Vignoles et al. 2016). If 
Roger Brown (2012) is right that further education is becoming more stratified as it is further 
‘marketized’, we should expect these unequal cost distributions to worsen.  
76 Harris et al. (2015); Powell, Wada, and Kumanyika (2014).  
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dose’ of this marketing, through greater exposure to media advertisements and 
higher levels of marketing messages in their communities.77 And they live in 
neighbourhoods with a more ‘obesity-promoting’ mix of food on sale – 
neighbourhoods with relatively less inexpensive healthier food options and 
relatively more fast-food restaurants.78  
 
Again here, instrumental outcome costs fall systematically and unequally in contexts 
where incitements to harmful behaviour are themselves systematically unequal, and 
these outcome costs help perpetuate severe inequalities – in this case, severe health 
inequalities. These incitements can be internalised through advertising and habit, or 
entrenched through unequal access to sources of wellbeing, like the availability of 
healthy food. This, then, is the first reason to be alive to the costs of choice as well as 
its values: in contexts marked by unequal social norms and/or unequal access to 
sources of wellbeing, the differential outcome costs and values of people’s choices 
are one of the ways through which inequalities are perpetuated and entrenched. 
 
Now to input costs. To choose, we need knowledge of ourselves and our options, 
and we need to reason with this knowledge, judge risks, and weigh competing 
desires. These are the obvious input costs of choosing, since gathering, assessing and 
deciding takes time and effort.79 In contexts like the UK where formal educational 
attainment is strongly linked to socio-economic background, we might again worry 
that these costs fall unequally and help reproduce inequalities.80 Rather than discuss 
time costs, I focus on the costs in terms of effort of will that choosing can carry, as 
these are important but all too easy to overlook. By these costs I mean the necessary 
 
77 Harris et al. (2015: 4).  
78 Powell et al. (2014). The same is true of the UK (Butler 2018). 
79 Dworkin (1982) discusses these costs, though not their potentially unequal distribution.  
80 The charity TeachFirst (2018) reports that the link between low socio-economic background 
and poor educational attainment is greater in the UK than almost any other developed country. 
For academic data and analysis see Machin and Vignoles (2004) and Crawford (2014).  
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focus, awareness, alertness to one’s situation, and discipline involved in making 
yourself choose what you know you should.  
 
In trying to keep these efforts of self-discipline visible, I follow Lauren Berlant. 
Writing about the global obesity epidemic, Berlant calls attention to ‘the burdens of 
compelled will that exhaust people taken up by managing contemporary labour and 
household pressures.’81 Berlant wants us to notice the exhaustion arising from a 
constant need to ‘choose well’, particularly for subjects already variously exploited 
and oppressed.  
 
Once we note the invisible effort involved in ‘choosing well’ against the odds, we 
can see that even those who resist frequent micro-incitements may not do so 
costlessly. If someone belongs to a community heavily targeted with incitements to 
certain behaviours and manages to resist them, we should not thereby assume that 
they escape the costs of choice just because these costs are not easily or immediately 
visible. The effort of discipline and will that such ‘swimming against the tide’ 
requires may leave them less strength of will to make other choices, attend to other 
issues, and fulfil other obligations. Berlant suggestively describes our ‘sovereign 
will’ – that part of us able to consciously and calculatedly make choices – as 
exhaustible and episodic.82 Recognising this helps to highlight how resisting constant 
micro-incitements is not costless – rather, the costs are just easily overlooked.   
 
I have already discussed how oppressive social norms are internalised and can then 
generate choices reproductive of that oppression, making an agent’s social context 
vital in constituting the value of a certain set of choices. But Berlant’s point 
foregrounds another way in which context can matter. Now we have reason to put 
 
81 Berlant (2007: 757). 
82 Berlant (2007: 779), for example, writes about the necessity of ‘small vacations from the will 
itself, which is so often spent from the pressures of coordinating one’s pacing with the working 
day.’ 
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the individual choices of that agent in the context of their own personal wider 
resources of time and energy: if they are exhausted because they are oppressed or 
exploited, they may simply not have the time or energy left for making good, ‘self-
enterprising choices’ against the grain of their environments. Internalization need 
not have occurred in such circumstances; the person may know they are choosing 
badly and yet be unable to do otherwise, given the ongoing, exhausting combination 
of environmental attrition and incitement they face.83  
 
Berlant’s work on obesity, eating and the over-compelled, exhausted or simply 
absent ‘sovereign will’ challenges the neoliberal construction of subjects as always 
‘actively choosing’. She argues that exhausted, exploited populations seek escape 
from this demand for ever-calculating, forward-looking choice through ‘spreading-
out activities like sex or eating, oriented toward pleasure or self-abeyance, that do 
not occupy time, decision, or consequentiality in anything like the registers of 
autonomous self-assertion.’84 Not everything we do is best understood as choice; 
sometimes our behaviour arises out of habit, unconscious or semi-conscious 
motivation, compulsive need, fear, addiction, a need for respite, or simple 
exhaustion.  
 
One way to mitigate the costs of our current understandings and practices of choice 
on particularly exploited communities, then, might be to take up Berlant’s call for 
‘better ways to talk about activity oriented toward the reproduction of ordinary 
life’.85 By this, I take her to be calling for better ways to talk about ‘going with the 
flow’ of social norms and distributions of access to wellbeing, rather than viewing all 
such behaviour as active choice. Talking about this range of activity is a first step to 
 
83 Stemplowska (2009: 249) is the only responsibility-sensitive egalitarian I have come across who 
acknowledges this, writing that ‘surely… people need some areas of their life where they can at 
least occasionally perform below their best without suffering negative consequences as a result 
(if only to perform at their best elsewhere).’ 
84 Berlant (2007: 757). 
85 Berlant (2007: 757). 
34 
 
theorising its political significance, and would provide a valuable challenge to the 
neoliberal ideal of the perpetually self-enterprising subject.86 In this context, 
Scanlon’s concession that sometimes the value of choice lies in having a choice and 
sometimes in making a choice begins to look worrying; it ushers through unremarked 
the slip from ‘having’ to ‘making’, thereby leaving unchallenged the characterisation 
of all behaviour where choice was possible as thereby instantiating active, conscious 
choice.87    
 
Choice can and does have instrumental costs, then: it has outcome costs when what 
we choose is bad for us, and it has input costs because the choices we make take 
time, knowledge, skill, energy, attention and discipline. Moreover, there are reasons 
to believe that those who already have less – the working class, women, and people 
of colour – bear an unequal share of both kinds of instrumental costs. Unequal social 
norms, and unequal access to resources as simple as time, fresh food, and energy 
constantly nudge such groups towards instrumentally costly choices. These 
incitements are both costly to resist and costly to accede to.  
 
2.4.2. The symbolic equality of actively choosing citizens  
 
Choice puts the levers in the hands of parents and patients so that they as 
citizens and consumers can be a driving force for improvement in their public 
services. And the choice we support is choice open to all on the basis of their 
equal status as citizens not on the unequal basis of their wealth. – Tony Blair88 
 
Scanlon describes the symbolic value of choice as conferring on the chooser a symbol 
of their adult competence - a sign of their equal membership in the group of mature 
 
86 This change of focus necessarily displaces the individual chooser as the primary locus of 
political theorising. In advocating for a focus on social practices over individual choices (see 
Chapters 6-8) this thesis aims to illustrate one of the possibilities that this displacement opens up.   
87 Scanlon (2013b: 11). 
88 Blair (2004a). 
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agents, capable of choosing for themselves. He writes that, ‘if people like me are 
expected to make certain kinds of choices for themselves, then the fact that I rely on 
others to make such choices or, worse, that I am not allowed by others to make such 
choices, indicates that I do not have, in my own eyes or those of others, the status of 
a competent person.’89   
 
For a choice to have positive symbolic value therefore depends, first, on the existence 
of a norm dictating that certain others around you also have this choice, and second, 
that your being on a par with these others is a positive sign. This value disappears, 
then, if either of these conditions are unmet: a choice has no symbolic value if there 
is no relevant group who normally have it, or if having that choice signals one’s 
membership in a group with negative connotations. Choices can carry symbolic 
costs, as with certain choices offered only to women that symbolise one’s 
membership in this category. But rather than analyse these costs, I will instead focus 
on how the set of choices citizens are formally allocated carry particularly strong 
symbolic value. I focus on this to argue that the symbolic importance of our ‘equality 
as citizen-choosers’ is used as an important counter-narrative to substantive 
inequalities – inequalities entrenched by the fall-out from the representative and 
instrumental functions of choice, among other things.  
 
Within our current political schema people are conceptualised as, first and foremost, 
actively choosing citizens. Our ability to choose is held to be one of the primary 
markers of our equal standing: neoliberal citizenship is ‘manifested… in the 
energetic pursuit of personal fulfilment and the incessant calculations that are to 
enable this to be achieved.’90 In such an environment, denying someone the ability to 
make a choice that others are granted comes to be seen as a serious threat to their 
equal standing. In other words, within such a political schema our equal formal 
 
89 Scanlon (2013a: 13-14). 
90 Rose and Miller (2010: 201). 
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access to a certain bundle of choices takes on particularly strong symbolic value; to 
remove one of these choices from someone is to seriously disrespect their position as 
an equal adult member of society.  
 
Almost as bad as the personal disrespect it symbolises, limiting consumer choice is 
also understood to threaten national economic growth since it interferes with 
markets and therefore the motor of economic productivity. This distinctive 
conceptualisation of political agents forms one point of an ideological triumvirate: 
the nation-state, economic growth, and the actively choosing citizen function in 
relations of mutual support and entanglement. In the USA, the ‘Personal 
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005’ – also known as the ‘Cheeseburger 
Bill’ – illustrates this. Seeking to immunise the food industry from an increasing 
number of legal suits from obese customers, the first thing the Act notes is that ‘the 
food and beverage industries are a significant part of our national economy.’91 
Lawsuits seeking to blame fast food companies for obesity are ‘not only legally 
frivolous and economically damaging, but also harmful to a heathy America.’92 In 
discussion of the Bill, its Congressman author stated that ‘in a country like the 
United States where freedom of choice is cherished, nobody is forced to super-size 
their fast-food meals’, highlighting everyone’s symbolic equality as choosers, and 
entangling the health of the nation with both its formal economy and its ‘protection’ 
of the individual consumer-citizen’s choices.93   
 
Yet this symbolic equality of choice is just that – symbolic. As argued, people with 
formal access to the same choice – people who are symbolically equal in this sense – 
 
91 US Congress (2005: 2). Twenty-three states have passed similar laws (Burnett 2006: 365).  
92 US Congress (2005: 2). George Bush’s (2001) speech after September 11 also drew upon the 
normative links between the consumer-citizen, the nation-state and the market when he asked 
citizens to keep spending in the wake of the attack (‘I ask your continued participation and 
confidence in the American economy. Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity; they 
did not touch its source’).  
93 ‘Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act’ (2004: 27). 
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can face vastly different instrumental input costs in terms of time, effort, access to 
information and resources, and energy required, to make comparable choices, and 
they often choose in contexts where they are incited to internalise unequal social 
norms that harm them and benefit others. The symbolic equality of having formal 
access to the same bundle of choices cannot eliminate or even mitigate the many 
substantive inequalities of such situations. The symbolic equality granted to us by 
our formally equal bundles of choices neither ensures nor promotes equal outcomes, 
equal inputs, social relations of equal standing, or even equal benefits for equal 
effort, nor any other version of substantive equality propounded by egalitarians. The 
symbolic equality granted by formally equal bundles of consumer choices is not the 
kind of equality we should seek.    
 
Yet the strong value accorded to the symbolic equality of the enterprising, actively-
choosing citizen is often used as a counter-narrative to egalitarian concern for the 
serious substantive inequalities that result from it. This often happens through 
paradigmatic individual success stories: proof that we could all transform our 
symbolic equality as choosers into substantial economic and social prosperity if only 
we try hard and choose well.  
 
Oprah Winfrey, who was born into poverty and abuse but is now ‘the world’s most 
powerful black woman’94 and the first and only black woman multi-billionaire in the 
US95 is an example of this. Winfrey’s brand, ‘one of the most lucrative… in the 
world’96, is about ‘taking responsibility for your life, knowing that every choice that 
you’ve made has led you to where you are right now. Well, the good news is that 
everybody has the power, no matter where you are in your life, to start changing it 
 
94 As quoted in Peck (2010: 8).  
95 Nsehe (2016). 
96 Miller (2009). 
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today.’97 Within these political discourses, we all have the power to do better 
through choosing better; the symbolic equality of our having choices is equated with 
a real and immutable potential for substantive future prosperity.98 There is 
something quasi-religious about this belief; following Mark Fisher and David Smail, 
let’s call it ‘magical voluntarism.’99 
 
Through this belief in magical voluntarism, our symbolic equality as choosers is 
used to detract from the unfairness of other substantive inequalities, since such 
substantive inequalities are rendered matters of choice. Lacking 
health/wages/knowledge, for example, is simply a sign of bad 
food/employment/education choices.  And, since our status as trusted active 
choosers is paramount to our status as equal, adult members of the political 
community, substantive inequalities become personal problems rather than political 
injustices. For those struggling, the lure of stories like Winfrey’s instantiates a kind 
of ‘cruel optimism’ at work within attachments to the symbolic value of choice: it 
keeps people hopefully working, dieting, and consuming while quietly eliding any 
structural barriers they face to the achievement of their goals. 100  
 
Note that universal non-choice can confer symbolic equalising value too, but this 
kind of value is currently far less feted. No UK citizen is afforded a choice about 
whether or not national laws to apply to them, for instance. This equality of non-
choice carries symbolic value as an important sign of (at least formal) equal footing 
within the legal sphere: equality before the law. The symbolic value of choice is only 
one form that the symbolic value of being treated equally along some important 
 
97 Peck (2010: 9). 
98 It is also reminiscent of the classic ‘American Dream’. And it connects to Bonilla-Silva's (2017: 
49) analysis of the central frames of contemporary ‘colour-blind’ racism, especially abstract 
liberalism (‘I am all for equal opportunity, that’s why I oppose affirmative action’) and 
minimisation of racism (‘Everyone has almost the same opportunities to succeed.’).  
99 Smail, as quoted in Fisher (2011).   
100 I take the term ‘cruel optimism’ from Berlant (2011).  
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dimension can take; to be afforded choices can be a sign of equal membership of a 
group, but so can being equally denied choices, or equally obligated to perform 
duties. Yet, within our current context, the dominant valued dimension of equal 
treatment is equal formal access to a certain bundle of choices, a symbolic equality 
that comes to erode the value of much else.101  
 
2.4.3. Representative costs  
 
[T]oo many young men in our community continue to make bad choices. 
Growing up, I made a few myself. And I have to confess, sometimes I wrote off 
my own failings as just another example of the world trying to keep a black 
man down. But… there's no longer any room for excuses. I understand that 
there's a common fraternity creed here at Morehouse: ‘Excuses are tools of the 
incompetent, used to build bridges to nowhere and monuments of 
nothingness.’ – Barack Obama102 
 
101 Brown (2015: 18) similarly argues that neoliberal reason ‘hollows out’ contemporary liberal 
democratic ideals and imperils ‘more radical democratic imaginaries.’ It has begun to look like 
what has survived this hollowing out of ideals of a shared, public good are ethno-nationalist 
ideals, heavy with nostalgia for an imagined safer past.    
102 As quoted in Coates (2013). Throughout the thesis I use this quote as emblematic of the ‘pull 
up your pants’ strand of race politics, named due to adherents’ preoccupation with the idea that 
if people of colour would only pull up their pants, they would gain respectability and do better 
in life. (E.g. After George Zimmerman was found not guilty of killing unarmed teenager Trayvon 
Martin, CNN anchor Don Lemon put this action first in his list of five things African Americans 
need to do to improve themselves and their circumstances {Richmond 2015; see also Coates 
2008}). While patterns of racial formation in the UK have important differences, Ansell (1997: 
265) argues that the UK shares with the US a strategy of ‘mystifying complex structural sources 
of social disadvantage via the construction of racialized victims who are themselves blamed for 
their own subordinate social location.’ This can be seen, for example, in political explanations of 
the 2001 race riots by appeal to South Asian people’s tendency to ‘self-segregate’, thus 
undermining community cohesion; one government report on these riots stated that racial and 
economic polarizations were ‘to an extent by choice’ (Rhodes 2009: 3.6). It is evident in Jack 
Straw’s view that Muslim women’s wearing of the niqab hindered community relations (Taylor 
& Dodd 2006). And in David Cameron’s statement that the 2011 riots were about bad parenting 
and criminality, not race or poverty (Cameron 2011b). A classed form of this politics was clearly 
evidenced when Cameron told one of Britain’s poorest constituencies that, ‘We talk about people 
being at risk of poverty, or social exclusion: it’s as if these things—obesity, alcohol abuse, drug 




Choice has representative value when it lets us represent and communicate 
something of value about ourselves and our relation to the world – when what we 
choose says something positive about us and our relationships. I want to choose 
what to give my family for their birthdays because I want my choices to represent 
and communicate how I view them and how I value our relationships.  
 
Clearly, though, choice can represent a whole range of things, both positive and 
negative. My choice to leave the washing up for you may say a host of things about 
me and us, either valuable (I am comfortable enough to do this) or costly (I think this 
menial task better suited to you; I value my own time above yours). This 
representative function is one of the more complicated facets of choice and I will 
manage only a partial account, focusing on three kinds of representative costs in 
particular. I begin by exploring what I call the ‘spiralling effects’ of choice, arguing 
that choice in the context of widespread belief in the magical voluntarism described 
above can work in concert with negative representations of oppressed groups to 
cement and exacerbate their oppression. I then address two more immediate costs 
this representative function can have for members of oppressed groups - those of 
personal and political isolation.  
 
First to the spiralling effects of choice’s representative function. My choices have 
representative value because we extrapolate from them clues about my wider 
character, views, and attachments: my choices are supposed to communicate ‘who I 
am’ in some sense. I argued in Section 2.4.1 that we have reason to expect oppressed 
groups to bear instrumental costs of choice unequally because they choose in 
contexts of harmful social norms and environments instantiating unequal access to 
 
where you are born, your neighbourhood, your school and the choices your parents make – have 
a huge impact. But social problems are often the consequence of the choices people make’ (see 
Stratton 2008).   
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sources of wellbeing and unequal incitements towards harmful choices. The 
representative function of choice means the story does not end there. If we view my 
choice of outcome x as representing who I am, but as a member of an oppressed 
group I am pushed again and again to make choices that are instrumentally costly to 
myself, I will likely soon come to be viewed as a ‘bad chooser’. In this way, bad 
choices come to constitute and reinforce negative representations of oppressed 
groups. This occurs in this section’s guide quote from Barack Obama, where he 
characterises the class of young black men he is addressing as belonging to a 
community of ‘bad choosers.’  
 
Extremely costly ‘spirals’ form when the representation of a community as one that 
makes certain bad choices starts to, in turn, affect the material context and social 
norms relevant to that community. First, negative perceptions of a group as ‘bad 
choosers’ can affect how others treat them in ways that make it even harder for that 
group to begin making the ‘good choices’ necessary to escape these negative 
representations. Fast food advertisers don’t just happen to target advertising on 
black communities in the USA; they do it because they view these communities as 
likely consumers of their products. And when black men are treated as bad or risky 
customers, these kinds of racist representations lead to their exclusion from a wide 
variety of economic goods, services, and opportunities – goods, services, and 
opportunities that are essential to functioning as a ‘good chooser’ within our 
economy.    
 
The expectation that they will make these ‘bad choices’ neither precedes their 
representation as a community of ‘bad choosers’, nor vice versa; rather the 
representation of a specific kind of people and the shrinking opportunities to 
contradict these representations grow together. But though they grow together, these 
representations, incitements and choices are not stable or still: past choices shape 
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how the group is represented, which shifts expectations for future choices, so that 
the loop from choice to representation shifts slightly too.103  
 
Once poor black communities are seen as particularly good targets for this 
advertising, for example, they are subjected to more of it. This shifts their choices 
slightly again, since they then choose under a heavier burden of incitements, 
including a growing number of fast food restaurants and a shrinking pool of heathy 
options on their doorstep. These small, gradual shifts are part of why oppressive 
social relations like racism are often described as having a ‘changing same’ quality.104  
 
These spirals, where certain behaviours (interpreted always, in a neoliberal 
paradigm,  as the making of certain intentional choices) come to mark you as being a 
certain kind of person and vice versa, are what Ian Hacking calls the ‘looping effect’ 
of human kinds.105  I prefer ‘spiralling effect’ simply because a slightly different 
trajectory is always emerging. Such effects will be varied and complex and will 
interact with a whole host of other forces. But we have particular cause to worry 
about these effects within a culture which expects different things from different 
genders, races and classes because it represents certain outcomes as just part of what 
it means to be a member of a certain class, gender or race.  
 
Groups pushed towards instrumentally costly behaviours are often cast as defective, 
stupid, dangerous, or unreliable through convenient and selective amplification of 
these representative costs. During arguments for the ‘cheeseburger bill’, for example, 
the author’s professed aim to protect ‘freedom to choose’ was followed quickly by 
the claim that, ‘people who bring these lawsuits against the food industry don't need 
 
103 On this, I follow Hacking’s (1996: 361) claim that ‘recognition and expectation are of a piece.’  
104 E.g. Bonilla-Silva (2017: 9). 
105 Hacking (1996). 
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a lawyer, they need a psychiatrist.’106 As obese people are cast as lazy and/or 
mentally defective107, similarly mothers are viewed as untrustworthy workers lest 
they put carework before formal employment108, and African American men are 
viewed as dangerous or risky customers and employees, further shutting them out 
of substantive economic equality109.  
 
In short, structural inequalities are swept up into individuals’ choices, via the 
fantasy of their perpetually sovereign wills and their symbolic equality as choosers. 
In this way, the ‘value of choice’ narrative that functions in public political discourse 
does not merely leave inequalities unchallenged; it actively helps cement them.  
 
These spiralling effects also work through self-perception.  What we’ve chosen in the 
past builds our own sense of what we are capable of, what our strengths are, what 
our character is – of who we ‘are’. ‘I picked the wrong present’ soon becomes ‘I am 
bad at picking presents.’ To end, I explore the personal and political consequences of 
this for ‘bad’ or ‘unreliable’ choosers themselves.  
 
The artificial set up of a recent Dove deodorant commercial neatly isolates these 
effects.110 In a shopping centre, Dove mounted a sign above each of the two entry 
doors; above one, a ‘beautiful’ sign, and above the other, an ‘average’ sign. Women 
arriving at this shopping centre were filmed choosing which door to enter through – 
choosing whether to affirm their beauty or averageness – and then interviewed. The 
door choice carries hardly any instrumental or symbolic costs or values, allowing 
their own self-representation and its consequences to take centre stage.  
 
106 ‘Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act’ (2004: 27). 
107 Friedman and Puhl (2012). 
108 Three in four mothers surveyed recently in the UK reported having had a ‘negative or 
possibly discriminatory experience during pregnancy, maternity leave, and/or on return from 
maternity leave’ (Adams et al. 2016). 
109 Chapters 7-8 focus on this phenomenon.  




The set-up implies that women can choose whether to feel beautiful or not and the 
women interviewed appear to accept this: they report feeling different about their 
bodies after choosing a door.111 This seems true to at least the following extent: you 
can occasionally make yourself feel better or worse about your body through sheer 
force of will. But, most interestingly for our purposes, after making this choice the 
women come to see themselves as responsible for their body image. They start to see 
their body image as a series of ongoing choices that they make. One (who chose 
‘average’) says ‘It was my choice. And now I will question myself for the next week, 
maybe month’. Another felt bad after ‘choosing average’ because ‘obviously, I had 
rated myself average, and nobody else.’112  
 
Their apparent ability to briefly control their own body image through choice comes 
to represent an ongoing ability to control this image. Just as Oprah’s success story 
comes to represent the magical voluntarist possibility that we could all be 
billionaires if we would only make the right choices, the momentary successes of 
these women in shaping their self-representations through nothing but their own 
choices come to represent the possibility that they could always do so.    
 
The choice of whether to assert one’s beauty is significant in a context where 
women’s looks are endlessly sensationalised through a near-constant barrage of 
micro-threats and incitements.113 In such a context, it is impossible for most women 
 
111 Dove’s slogan, ‘Choose Beautiful’ (Dove US 2015), reinforces this: feeling beautiful or not is 
simply a choice you can make. 
112 Dove US (2015). One woman does express confusion about what her choice represents, but 
even she maintains a clear distinction between what she believes about herself and the outside 
messages she feels ‘bombarded’ by; she asks ‘Am I choosing because of what’s constantly 
bombarded at me, and what I am being told that I should accept? Or am I choosing because 
that’s what I really believe?’ 
113 A recent advertisement asks women, ‘Are you beach body ready?’ next to a photo of a bikini-
clad model – see Sweney (2015). For accounts of the familial and social pressures women face to 
look a certain way, see Fahs’ (2011) students’ experiences of not adhering to female hair removal 
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to continually ‘choose’ to feel beautiful in any meaningful way – even more so for 
women whose skin colour or hair type do not approximate the racialised beauty 
standards that operate in the Euro-Atlantic West. But once the possibility of making 
one isolated choice of this kind is brought to the fore, these women feel that their 
inability to make the ‘right choice’ on an ongoing basis is their fault, rather than a 
fault of their environment. They know they are capable of ‘choosing beautiful’, so 
why can they not choose it regularly? The representation of an effect of structural 
oppression as just bad personal choice can be a recipe for emotional isolation, self-
directed frustration and confusion for the ‘bad chooser’.  
 
The characterisation of subjects as actively choosing agents above all else 
perpetuates this primacy of choice above context. Crucial to this is the invisibility of 
input costs – especially willpower costs – described earlier, and the indifferent 
equivocation between having ongoing formal opportunities to choose and having 
the resources and context necessary to enable sustained, meaningful choices.  
 
Furthermore, this emotional isolation can carry political consequences. How can one 
see oneself as part of a solidaristic community bound together through shared 
oppression if one attributes one’s situation to bad personal choice? Within such a 
political schema, all anxieties, lacks and needs come to seem personal problems and 
failings – things to feel ashamed of, to try harder on, but not to make public or seek 
wider socio-political change around. In situations of precarity, where the means of 
flourishing (a home, income security, self-esteem, nutritious food, time to rest and to 
care for others etc.) are available but only on the condition that we ‘choose well’, this 
political isolation can be wide-ranging.  
 
norms. The campaign group ‘No More Page 3’ compared every picture of men and women in 
The Sun (the UK’s best-selling newspaper) for 6 months; most men were pictured clothed and 
active, displaying a range of emotions, while most women wore very little and were passive 
(Studio 212, 2014). As for incitements, consider the make-up brand L’Oreal’s famous slogan 




Such depoliticising individualistic isolation is visible in our current political 
conversations. In the economic sphere, those who choose well are ‘strivers’, while 
those who lack or need are ‘skivers’. Women who struggle simply need to ‘lean in’ at 
work, ‘choose beauty’ at home, and think positive.114 And people of colour must let 
go of their ‘excuses’, make use of their inalienable power to choose better, and 
knuckle down.  
 
Rose notes that the left has struggled to articulate a successful counter-narrative to 
this political schema. Doing so requires an alternative ethics and a different 
understanding of the subject that is as compelling as the ethics and understandings 
‘inherent in the rationality of the market and the valorisation of choice.’115  Several 
avenues look promising. First, can we conceive of a subject that is socially 
constructed and instantiates a richer range of behaviour than ‘active choice’ alone? 
Second, can we articulate persuasive egalitarian ideals beyond the bare symbolic, 
formal equality of choice? And third, can we reach beyond the lonely individuation 
of neoliberal politics to bring structural injustices to the fore, without giving up on 
agency altogether? 
 
2.5. Conclusion: Putting Choices in Context  
Choice is central to our dominant political conception of agents. I have tried to 
untangle some of the ways in which the ideal of personal choice functions, focusing 
particularly on the kinds of costs it carries, who bears their brunt, and how they 
interact with other costs and inequalities.116 I argued that choice can and does have 
some serious costs that do not fall equally. Members of oppressed groups often 
 
114 ‘Lean in’ is a reference to Sandberg (2013). See also Rottenberg (2014).  
115 Rose (1996: 160).  
116 The topic is large and I have undoubtedly neglected important parts. In particular, having 
focused so much on costs and inequalities, I trust the large ‘value of choice’ literature to serve as 
necessary balance. 
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shoulder a lion’s share of instrumental costs, due to harmful social norms and 
unequal access to sources of wellbeing. Our symbolic formal equality as active 
choosers is used as a strong counter-narrative to the many substantive inequalities 
that result. In this ubiquitous political bait-and-switch we are tempted in and 
placated by the powerful language of equality while living a hollowed-out distortion 
of this ideal.     
 
The representative functions of choice can then naturalise and entrench these 
substantive inequalities, leaving members of oppressed groups battling negative 
representations that limit their substantive choices even further, as well as causing 
emotional and political isolation. To counter this, we must foster different ways of 
understanding choice, as well as different ways to think about people and their 
environments more generally. An alternative theory and ethics of the subject and 
their socio-political context – one that goes far beyond that of the liberal ‘value of 
choice’ literature – is required to effectively challenge these inequalities.  
 
To avoid these regressive narratives, must egalitarians give up talking of choice and 
responsibility entirely? Though this chapter aimed to scrub away some of the 
glamour and romance of contemporary choice discourse and to put our choices 
firmly back in social context, I do not think we can give up on the concepts of choice 
and responsibility altogether; they are sometimes simply too useful and important. 
We want to be able to say that women are responsible for performing a 
disproportionate share of unpaid carework, or that they do not choose to risk sexual 
assault by what they wear or where they go, for example.  
 
Over the next three chapters, I grapple with this situation. I argue that if egalitarians 
use the concepts of choice and responsibility, they must draw on them in careful and 
critical ways – but that egalitarian political philosophers have failed to do this all too 









3.  THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF 
AGENT RESPONSIBILITY 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
We need to pay more attention to our responsibilities, as well as our rights… I 
want to see people taking greater personal responsibility for managing their 
own health.  
It’s about people choosing to look after themselves better, staying active and 
stopping smoking. Making better choices….  
– Matt Hancock MP, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (2018-
Present)117 
 
The UK Heath Secretary’s views on the need for people to ‘take responsibility’ for 
their own health can be traced back to a lineage of thought that the radical neoliberal 
economist Gary Becker helped develop and took to its extreme. For Becker, ‘most (if 
not all!) deaths are to some extent “suicides”’ since ‘they could have been postponed 
if more resources had been invested in prolonging life’; he thinks that because we all 
fail to make maximally healthy choices, all our deaths are, to some extent at least, 
self-authored.118 Yet Simon Capewell, a professor of public health and policy, called 
the Heath Secretary’s focus on choice and personal responsibility ‘victim blaming.’ 
 
117 The first sentence is a direct quote from a speech by Hancock (2018); the second is from his 
press release summarising the contents of this speech to the media (quoted in Campbell 2018). 
118 Becker (2013: 10).  
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‘People do not ‘choose’ obesity or diabetes or cancer’ Capewell insisted, ‘[t]hey have 
just been overwhelmed by a toxic environment.‘119  
 
In philosophical parlance, Capewell disagrees with Hancock and Becker about 
whether or not people are ‘agent responsible’ for their bad health. I am agent 
responsible for those outcomes I ‘author’ – those which ‘stem appropriately from’ or 
‘suitably reflect’ my agency.120 Agent responsibility, then, is a philosophical term of 
art designed to systematically unpack and carefully articulate the fuzzy folk concept 
of ‘choice.’ 
 
In Chapter 2, I argued that contemporary political discourse about choice often 
functions to reproduce, entrench, and then justify, structural inequalities along the 
lines of race, gender, and class. I ended the chapter with the following worry: how 
can egalitarians avoid complicity with these inegalitarian functions, given that 
relinquishing use of the concepts of choice and agent responsibility entirely seems an 
unattractive and nigh on impossible prospect? Chapters 3-6 address this worry. In 
these, I argue that though egalitarian political philosophers have too often fallen into 
uncritical uses of choice and/or agent responsibility, this can be avoided with a better 
understanding of how these concepts work.121  
 
My argument goes as follows: Chapter 3 introduces the concept of agent 
responsibility and its role in egalitarian thought. Here, I argue that as far as political 
philosophers investigate the concept at all, their common apolitical understandings 
are incomplete – and in ways not amenable to a quick and simple fix. This chapter 
 
119 Campbell (2018). 
120 Knight and Stemplowska (2011b: 12–13); Vallentyne (2008: 58). 
121 In Chapter 6 I advocate we decentre the concepts of choice and agent responsibility from 
egalitarian approaches to distributive justice; we may still use them but they cannot and should 
not serve as the primary or foundational motors of our distributive theories.  
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therefore illustrates the need for deeper investigation into the mechanisms of agent 
responsibility.  
 
Chapter 4 undertakes this deeper investigation. There, I identify three 
indeterminacies within the standard definition of agent responsibility. All three 
indeterminacies are obscured by examples addressing only two possibly relevant 
agents responsible for two entirely separate outcomes, but all three re-emerge with 
vengeance within any actual political community. I analyse how we resolve these 
indeterminacies in our everyday, intuitive agent responsibility attributions.  
 
This approach then gives me the tools necessary to suggest an alternative 
understanding of agent responsibility in Chapter 5 – an understanding that 
recognises the concept’s important and unavoidable ethico-political dimensions. I 
show how this alternative understanding can resolve the indeterminacies outlined in 
Chapter 4, and how it reveals the possibility of more egalitarian conceptions of 
choice and responsibility than those outlined in Chapters 2-4. Finally, in Chapter 6, I 
tie up the threads of this long argument and explore its implications for how 
political philosophers can and should use the concepts of choice and agent 
responsibility.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, some of the costs of choice can be put down to the 
internalisation of harmful norms by the choosers themselves. But, as I emphasised, 
this is only one part of the story. Examining the workings of agent responsibility 
over the next four chapters reveals how this concept – and its folk parallel, ‘choice’ – 
are able to play such a central and persuasive role in inegalitarian and conservative 
political thought, functioning as a powerful tool for displacing issues of structural 
injustice from political discourse. These chapters also suggest ways for egalitarians 




3.2. Agent Responsibility in Politics and Philosophy  
In the last few decades advanced liberal democracies have pushed a 
‘responsibilising’ mode of government.122 Within this mode of government, a focus 
on individual responsibility displaces structural issues of economic distribution and 
poverty: inequalities are portrayed as justified because they stem from failures of 
agent responsibility. For example, those claiming ‘job seekers’ allowance’ in the UK 
must demonstrate they are actively seeking work and willing to accept any job.123 In 
this way, receipt of state benefits is made conditional on lacking any agent 
responsibility for unemployment, with agent responsibility for one’s unemployment 
assumed until proved otherwise.  
 
Just as the concept of choice does much work in public political discourse, its 
philosophical parallel, agent responsibility, does much work within political 
philosophy. The term was developed within ‘responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism’ 
– a dominant contemporary strand of egalitarian thought that places significant 
weight on the moral significance of choice.124 Responsibility-sensitive egalitarians 
view agent responsibility as the ‘first concept at the heart of debates about 
distributive justice and responsibility.’125  
 
122 Rose (1996, 2000). See Chapter 2, Section 4 for discussion.  
123 UK Government (2013: 2). 
124 For an overview of contemporary responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism see Knight and 
Stemplowska (2011a). 
125 Knight and Stemplowska (2011b: 12). There are many different forms of responsibility-
sensitive egalitarianism and the arguments of the next four chapters do not apply to every form 
of this theory. In particular, they do not apply to those interpretations of responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism which are grounded in concepts other than choice or agent responsibility. For 
example, my arguments are not aimed at ‘desert-catering’ interpretations, since these theories 
hold that desert, rather than choice, grounds consequential responsibility (e.g. Temkin 2011). Nor 
do they apply to ‘all-luck egalitarianism’ – an interpretation upon which responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism’s ‘anti-luckism’ takes precedence over its ‘pro-choicism’ (on these distinctions see 
footnote 25, p.17); accordingly, all-luck egalitarians deny any relevant distinction between option 
luck and brute luck (for discussion see Segall 2010: 45-57). I therefore address my arguments to a 
specific group of ‘pro-choicist’ theorists – those who see choice as a primary ground of 
consequential responsibility. 




These theorists hold that to treat people as equals – to show them equal respect and 
concern – we must equalise their distributive share of opportunity for either welfare 
or resources.126 They centre the concept of choice because they think that not to do so 
unjustly punishes the prudent and hardworking to care for the lazy, unfairly 
ignoring the moral significance of agent responsibility for outcomes.127 Such theorists 
therefore often start from the idea that, under conditions of initial equality of 
opportunity, agent responsibility for a benefit or burden justifies leaving one to bear 
or enjoy that benefit or burden.128 Agent responsibility is thus seen as a key 
determinant of just distributions, and attributions of agent responsibility as the raw 
data that a theory of justice must translate into just shares.129  
 
Responsibility-sensitive egalitarians do not much discuss structural injustices of race, 
gender, and class. Most likely this is because, like all philosophers, they choose to 
specialise by working on some questions while acknowledging that there are other 
important questions they are not addressing. I have sympathy with this; we are all 
 
126 They therefore think the ‘currency’ of egalitarian justice – the good of which people are 
entitled equal shares to – is either opportunity for welfare or opportunity for resources. On the 
‘currency’ question, see Cohen (1989). The comfortable ease with which many egalitarians 
accepted this economistic framing of distributive justice is perhaps one example of how our 
neoliberal context has converted ‘the distinctly political character, meaning, and operation of 
democracy’s constituent elements into economic ones’ (Brown 2015: 17). In contrast to critical 
approaches to raced relations which use economistic objectifications to reveal and denaturalise 
raced distributions and critique raced social relations (e.g. ‘whiteness as property’ {Harris 1993}; 
‘the wages of whiteness’ {Roediger 1999}), this responsibility-sensitive egalitarian objectification 
often naturalises structural inequalities (as argued in Chapter 4; I discuss Harris and Roediger in 
Chapter 7, Section 3.3, and Chapter 8, Section 4).  
127 E.g. Segall (2013: 44). For a counter-argument see Phillips (2004). 
128 Stemplowska (2009: 237) calls this the ‘luck egalitarian principle’. Though both appeal to the 
justificatory force of agent responsibility to determine who deserves what, responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism is not equivalent to political responsibilisation practices since responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarians require this initial ‘equal opportunities’ baseline for agent responsibility to justify an 
outcome. 
129 The term has seeped into other parts of political philosophy in place of the more common 
‘choice’ too. For example, one prominent view in just war theory states that a person’s agent 
responsibility for imposing risks on others determines whether she has alienated her own right 
not to be harmed. See Lazar (2009: 702). 
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forced to leave important topics out of our work for a lack of time or space to 
adequately address them. However, this position assumes it is possible to undertake 
meaningful work about responsibility and equality without theorising (in much 
depth, at least) about structural injustices like these. Why might philosophers think 
this? Looking to the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian literature, two main 
assumptions appear to underly this belief.     
 
First, most of these philosophers start their theorising from an imagined egalitarian 
baseline from which everybody begins their adult lives with access to equal 
opportunities; injustices like racism, sexism, and classism are assumed incompatible 
with such a baseline. For example, Ronald Dworkin simply stipulates that before 
egalitarian redistributive measures take place we must guarantee people’s tastes and 
preferences are not prejudiced along racial lines.130 He explains that if people suffer 
because of others’ racial prejudices, this violates his requirement that peoples’ tastes 
be free of prejudice. (In contrast, his egalitarianism is ‘neutral’ about those people 
disadvantaged because their skills are not valued by others and so cannot command 
as much market income.131)  
 
Second, some responsibility-sensitive egalitarians seem to believe that structural 
injustices of race, gender, and class can easily be rectified through proper application 
of their preferred choice/compensation framework. In other words, they do not 
spend much time theorising these topics directly because they think that their work 
on equality and responsibility can solve problems of structural injustice quite 
straightforwardly. Carl Knight, for example, clearly takes such injustices very 
seriously. However, his discussion of them remains brief because he believes they 
 
130 Dworkin (2002: 161–62). Dworkin (2003) rejects being labelled as a luck egalitarian. I include 
him in my discussion because, though he may not object to unlucky inequalities tout court, 
choice-sensitivity remains central to his theoretical approach. 
131 Dworkin (2002: 162). I am deeply sceptical of this approach but my reasons for scepticism rely 
on arguments I have yet to make; see Chapter 6, Section 2. 
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can be easily translated into his responsibility-sensitive choice/compensation 
framework.  
 
During his short discussion about luck egalitarianism and race, he expresses surprise 
at Iris Marion Young’s concern that luck egalitarianism cannot adequately grasp the 
problems of structural injustice.132 Knight is confused: why would anyone worry that 
luck egalitarians would not take racial inequalities incredibly seriously, since ‘one 
could hardly choose better cases to bring out the attractions of luck egalitarianism!’133 
According to Knight, race, like social class, is ‘one of the most obvious sources of 
responsibility-insensitive inequalities, and one of the easiest to rectify.’134 This 
welcome recognition of the centrality of racial injustice is paired with the strange 
claim that they are easy to rectify. The latter assertion appears to rest on Knight’s 
confidence that responsibility and luck can easily be distinguished in non-racist 
ways.  
 
Yet there are reasons to wonder whether things are as straightforward as Knight 
suggests. As argued, we need only look at contemporary politics to see how 
discourses about ‘choice’ often function to reproduce and justify structural 
inequalities along the lines of race, gender, and class. And, crucially, it cannot be 
taken for granted that philosophical approaches to agent responsibility will manage 
to avoid being tainted by similar problems without a healthy dose of caution. To see 
this, note that a few pages earlier in the same chapter Knight suggests using IQ tests 
to determine whether people are capable of agent responsibility, seemingly unaware 
of the long history of IQ tests being used as instruments of racial (and classed) 
control and violence.135  
 
132 See Young (2011b).  
133 Knight (2009: 149). 
134 Knight (2009: 149). 




IQ tests have been used to justify inequalities along the lines of class and race, to 
reinforce these inequalities by ‘shunting vast numbers of working class and minority 
children onto inferior and dead-end educational tracks’, and even to validate 
compulsory sterilisation laws.136 They have proved so useful in shoring up racial and 
class hierarchies because of the prevalent underlying assumption that they measure 
only the inherent, fixed intelligence of the individual measured.137 By assuming a 
naturalised, individualistic conception of intelligence these tests disguise judgements 
based on structural sexism, racism, and classism as politically neutral ‘scientific’ 
diagnoses.138 This makes them well-suited to the justification and naturalisation of 
racist social structures, relations, and distributions.139  
 
Therefore, Knight leans on IQ tests as a racially neutral measure of agents’ capacity 
for agent responsibility in the face of worrying evidence that it is nothing of the sort. 
This raises questions about his faith in the ease with which we can arrive at 
politically neutral (and specifically, non-racist, non-sexist, non-classist) ways to 
determine who is agent responsible for what. It also suggests one reason for 
avoiding a strict division of labour between ideal and non-ideal theorising on this 
 
136 Rose et al. (1990: 87).  
137 For example, during World War I, the American Army tested immigrants’ IQs by asking them 
questions about US baseball teams, tennis rules, and manufacturers of US consumer goods (Rose 
et al. 1990: 88).  
138 Young’s original argument suggests that (among other things) the ‘distributive paradigm’ 
within political philosophy is animated by an overly individualistic worldview which 
depoliticises wider institutional structures and helps ‘forestall criticism of relations of power and 
culture in welfare capitalist society’ (2011a: 75). Chapters 4-5 can be read as a suggestion that the 
insufficiently politicised approaches to choice within one contemporary strand of the distributive 
paradigm - responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism – retains this harmful individualism and its 
depoliticising effects. My route to this conclusion runs through analysis of the concept of choice 
rather than distributions however, unlike Young’s arguments.    
139 Nor are such naturalisations confined to the past. Saini, documenting the recent resurgence of 
‘race science’, was told by professor of biochemistry, Gerhard Meisenberg that ‘some countries 
are too cognitively challenged to prosper, that essentially they are poor because they are stupid. 
His only evidence was historical IQ test scores’ (Saini 2019: 159). Meisenberg is not the fringe 
figure we would wish him to be: he sat on the editorial board of the peer-reviewed academic 
journal Intelligence until 2018 (Saini 2018). 
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topic: a lack of awareness of the real-world mechanisms of structural injustice can 
lead to idealised theories which, if implemented, risk cementing problematic 
inequalities rather than challenging them – in ways entirely at odds with their aims 
and motivations.140 The IQ case alone cannot support this broad claim about the need 
to avoid strict ideal/non-ideal divisions of labour on this topic, but it does suggest 
that this claim warrants further investigation.  
 
Knight is not the only theorist who portrays structural injustices as easily rectified by 
appeal to responsibility-sensitive egalitarian frameworks. Asked how his theory 
handles gender inequalities, Dworkin argued that ‘if a woman were willing to take a 
pill that would transform her into a man, then she would need to be compensated 
for being a woman’ – if she would not choose to take the pill, she must not envy men 
to a sufficient degree to warrant compensation.141 Shlomi Segall similarly argues that 
someone denied a job because of her skin colour but offered an adequate 
compensation package – defined as one that they would choose above the job – no 
longer suffers racist discrimination.142  Like Knight, both these theorists therefore 
think that appeal to agent responsibility (or hypothetical agent responsibility) can 
adequately solve issues of structural injustice.  
 
In sum, then, it is certainly not the case that responsibility-sensitive egalitarians 
condone racism, classism, or sexism. Rather, they often assume these issues away in 
their idealisation, to be dealt with by other theorists. When they do discuss these 
structural injustices, theorists like Knight, Dworkin, and Segall portray them as 
straightforwardly solvable through recourse to agent responsibility. However, 
 
140 It might be argued that since Knight is undertaking ideal theorising, it is unfair to consider the 
effects of his proposals in the real (racist) world. I return to the possibility of non-racist, non-
classist IQ tests in Chapter 6, Section 2.1; for now I note only that if ideal theorists do not intend 
for their theories to have real world application I am unsure why they make concrete policy 
proposals like this.  
141 As reported in Robeyns (2003: 541).  
142 Segall (2013: 126–27). 
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Knight’s IQ example suggests that what might at first look like elegant ways to 
determine agent responsibility are in fact tied up with the very structural injustices 
we are concerned to combat. Given that, as argued, responsibilisation has become 
central to the reproduction of real-world structural inequalities, we therefore have 
strong political and philosophical reasons to explore the concept of agent 
responsibility further. Specifically, it is worth exploring how exactly we tell when a 
particular person is agent responsible for a particular outcome.  
 
Political-philosophical analyses of agent responsibility  
Recall that I am agent responsible for those outcomes I ‘author’ – those which ‘stem 
appropriately from’ or ‘suitably reflect’ my agency.143 Surprisingly, despite the 
prominence of agent responsibility within egalitarian political philosophy, the 
opaque notion of authorship the concept rests on, and the significance of its folk 
parallel ‘choice’ within real world politics, political philosophers have not much 
interrogated its workings.  
 
Instead, theorists tend to take one of three broad (and overlapping) approaches to 
determining who is agent responsible for what.144 First, some briefly acknowledge 
the complexity of working out exactly what we author before bracketing the issue.145 
Let’s call this the non-analysis. There is absolutely nothing wrong with the non-
analysis in and of itself; we all have to bracket certain issues in order to focus on our 
chosen topics.  It is only that we now have reason to think this particular bracketed 
topic warrants further investigation.  
 
 
143 Knight and Stemplowska (2011b: 12–13); Vallentyne (2008: 58). 
144 McTernan’s (2015) ‘practice-based’ view of responsibility provides an important exception. 
However, she does not analyse agent responsibility specifically; rather her account is designed to 
capture an explicitly moralised form of responsibility which implies accountability and licences 
reactive attitudes of praise and blame (see McTernan 2015: 15, footnote 1).    
145 E.g. Segall (2013: 3); Stemplowska (2009: 240); Tan (2008: 669). Nothing stands in the way of 
these philosophers accepting my political account of agent responsibility.  
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Second, some political philosophers defend this bracketing by implying that analysis 
of the concept lies beyond our remit because the term is borrowed from outside 
political philosophy. For example, Gerald Cohen thinks putting agent responsibility 
at the centre of distributive justice may well ‘subordinate’ political philosophy to 
‘metaphysical questions.’146 Richard Arneson suggests we ‘leave this issue to the free 
will and determinism metaphysicians’, and others echo his suggestion that the 
problem of understanding what we are agent responsible for is reducible to the 
metaphysical problem of free will.147  
 
Because of this, Knight proposes that a committee of metaphysicians oversee public 
policy decisions involving agent responsibility attributions.148 In a rare article 
directly engaged with this topic, Peter Vallentyne suggests agent responsibility be 
calculated using ‘objective’ probability changes, and labels his approach a 
‘metaphysical (or ledger) conception.’149 When discussed at all, then, the job of 
analysing agent responsibility appears to sit well outside political philosophers’ 
remit and expertise. Let’s call this the metaphysical analysis. (Note that the conception 
of metaphysics invoked here appears to preclude legitimate overlap between 
normative political theory and metaphysics.150)  
 
Third, other philosophers work from a kind of ‘common-sense’ account of agent 
responsibility. Dworkin, for example, relies on ‘ordinary ethical experience’ to 
distinguish ‘choice’ from ‘circumstance.’151 This is because he wants to carry the 
 
146 Cohen (1989: 934). 
147 Arneson (2004: 10). Knight (2006: 185) likewise suggests that a solution to the free will 
problem would fully dictate who is owed what. Smilansky (1997: 157-158) argues that 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian justice 'crucially depends' on our answer to the free will 
problem (not mentioning anything else it may depend on). 
148 Knight (2006). 
149 Vallentyne (2008: 59). 
150 On this see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.  
151 Dworkin (2002: 289-90; 323). 
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‘familiar structure of our personal morality… into politics intact.’152 Let’s call this the 
common-sense analysis.153  
 
Though some philosophers formally espouse either the non-analysis or the 
metaphysical analysis, many nonetheless draw on examples involving common-
sense attributions of agent responsibility in order to build their theories of justice.154 
This suggests an (understandable) prevailing assumption that even if we may not 
know exactly who is agent responsible for what, we can expect this to roughly follow 
the common-sense analysis.  Because of this assumption, in practice, the common-
sense analysis of agent responsibility underlies much responsibility-sensitive 
theorising.155  
 
Over the next three chapters, and against both the metaphysical and the common-sense 
analyses, I build an alternative political analysis of agent responsibility. I argue that, far 
from being beyond the scope of political philosophy, it is vital that we recognise the 
important and inescapable political dimensions of this concept. One of the upshots of 
my account is that we cannot leave determinations of agent responsibility solely to 
 
152 Dworkin (2002: 294). 
153 I include Roemer’s (1993) approach in this category; he suggests we collectively vote on what 
constitutes a responsibility-undermining factor (e.g. ethnicity, family history, etc.) and then use 
these votes to assess groups of peoples’ responsibility for outcomes.  Though he calls his 
approach ‘political not metaphysical’ (Roemer 1993: 149), its political aspect seems to begin and 
end with asking society to vote in this way. Because of this, his conception of responsibility is 
explicitly designed to reflect common sense responsibility attributions rather than to encourage 
any substantive political critique of these.  
154 E.g. Knight (2009) who argues for the metaphysical account (178-188) but frequently theorises 
about responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism on the basis of common-sense authorship 
attributions (e.g. 6-7; 17; 137-140; 149). Segall appeals to the non-analysis (2013: 3) but then goes 
on to rely on intuitive common-sense judgements of authorship (e.g. 45-63); Stemplowska does 
likewise (e.g. 2009: 240). Cohen endorses the metaphysical analysis but also argues using 
common-sense authorship attributions (e.g. 1989: 936). 
155 Exceptions include those luck egalitarian moments of theorising the normative consequences 
of hard determinism (e.g. Knight 2006: 179; Arneson 1989: 86-87 - who then quickly states that 'in 
practice… rough and ready judgements' of responsibility and opportunity can be made). 
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common sense or to metaphysicians; any political philosophers drawing on the concept 
must engage in debates about who is agent responsible for what. 
 
 To make this argument, I bracket other important questions. For example, I here 
simply accept that the performance of intentional action captures what we mean by 
‘agency’. I do not discuss the metaphysical problem of free will.156 Nor can I do justice 
to debates over differing metaphysical accounts of causation.157 I assume the possibility 
of causation by omission in cases where an agent has a responsibility as obligation they 
fail to fulfil; if I am obligated to water your plants while you are away because I 
promised to, I author your plants’ deaths through my omission to follow through. 
When I talk of responsibility without specifying which kind, I mean agent 
responsibility. And, since I start from a definition that states I am agent responsible for 
those outcomes I ‘author’, I use ‘x authors y’ to mean just that ‘x is agent responsible for 
y.’158 
 
3.3. A Standard Analysis of Agent Responsibility  
I am agent responsible for something if I ‘author’ it or ‘bring it about qua free agent.’159  
Attempts to taxonomise the many slippery meanings of responsibility distinguish 
agent responsibility from four other kinds: causal (I caused x), consequential (the 
burdens/benefits that stem from x are justly mine to shoulder/enjoy), moral (I am 
blameworthy/praiseworthy for x), and responsibility as obligation (I have obligations 
regarding x).160 You may cause the window to break but if I pushed you into it, you do 
not seem agent responsible – I brought it about, not you. It seems unfair to charge you 
 
156 Not because I think it has no relevance, but to highlight the many other issues which have 
enormous relevance to determinations of agent responsibility yet are almost always overlooked.  
157 E.g. Schaffer (2016).  
158 Knight and Stemplowska (2011b: 12–13).  
159 Knight and Stemplowska (2011b: 12–13). ‘Bringing about qua free agent’ is distinguished from 
causal responsibility through the involvement of agency. 
160 Knight and Stemplowska (2011b: 11).  
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for its repair, suggesting you lack consequential responsibility too.161 If you promise to 
ensure I stop breaking windows, you acquire a responsibility as obligation: you 
become responsible for keeping me in check.  
 
Causal responsibility is necessary but not sufficient for agent responsibility. As shown 
by your lack of authorship of the broken window, the outcome must also ‘stem 
appropriately’ from or ‘suitably reflect’ your agency.162 Because agency is often held to 
consist in the performance of intentional actions, one way to ensure this connection is 
to add an intention requirement so that one is responsible for x if and only if one 
caused and intended x.  
 
However, in paradigmatic political-philosophical examples of agent responsibility the 
agent – a mountaineer recklessly climbing without insurance163, a motorbike rider 
wearing no helmet to feel the wind in his hair164, or a lazy beach bum165 - does not intend 
their resulting precarity or injuries. They intend to climb mountains, drive without a 
helmet, or spend a day surfing, and may even explicitly hope not to become injured or 
destitute. As they are nevertheless held paradigmatically responsible for their need of 
support, the definition is commonly broadened by adding some form of ‘reasonable 
foreseeability’ condition.166 It is this extension beyond directly intended outcomes that 
makes the concept unique.167 
 
161 If I intentionally pushed you, I seem morally responsible for the breakage. But moral and 
agent responsibility can come apart since some outcomes do not seem to have a moral character; 
you are agent responsible for your latest self-portrait, though likely not morally blameworthy or 
praiseworthy for it. 
162 Knight and Stemplowska (2011b: 12); Vallentyne (2008: 58). 
163 Stemplowska (2009: 252). 
164 Fleurbaey (1995: 40). The same is true of many paradigm public political invocations of 
responsibility; no one intends to get diabetes, for example.  
165 Hirose and Segall (2016). 
166 E.g. Stemplowska (2013b: 404); Vallentyne (2008: 61); Dworkin (2002: 73); Rakowski (1991: 74).  
167 Hence my focus on the class of cases where an agent is causally responsible for a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of an intended action. Responsibility stemming from intentional action, 
rather than intentional action itself, is my primary concern. The political dimensions of intention 
have been persuasively documented elsewhere – e.g. Bartky (1988); Chambers (2010).        




It is fairly standard, then, to assume a definition which states that one is agent 
responsible for x if and only if one was causally responsible for x and x was either 
intentional or a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an intentional action.168 Let’s 
start by interpreting the causal and reasonable foreseeability conditions of this 
standard model to be apolitical. This seems especially plausible in the case of the 
causal condition. Causation, after all, is ‘commonly held to be a paradigmatic 
example of a natural and so entirely non-normative relation.’169  
 
Note that the reasonable foreseeability condition is hypothetical – the agent need not 
have actually foreseen the possible consequence. Rather, we judge it reasonable to 
expect their foreseeing it. This condition is therefore indeterminate until we decide 
which consequences it is reasonable to expect agents to foresee stemming from their 
actions. An apolitical understanding of reasonable foreseeability would count all and 
only what would be foreseen by a reasonably competent and knowledgeable agent, 
where these competencies and this knowledge are based on average levels of skill, 
effort, knowledge, and common sense.170 This apolitical understanding would 
maintain that, though normative in the loose sense that it involves social norms, this 
map of foreseeability is nonetheless not political; it just reflects the way the world is. 
So far, so standard. However, I now turn to a case which reveals things to be more 
complicated than this standard analysis of agent responsibility can account for.   
 
 
168 Many theorists adopt similar definitions of agent responsibility - e.g. Stemplowska (2013b: 
404); Vallentyne (2008: 61); Dworkin (2002: 73); Rakowski (1991: 74).  
169 McGrath (2005: 125). 
170 It might be thought a better apolitical characterisation understands an outcome as reasonably 
foreseeable if we would generally expect agents to foresee that outcome given the totality of that 
particular agent’s evidence. However, this understanding cannot explain cases where we assume 
the agent in question will undertake a certain amount of investigation before acting but they fail 
to do so. For example, someone who turns into oncoming traffic because they neglect to check 
whether the road was clear will not have evidence of the oncoming traffic; despite this, the 
resulting crash is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of her actions because we expect people 
to check whether the coast is clear before pulling out.  
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The case of sexual assault:  
 
The sexual assault had been so clear, but instead, here I was at the trial, 
answering questions like: How old are you? How much do you weigh? What 
did you eat that day? Well what did you have for dinner? Who made dinner? 
Did you drink with dinner? No, not even water? When did you drink? How 
much did you drink? What container did you drink out of? Who gave you the 
drink? How much do you usually drink? Who dropped you off at this party? 
At what time? But where exactly? What were you wearing?... 
Regretting drinking is not the same as regretting sexual assault. We were both 
drunk, the difference is I did not take off your pants and underwear, touch you 
inappropriately, and run away. That’s the difference.171 
 
Suppose a woman goes to a bar alone to have a couple of drinks, knowing that doing 
so is risky. On leaving she is followed and sexually assaulted. Is she co-responsible 
for this assault? Our current definition suggests she is, for what woman gets to 
drinking age without being warned frequently that women who have been drinking, 
or who go home alone (or who wear revealing clothes, etc.) put themselves at risk of 
sexual assault?172 Rape statistics are often used to threaten women into this kind of 
‘healthy caution.’173 If we think it common-sense to expect that drinking alone while 
female carries risks of sexual assault, then our current approach counts assault as a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of acting thus.  
 
171 Extract from the victim statement in the sexual assault case against Stanford student Brock 
Turner – as quoted in Baker (2016).  
172 On drinking see, e.g., Smith (2014) and Schulte (2015). Similarly, the police and judiciary often 
highlight the assault risks involved in women doing activities like using headphones (BBC News 
2018), accepting a drink at a party (Petter 2019), being drunk (Guardian Staff 2017), or walking 
home alone (Keeling 2015). A recent survey suggests many would go further than assigning only 
causal or agent responsibility: 38% of men and 34% of women hold a woman who goes out late 
wearing a short skirt, gets drunk, and is sexually assaulted as partly or wholly to blame for the 
assault (Taaffe 2017: 10). 
173 Hall (2004: 8, 11).  




Mainstream political philosophy appears to agree with public political discourse 
here. For example, in a similar case (where a woman risks a mini-skirt rather than 
lone drinking) Zofia Stemplowska holds our woman agent responsible for her 
disadvantage ‘to some degree.’174 In other words, our woman is deemed to co-author 
the assault to some unspecified extent. (Importantly, Stemplowska does not think 
this degree of co-responsibility justifies the resulting disadvantage.175) Similarly, 
Vallentyne holds agents responsible for outcomes to the extent that their 
autonomous choice increased the chance of the outcome and they ‘should reasonably 
have’ believed this to be so.176 Because of this, women who knowingly risk drinking 
alone would again be held to co-author any resultant sexual assault.177  
 
Yet feminists insist that women are not co-responsible for such outcomes. Instead, 
we assert things like: ‘What happened to me had nothing to do with where I walked 
or what I wore, and everything to do with the actions of two men’;178 or, ‘No matter 
what someone has done or failed to do, they did not cause their sexual assault.’179 
Our current definition of agent responsibility struggles to make any sense of such 
claims; it assumes we are responsible for all commonly foreseeable outcomes of our 
intentional actions, therefore dismissing the feminist contention that our assault 
 
174 Stemplowska (2009: 245). In fairness, this understanding of responsibility is far from unique 
within responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism; unlike most, Stemplowska simply acknowledges 
its more controversial consequences.  
175 Stemplowska (2009: 244-245). In this she departs from other, ‘purer’ responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarian understandings of agent responsibility, since on her view agent responsibility is only 
necessary, not sufficient, to justify disadvantages. She argues that agent responsibility is only 
sufficient to justify disadvantages if an appropriately egalitarian ‘opportunity structure’ is in 
place: if our society allows only a certain range of choices and connects these choices to outcomes 
in ways acceptable to egalitarians. I contrast Stemplowksa’s approach with mine in Chapter 5, 
Section 2.1.  
176 Vallentyne (2008: 61, 64). 
177 In fact, due to a quirk of Vallentyne’s (2008: 70-71) account, the more fearful and indisposed 
towards going to the bar they were, the greater the degree of their co-authorship of the assault.  
178 Remeikis (2018). 
179 Eastern Michigan University (2018).  
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victim does not co-author her assault.  
 
Because I take these feminist claims about authorship seriously, I assume that our 
understanding of agent responsibility should be able to accommodate them.180 One 
obvious way to improve our definition in order to make room for the feminist 
understanding of this case is to politicise the reasonable foreseeability condition in 
some way. (The idea that the reasonable foreseeability requirement might have some 
political dimensions seems far more plausible than the idea that the causal 
responsibility requirement does, after all.) Two possible political readings of this 
foreseeability requirement suggest themselves.  
 
First, we might claim that knowledge is dispersed unevenly in societies in ways 
which reflect political power and status hierarchies. What is common sense to some 
or most people may not be commonly known to certain marginalised groups, who 
are then held to unfair ‘reasonable foreseeability’ standards. Take classed forms of 
knowledge about career advancement, for example: perhaps many middle- and 
upper-class people know that ‘it’s good to be right, but it’s better to be funny’ in 
prestigious industries like journalism, but few working class people know this.181 If a 
working class person misses a promotion because they avoid all humour in their 
interview, we want to be able to fight the idea that he should reasonably have 
foreseen this outcome.  
 
This political dimension of reasonable foreseeability is certainly important, since 
‘practices of ignorance are often intertwined with practices of oppression and 
 
180 In Chapter 5, I am able to give a full, reasoned defence of feminist authorship claims regarding 
sexual assault; for now, I assume they are correct in order to suggest the need for a deep-
reaching overhaul of our approach to responsibility attributions.  
181 As one journalist told researchers analysing the UK’s class pay gap (Friedman & Laurison 
2019). 
3.  THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF AGENT RESPONSIBILITY 
67 
 
exclusion.’182 However this politicisation of reasonable foreseeability does not help 
shed light on our assault case. There, the problem is not that women do not know 
the risks of drinking alone; we know these risks all too well and yet still – so us 
feminists insist – our woman does not co-author the assault.  
 
Therefore, to deal with the assault case it is necessary to consider a second, deeper 
politicisation of the reasonable foreseeability condition. I end this chapter by 
suggesting that this deeper politicisation of reasonable foreseeability in fact reveals 
the need to politicise agent responsibility’s causal requirement as well. Specifically, 
this case suggests that we must add to our understanding of agent responsibility the 
idea that common-sense knowledge about what causes sexual assault itself reflects 
problematic power hierarchies. While the dispersal of knowledge can certainly be of 
political concern, the assault case suggests that the relevant common-sense 
knowledge itself has important political dimensions – or so I will now argue.  
 
To see this first note that in the assault case we tend to single out just the perpetrator 
and the victim as the only plausible authors. Their actions, and theirs alone, 
commonly constitute the focus of our investigations when deciding who is 
responsible for the assault. Yet though our woman’s decision to knowingly take a 
risk causally contributed to this outcome in a foreseeable way, so did countless other 
intentional actions and omissions barely ever mentioned in such cases: the bar owner 
risked opening his bar that night, despite our knowledge that alcohol can facilitate 
such assaults;183 the local authority made licensing and policing decisions in the face 
of similar knowledge; the perpetrator’s parents trusted their adult son with 
independence despite knowing that 99% of perpetrators of sexual assault are men;184 
 
182 Tuana and Sullivan (2006: 1). 
183 Abbey et al. (2004). 
184 See Flatley (2018) for UK statistics on the gender of (reported) sexual assault perpetrators. Men 
who commit sexual assault are a small minority; nonetheless, here I draw on an idea similar to 
Crabb (2015) when she argues that ‘a woman gets killed by her male partner every single week, 
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the perpetrator’s school failed adequately to teach him the importance of consent; 
and the victim’s school failed to teach her more caution; the list could go on.  
 
All these actions and omissions form necessary parts of the causal web leading up to 
the assault in question, and all these agents could have foreseen the risks their 
actions ran. It is common knowledge that alcohol facilitates sexual assault – after all, 
this fact is frequently what prefaces warnings to women not to drink185 – and that 
men are far more likely to commit assault than women. Yet we would never say that 
the bar owner, the perpetrator’s parents, or the victim’s school co-authored the 
assault. This is because we do not tend to think of the actions of the bar owner, the 
parents, or the schools as being causally responsible for the assault. At most, they are 
background enabling conditions of it. Asked what caused the assault, we would 
barely ever say ‘oh, the perpetrator’s parents granted him normal adult levels of 
independence’ or ‘well, the bar-owner opened his bar that night.’  
 
In contrast, the idea that women who take unnecessary risks (like drinking alone 
while female or wearing a short skirt) and perpetrators committing sexual assault 
are causally responsible for the outcome of sexual assaults are familiar.186 In this 
way, common-sense ideas of reasonable foreseeability in fact rely on common-sense 
ideas about causal responsibility: if we commonly think action x risks causing or will 
 
and somehow that doesn't qualify as a tools-down national crisis even though if a man got killed 
by a shark every week we'd probably arrange to have the ocean drained.’ In England and Wales, 
roughly 11 of the most serious sexual offences (rape, attempted rape or sexual assault by 
penetration) occur every hour – it is thus similarly epidemic (Rape Crisis n.d.). Just as Crabb’s 
point does not rely on the majority of sharks killing people but rather on the harm that those 
who do kill cause, my point does not rely on the majority of men committing assault. Nor am I 
arguing that we ought to deny men normal adult independence; I think most of us would agree 
that the costs of granting men full independence (i.e. sexual assaults) are outweighed by the costs 
of not doing so (i.e. half the population deprived of their basic liberties). I am simply 
highlighting the many others who knowingly took risks (however small) leading up to the 
assault outcome, yet who never get considered as its co-authors (to any degree), and to explore 
why this selection works as it does.  
185 E.g. Smith (2014); Schulte (2015). 
186 For examples of this familiar idea of the causes of sexual assault see footnote 172 (p.64).  
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cause outcome y, we will think it reasonable to foresee that doing action x risks or 
will result in outcome y.  
 
This fits feminist statements about assault too. Recall, for example, ‘what happened 
to me had nothing to do with where I walked or what I wore, and everything to do 
with the actions of two men’ or, ‘no matter what someone has done or failed to do, 
they did not cause their sexual assault.’187 (More generally, Fanflick includes the idea 
that ‘the victim did something to cause the rape’ in her list of common rape 
myths.188) These are not statements about the gendered dispersal of common-sense 
knowledge. Rather, these statements focus on causal responsibility – they are claims 
about whose actions are causally responsible for sexual assault and whose are not. 
Therefore, to politicise the reasonable foreseeability condition so that it can 
successfully handle the assault case, we have to base this foreseeability on a 
sufficiently politicised understanding of causal responsibility. 
 
Seeing reasonable foreseeability’s reliance on causal responsibility also lets us be 
more specific about what the deeper politicisation of the reasonable foreseeability 
condition mentioned above might mean. I initially suggested that the common-sense 
knowledge we base our judgements of reasonable foreseeability on can have political 
dimensions, but now I can be more specific: it is common-sense knowledge of causal 
responsibility in particular which appears to have these political dimensions.  
 
Let’s take stock. Our understanding of agent responsibility cannot make sense of the 
assault case via the shallower political interpretation of the reasonable foreseeability 
condition. And the deeper politicisation of reasonable foreseeability seems to require 
a political understanding of the causal condition too – an understanding which 
recognises that common-sense views about what counts as a cause and what counts 
 
187 Remeikis (2018); Eastern Michigan University (2018).  
188 Fanflick (2007: 17). 
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as merely a background enabling condition can be and are affected by political 
power hierarchies. If our analysis of agent responsibility is to adequately handle 
feminist approaches to the assault case, it must therefore be based on interpretations 
of reasonable foreseeability and causal responsibility that recognise this.  
 
At this point it may feel like we must have taken a misstep somewhere; as I 
mentioned, causation is supposed to be a paradigmatically natural – i.e. non-
normative and so, certainly not political – concept. Surely there is simply one 
politically-neutral fact of the matter about who is causally responsible for the assault, 
and therefore who should have reasonably foreseen it? Granted, this may still be 
true; the assault example only provides a prima facie case against the standard 
model of responsibility and illustrates the complexity of altering this model to take 
feminist claims about assault authorship seriously (as I think we need to). However, 
in the next two chapters I go further. There, I show that an understanding of causal 
responsibility which recognises its pragmatic and normative-political dimensions is 
both possible, plausible, and necessary. And, I suggest, our understanding of agent 
responsibility works best when paired with such a politicised understanding of its 
causal requirement.  
 
3.4.  Conclusion: Reasons to Look Beyond the Standard Analysis 
In Chapter 2 I argued that a focus on individual choice can serve to justify structural 
inequalities by portraying them as stemming from failures of choice: simply 
individual ‘bad choices’ rather than injustices. This chapter introduced the concept 
of agent responsibility – the philosophical term of art meant to capture our 
relationship to those outcomes we have chosen – and its role in certain strands of 
egalitarian political thought.  
 
Motivated by the harmful consequences of ‘choice’ discourses within real-world 
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politics outlined in Chapter 2, I examined how these egalitarians tend to handle 
structural injustices. Using Knight’s proposal that IQ be used to measure when 
someone is capable of agent responsibility, I suggested that race-, gender-, and class-
neutral analyses of exactly who is agent responsible for what may not be as 
straightforward as they first appear.  
 
After outlining how responsibility-sensitive egalitarians theorise (or do not theorise, 
as is often the case) how agent responsibility attributions work, I attempted to pin 
down exactly who is agent responsible for what. Working from a standard 
‘intention, causal responsibility, plus reasonable foreseeability’ model of agent 
responsibility, I examined the case of sexual assault. I argued that this standard 
model seemed unable to make sense of feminist clams about how women do not co-
author their own sexual assaults by risking actions like drinking alcohol, wearing 
miniskirts, or walking home alone.  
 
To try to make sense of these feminist claims, I suggested we politicise our 
understanding of agent responsibility. But a shallow politicisation of the concept’s 
reasonable foreseeability condition – which only recognises that the dispersal of 
knowledge can be shaped by political hierarchies – did not do the trick. To make 
sense of these feminist claims about agent responsibility, I argued, we need to 
understand our knowledge of causal responsibility itself to have important political 
dimensions. This suggests we must politicise our understanding of agent 
responsibility’s causal requirement as well as its reasonable foreseeability 
requirement.189  
 
A quick fix of the standard model of agent responsibility through simple alterations 
 
189 Perhaps this is not surprising. The outcomes it is reasonable to foresee arising from an action 
are all and only those that action will cause or risks causing. If properly picking out cases of 
reasonable foreseeability looks to have important political dimensions, this suggests picking out 
cases of causal responsibility might too. 
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to our understanding of the reasonable foreseeability condition is therefore 
insufficient; further-reaching reforms are required to properly understand how and 
why we attribute responsibility in the ways that we do, and how we are to 
understand and adjudicate debates involving conflicting authorship attributions.  
 
The next chapter looks at how to supplement this standard model to give us this 
understanding. There, I identify three indeterminacies in the standard account, and 
outline how we unthinkingly resolve these indeterminacies in common-sense, 
intuitive responsibility attributions. In Chapter 5 I then build on this account to 
outline how and why, in normative political debates, attributions of agent 
responsibility have inescapable normative political dimensions. What should be 
clear already, however, is that determining who chooses what outcomes and why is 










We will need to confront Britain’s culture of irresponsibility and that will be 
hard to take for many people. And we will have to tear down Labour’s big 
government bureaucracy, ripping up its time-wasting, money-draining, 
responsibility-sapping nonsense. – David Cameron190 




Political arguments and economic exhortations based on the significance of 
individual choice and responsibility are widespread: they pop up everywhere from 
public health to beauty to racialised poverty.192 And the trend rolls on within liberal 
egalitarian political philosophy, albeit importantly softened by caveats promising 
initially equal distributions. Here, responsibility-sensitive egalitarians prefer to talk 
in terms of ‘agent responsibility’: the philosophical term for what one chooses or 
‘authors.’ I am deemed agent responsible for those outcomes which ‘stem 
 
190 Cameron (2009). 
191 As quoted in Hall & O’Shea (2013a: 8). 
192 Campbell (2018); Dove US (2015); Coates (2013). 
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appropriately from’ or ‘suitably reflect’ my agency.193 These egalitarians debate 
whether any unconditional public goods and services can be justified, given that 
these would be insensitive to individuals’ differing personal choices and therefore 
insensitive to differing levels of agent responsibility for their needs.194  
 
But how to tell exactly what we are agent responsible for? As I suggested in Chapter 
3, this is not as clear as it might first seem. In this chapter I argue that standard 
understandings of agent responsibility contain three important indeterminacies. I 
then explore how we resolve these indeterminacies in everyday practice, where we 
frequently make instinctive and determinate responsibility attributions. I argue that 
these instinctive responsibility attributions rely on certain common-sense beliefs: 
beliefs about which agents exist in the political sphere and what responsibilities as 
obligations they hold to one another, as well as beliefs about how to demarcate the 
public, economically-productive sphere from the private, unproductive sphere.  
 
Importantly, I do not endorse the common-sense resolutions outlined in this chapter. 
Just because they, and the beliefs underlying them, are widespread does not mean 
we should uncritically accept them. In fact, in Chapter 5 I argue against any such 
 
193 Knight and Stemplowska (2011b: 12-13); Vallentyne (2008: 58). Agent responsibility is a 
philosophical term of art designed to systematically unpack and articulate the fuzzy folk concept 
of choice. 
194 Knight (2015) surveys this debate, finding four avenues unpromising. He argues that a further 
three avenues do allow responsibility-sensitive egalitarians to respect the moral significance of 
choice while also providing (what he claims to be) unconditional public goods and services, by: 
(a) noting that I might be a different person when I made the choice to when I suffer its 
consequences, effectively rending the choice someone else’s – someone who flips out of existence 
before they can bear their choice’s consequences (though note that this makes public provision 
conditional on not being identical to one’s past self); (b) allowing people to suffer the expected 
consequences of their choices, rather than the actual consequences of their choices (making 
public provision conditional on always making choices we expect to go well, despite the fact that 
such options may not always exist); or, (c) by noting that we do not know if people have free 
will, so we can actually most safely respect the moral significance of choice by not letting people 
bear the full consequences of their choices after all – instead we make a ‘best guess’. Knight’s 
(2015: 132) referencing suggests we do this by recourse to a panel of metaphysicians, making 
public provision conditional on this panel’s conclusions. 
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uncritical acceptance. There, I use the descriptive account of how we do in fact 
attribute responsibility developed in this chapter to show the importance of 
subjecting these common-sense resolutions to normative political critique. (Chapter 
5 therefore builds directly on this chapter, insisting that we can and must advocate 
determinate responsibility attributions resting on egalitarian good sense rather than 
common sense.) 
 
In this chapter, when I talk of responsibility without specifying which kind, I mean 
to refer to agent responsibility. And, since I work from a definition of agent 
responsibility which understands me to be responsible for those outcomes I ‘author’, 
I use authorship and responsibility synonymously.195 
 
4.2. Three Cases: Sexual Assault, Homelessness, and Unpaid 
Carework 
This chapter and the next revolve around three central cases: in addition to the case 
of sexual assault introduced in Chapter 3, I also examine cases of homelessness and 
unpaid carework. Though all these examples are adapted from political-
philosophical literature on choice, each has important real-world parallels. First, 
recall Zofia Stemplowska’s assertion that a woman who risks wearing a miniskirt co-
authors any resulting sexual assault ‘to some degree.’196 This view is uncomfortably 
close to common claims that women who wear ‘provocative’ clothing are ‘asking for 
it.’  
 
Second, take the case of two men, both previously rehoused by the state after a flood 
and both again in need of only one remaining flat. Ben lost his state-allocated flat to 
 
195 Knight and Stemplowska (2011b: 12-13). 
196 Stemplowska (2009: 245). The understanding of responsibility informing this conclusion is far 
from unique within responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. Stemplowska does not believe that 
the sexual assault victim ought to bear the burdens of the assault.  
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a fire because, knowing the risks, he left a candle alight and went out. Adam lost his 
due to a faulty cooker fire.197 It first seems clear that Ben, unlike Adam, is responsible 
for his homelessness, and this can prompt us to think Adam should get the 
remaining flat; such examples are commonly used to motivate exactly this kind of 
conclusion.198 
 
The real-world parallel of irresponsibly risking a fire is irresponsibly failing to secure 
regular paid employment. In the UK, for example, a previous Labour Housing 
Minister suggested evicting social housing tenants if they could not prove they were 
actively seeking work.199 She wanted the right to housing to become (supposedly) 
sensitive to tenants’ choices, rather than inalienable.200 This policy has since become 
reality: unemployed claimants now risk losing housing support if they cannot prove 
they have spent 35 hours a week that month looking for work.201 Successive 
Conservative governments have also thinned out people eligible for social housing 
assistance by broadening the kinds of behaviour that count as ‘intentional 
homelessness’ – if you are deemed intentionally homeless, local authorities are not 
legally obligated to help rehouse you.202 
 
Third, suppose Sylvia is not formally employed. She cooks for her partner, cleans 
their house, washes his clothes, administers household bills and repairs, provides 
 
197 Adapted from Stemplowska (2009: 242). 
198 E.g. Kymlicka (2002: 72-73); Knight (2015: 126-128); Segall (2013: 44). Stemplowska (2009: 242) 
takes a slightly different tack to the common responsibility-sensitive egalitarian uses of such 
cases. While she does use this example to provoke the intuition that, other things being equal, 
Adam should get the remaining flat she goes on to argue this does not mean we always ought to 
bear the burdens of what we are responsible for. 
199 Wintour (2008).  
200 Dwyer (2004) discusses increasing welfare conditionality in the UK. Whiteford (2013) outlines 
New Labour’s mixed record on street homelessness, including their forays into conditionality 
and responsibilisation. Hodkinson and Robbins (2013) put this into historical perspective, 
highlighting the centrality of housing reform to the neoliberal project in the UK.  
201 Cain (2016). 
202 Hodkinson & Robbins (2013). 
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emotional care when he gets home, and disproportionately maintains their social 
and familial networks. Her partner works full time and Sylvia depends financially 
on his salary. Cases like Sylvia’s are a point of contention for responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarians, constituting the ‘problem of vulnerable dependent caretakers.’203 Since 
Sylvia chose unpaid carework and consequently ended up poor and financially 
dependent she looks, prima facie, agent responsible for her poverty – she knowingly 
chose it – and yet it seems unjust to leave her to bear poverty resulting from caring 
for others.  
 
The real world parallel of the view that unpaid carers author their own poverty is 
also easy to locate. As I will discuss further in the course of this chapter and the next, 
standard economic models count such unpaid carework as unproductive; if this 
widespread assumption is correct, why economically reward people for performing 
economically unproductive activities?204 This classification of caring activities 
(traditionally gendered female) as unproductive is one reason women in the UK – 
who continue to shoulder a greater burden of unpaid care205 – are more likely to live 
in poverty and have fewer financial assets.206 Many women in heterosexual couples 
rely on their partner to save for them but neither assets nor financial decision-
making are always shared equally. 207  
 
Moreover, lone parents – 90% of whom are women208 – cannot rely on a partner’s 
income while they care for children; lone-parent households are twice as likely to 
 
203 Anderson (1999: 298) named this problem. For differing luck egalitarian responses compare 
Rakowski (1991: 109, 153) to Knight (2005: 60-62). 
204 Folbre (1991); Marcal (2015). 
205 Coote and Himmelweit (2013).  
206 Reis (2018). Westaway and McKay (2007: 5) argue that gendered savings and debt gaps are 
‘mostly simply a symptom’ of the gender pay gap and women’s shouldering of unpaid 
carework.   
207 Westaway and McKay (2007); Rowlingson and Joseph (2010). 
208 Cain (2016: 489). 
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live in poverty as two-parent households.209 As the principle that all public support 
be made conditional on people making the ‘right choices’ has taken deeper root in 
the UK’s benefits regime, these single parents are caught between their children’s 
care needs and financial sanctions for either not working full time or for failing to 
spend 35 hours a week actively looking for work.210 Working out how and why we 
attribute responsibility in cases of housing, assault, and unpaid carework therefore 
has both real-world and philosophical import.211  
 
4.3. Three Indeterminacies of Agent Responsibility 
Political philosophers who use the concepts of choice and/or agent responsibility do 
not tend to spend much time analysing exactly how these concepts work. As 
discussed, some simply acknowledge this gap in their work; others argue that such 
an analysis must be done by metaphysicians rather than political philosophers; and, 
in practice, many simply adopt a common-sense analysis of the concept whereby 
they accept that our intuitions on who is responsible for what are reliable enough to 
form the foundations of normative political debate.212  
 
Standard understandings, then, tend to begin and end with the idea that 
responsibility requires causation, intention, and reasonable foreseeability: to be 
responsible for outcome x, this account says, my intentional action y must have 
 
209 Department for Work and Pensions (2017). 
210 Cain (2016). 
211 Responsibility-sensitive egalitarians would not endorse the inequalities resulting from the 
real-world ‘choices’ just outlined because the choices were not made from an initially equal 
baseline. I am only highlighting how dominant philosophical models of determinate agent 
responsibility mirror the dominant models operating in mainstream public political discourse in 
certain ways: both assume certain forms of ‘irresponsible’ behaviour can make one solely 
responsible for one’s homelessness, or partly responsible for one’s sexual assault, for example. 
212 Segall (2013: 3), Stemplowska (2009: 240), and Tan (2008: 669) simply acknowledge this gap in 
their work; Cohen (1989: 934), Arneson (2004: 10), and Knight (2006: 185) suggest that the 
concept lies within metaphysics rather than political philosophy; Dworkin (2002: 289-90, 323), 
Segall (2013: 3), Stemplowska (2009: 240), and Knight (2009: 149), adopt a common-sense 
approach though only Dworkin does so explicitly. For discussion see Chapter 3, Section 2. 
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caused x, and x must have been a reasonably foreseeable consequence of y.213 
However, as shown in Chapter 3, this standard account struggles with authorship 
attributions the case of sexual assault – and in ways that do not look 
straightforwardly fixable through small tweaks to the reasonable foreseeability 
requirement.  
 
In fact, when we try to ascertain responsibility using this definition we hit three 
sources of indeterminacy. These indeterminacies usually remain hidden because 
political philosophers tend to theorise about responsibility using cases where two 
similarly positioned people both need assistance, one despite having chosen 
prudently and the other due to less prudent choices.214 In the case of Adam and Ben, 
for example, it seems clear that candle-lighting Ben, unlike electrical-fault Adam, is 
responsible for his homelessness, and this can prompt us to think Adam should get 
the remaining flat; such examples are commonly used to motivate just this kind of 
conclusion.215 Arguing for more nuance, Stemplowska thinks instead we are only 
justly left to bear the burdens of what we are responsible for under specific, limited 
circumstances.216 Neither approach question Ben’s responsibility for his 
homelessness, however.  
 
Notice how the framing of the case suggests that Adam and Ben are the only 
relevant agents here – that no other potential authors of Ben’s homelessness are 
worth consideration. Yet this assumption seems unfounded on our current standard 
definition of responsibility. For one thing, the state has found itself unable to house a 
victim of multiple catastrophic accidents (flood and fire). Ben negligently left the 
 
213 For expanded discussion of the issues of this paragraph, see Chapter 3, Section 2. 
214 E.g. Kymlicka (2002: 72-73) reasons from a case of two people with identical talent, 
background and resources; Knight (2015: 126-128) analyses the case of initially identical Bill and 
Ben; Segall (2013: 44) discusses Prudent and Lazy, stranded on a desert island to further abstract 
them from any social context.  
215 For examples, see footnote 198 (p.75).  
216 Stemplowska (2009: 242-243). Cf. Rakowski (1991: Ch.3).   
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candle burning but we might think the state’s under-provisioning of emergency 
housing negligent too. To hold Ben solely responsible for his homelessness, we must 
first assume either that the state does not exist as a political agent capable of 
responsibility or that, if it does, it did not play any role in bringing this homelessness 
outcome about. If the state is capable of responsibility and might have foreseeably 
contributed to Ben’s homelessness, his sole responsibility for this outcome remains 
unclear.  
 
Other agents are also worth considering. Did Ben’s flat meet fire safety standards 
and, if not, are the local housing authority or the building company agents capable 
of responsibility? Was Ben entitled to firefighting help from the state or local council 
that he never received, leaving him unable to control the fire on his own? Did Adam 
sit passively next to his garden hose watching as, through Ben’s open window, the 
candle-flame slowly caught the curtains? 
 
The first indeterminacy, then, stems from the fact that our definition is silent 
regarding what agents capable of responsibility exist in the political sphere, and 
which of these agents’ actions and omissions are relevant to the outcome in question. 
We must supplement the definition before we can talk confidently about who is 
responsible for what. Can only individuals act intentionally, or can collectives do so 
too? And of those agents capable of intentional action, how are we to determine 
which of their intentional actions and omissions are relevant to the outcome in 
question? Let’s call this the problem of picking the right agents.  
 
The second indeterminacy arises because we sometimes deny that responsibility 
flows from an intentional action to certain nonetheless reasonably foreseeable 
consequences. At these times, it seems the outcome no longer ‘belongs’ to the agent 
who causally contributed to it, despite its apparent foreseeability. This is clearest in 
cases of rights infringements like sexual assault and I have already gestured towards 
4.  COMMON-SENSE RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS 
81 
 
this indeterminacy in Chapter 3.  
 
Recall that, contra common-sense and Stemplowska’s belief, feminists insist that co-
responsibility for the assault does not flow from our woman’s choice to risk drinking 
alone in public.217 Though her decision to take this risk causally contributed to the 
assault, so did many other intentional actions and omissions not mentioned: the bar 
owner’s choice to open that night despite our knowledge that alcohol can facilitate 
sexual assaults; the local authority’s licensing and policing decisions in the face of 
similar knowledge; the perpetrator’s parents’ decision to leave their son 
unsupervised despite our knowing that 99% of perpetrators of sexual assault are 
men;  the perpetrator’s school’s failure to adequately teach the importance of 
consent; and so on.218  
 
Are all these agents co-responsible for the assault? And if not, how do we determine 
why agency flows from some of these actions and omissions to the assault 
consequence but not others? Again, two-person, two-outcome examples hide this 
indeterminacy since their framing pre-selects just one or two actions for our 
attention and ignores all others. But this is an artificial elision rather than a solution 
to what I will call the problem of mapping responsibility’s flow. 
 
Though clearest in rights infringement cases, this indeterminacy arises much more 
widely. Take market transactions. Suppose the thousands of people who bought 
apples in a region last year each fractionally contributed to making harvesting a 
particular orchard look economically viable this year; comparable demand was 
predicted largely on the basis of last year’s demand. Given this, it was easily 
foreseeable that these shoppers’ actions would likely be a positive factor in farmers’ 
choice to invest in growing apples this year. Do these shoppers thereby co-author 
 
217 Stemplowska (2009: 245). 
218 Abbey et al. (2004); Flatley (2018).  
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some part of this year’s crop? We standardly deny this; we deny that responsibility 
flows from their actions to this nonetheless fairly easily foreseeable outcome.  
 
On to the third and last indeterminacy – that of ascertaining degrees of responsibility. 
Alone on an uninhabited island we might claim complete responsibility for anything 
we altered. But societies are fundamentally shared enterprises, meaning even 
seemingly independent outcomes are thoroughly enmeshed with the behaviour and 
choices of many other agents.219 As most (all?) outcomes have more than one 
potential author, it is essential we know how to divide responsibility amongst 
multiple authors if the concept is to be of any practical use. 
 
Take Sylvia, who is not formally employed but performs all the house- and carework 
that allows her partner to thrive at his paid job. Is Sylvia co-responsible for any of 
her partner’s financial success, or is she only responsible for her clean house and 
relative poverty? This depends on how we map the flow of responsibility (our 
second problem). But if we decide she is co-responsible for her partner’s economic 
productivity we must then ask: to what degree? Again, this indeterminacy remains 
hidden in standard two-person, two-outcome examples where each outcome tends 
to be framed as stemming solely from one agent’s actions. And, again, our current 
definition offers no guidance on this issue.  
 
We therefore lack a workable account of responsibility. Our definition leaves 
unsolved the problem of picking the right agents. It suggests responsible agency 
flows along all intentional causal chains until their results could no longer be 
foreseen, giving us no principled way to delimit responsibility’s flow. And it is silent 
 
219 Rawls (2009: 88-89) notes this with his emphasis on reciprocity. As does Ripstein (1998), who 
argues that ideas of responsibility, reciprocity, and equality are inescapably interdependent. I agree 
and am indebted to him here. We diverge on other, less fundamental matters: he does not address 
agent responsibility per se, he focuses on how legal frameworks animate conceptions of 
responsibility, and we develop the implications of our political accounts differently.  
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on how to determine degrees of responsibility, notwithstanding that societies are 
fundamentally shared enterprises in which all outcomes result from the combined 
actions of many agents.  
 
4.4. Theorising Common-sense Responsibility Attributions 
Despite these three indeterminacies, we certainly act as if we have a determinate notion 
of responsibility, appealing to it often. Feminists claim that women who knowingly risk 
wearing miniskirts are not responsible for resultant sexual harassment; campaigners 
hold particular companies responsible for environmental disasters; if you cook me 
lunch, I will hold you responsible for it.220 I do not think we should try to give up the 
concept entirely – it captures something too useful.221 But, as argued in Chapter 3, to 
properly fix this ‘causation, intention, and reasonable foreseeability’ model requires 
more than a relatively simple and shallow politicisation of the reasonable foreseeability 
requirement; we need to go further than recognising that common-sense knowledge is 
shared unequally across society in ways that reflect political power hierarchies.  
 
What to attempt instead, then? Rather than dive straight into my alternative solutions 
to the three problems just sketched, I turn to the descriptive task of accounting for how 
people do in fact make determinate responsibility ascriptions. Understanding this 
sheds light on how political philosophers should reason with and about the concept of 
agent responsibility. The foundations of this descriptive task consist of, first, an 
expanded explanation of political schemas – those unconscious frameworks introduced 
in Chapter 2 to discuss the ‘system of thought’ element of neoliberalism.  Second, an 
explanation of how political schemas shed light on how we do and should decide upon 
which intentional agents exist within the political sphere. And, third, an analysis of 
how responsibility’s causal requirement functions in everyday practice. Finally, I 
 
220 Remeikis (2018); Fanflick (2007: 17); Greenpeace (2015). 
221 I discuss the prospects of giving up the concept altogether in Chapter 6, Section 2.2, defending 
its limited use for certain theoretical tasks. 
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explain how these elements help us instinctively and unthinkingly resolve the three 
indeterminacies just outlined.   
 
4.4.1. Schemas  
When ascribing responsibility, we normally unthinkingly pick out who we take to be 
the relevant agents, making quick, intuitive assumptions about causal responsibility 
and reasonable foreseeability as we go. I will argue that we do this through reliance on 
common-sense political schemas.  
 
A schema is a conceptual, narrative and evaluative framework that renders reality 
‘thinkable’.222 We could list uncountable facts about any situation, and uncountable 
causes for any outcome. For the presence of one simple tree, for example, we can look 
to the people and animals who contributed to its genetic make-up and nutrition, its 
position and surroundings, the effects of drought on its survival, who and what caused 
that drought, and so on, ad infinitum. Schemas are systems of thought that help us pick 
only some facts and causes from this otherwise overwhelming chaos, characterise them 
in certain ways, and conceptualise their relationships to one another. Schemas help us 
individuate objects and events and guide our judgements about the relative salience of 
causal chains so that, though the presence of carbon dioxide is essential to the tree’s 
survival, it is not what we would point to when asked about its continued presence. 
 
Schemas contain the unspoken assumptions we use to make sense of our world, and 
different spheres of life have their own dominant schemas. Importantly, a sphere’s 
dominant (common-sense) schemas tend to reinforce its dominant practices, and vice 
 
222  My definition is drawn from Rose’s (1996) concept of a ‘political rationality’ and Haslanger’s 
(2012d) concept of a ‘schema’. I avoid ‘rationality’ terminology because of its association with 
different debates in analytic philosophy (e.g. Kolodny and Brunero 2016). Schemas resemble Geuss’ 
notion of ideology in his non-pejorative, ‘descriptive sense’ (1981, 4-6). 
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versa - the conceptual and the practical grow and work together. 223 For example, the 
family sphere involves the concepts of mother and child. It contains rules and norms - a 
mother is a woman with an especially strong emotional bond to her child, plays a 
specific role in their development, and so on. These elements contribute to a schema 
within which mothers are assumed specially placed to care for their children, and 
where mothers’ role as primary carers is assumed.  
 
Because the conceptual and the practical tend to work together, dominant schemas 
become naturalised through their fit with dominant practices. For example, the view of 
mothers’ special childcare roles becomes naturalised as plain fact through its 
frictionless fit with a range of dominant practices whereby mothers act as the primarily 
carers of young children. Because spheres’ dominant practices tend to mesh with and 
reinforce their dominant schemas, schemas often go unnoticed. Frequently used and 
rarely challenged, these thought-, feeling- and action-structuring frameworks remain 
largely unconscious.  
 
4.4.2. Schemas’ Political Ontologies 
I now turn to the first role schemas play in authorship attributions. I outline how, in 
everyday practice, common-sense schemas contain the background political ontologies 
that partly animate our intuitive authorship ascriptions. I argue that implicit political 
ontologies are crucial in setting responsibility’s parameters. For if we intuitively tend to 
view certain kinds of persons or groups as incapable of intentional agency and others 
as model examples of intentional agents, we will not hold the former agent responsible 
 
223  By ‘dominant’ I mean a schema that that has (or is gaining) widely accepted discursive force so 
that it feels like common sense and aligns (or increasingly aligns) with the sphere’s key practices, 
material structures, and distributions. Here I work from Williams (1973: 9), who discusses 
‘dominant’ hegemonic systems as ‘not merely abstract but… organised and lived’, and because of 
this, which come to constitute ‘a sense of reality.’ As Williams notes, such dominance will never be 
static or absolute, since schemas are neither neatly unified nor total in reign; see Brown (2015: 48) 
for a description of the neoliberal political schema as at once both a ‘global phenomenon’ and an 
‘inconsistent, morphing, differentiated, unsystematic, contradictory and impure… field of 
oscillations’. I use ‘dissident’ to refer to schemas not dominant in this sense. 
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for anything and will look straight to the latter when assigning authorship. More 
specifically, I suggest that individualist political ontologies predominate in political 
philosophy and public political discourse.  
 
I then argue that egalitarians can and should critically engage with this common-
sense individualism. It is a mistake to think political philosophers need simply wait 
for a value-free metaphysics to tell us which political ontology is the correct one. 
This is because there is no neat divide between social metaphysics and normative 
political philosophy, nor is social metaphysics necessarily more explanatorily 
foundational than normative political philosophy. Rather, normative political 
concerns can play a legitimate role in determining our political ontology, and thus in 
setting the parameters for our authorship attributions.  
 
(i)  Common-sense Political Ontologies 
 
‘There is no such thing as society. There are only individual men and 
women… and their families.’ – Margaret Thatcher224 
 
Egalitarian political-philosophical appeals to responsibility often presume a 
background ontological individualism.225 As discussed, two-person, two-outcome 
examples like that of Adam and Ben pre-pick the relevant agents in their framing and, 
in doing so, silently exclude possibly relevant collective political agents like the state. 
Similarly, Stemplowska mentions only an assault victim and the perpetrator when 
discussing responsibility for sexual assault; no political collectives who may have been 
co-responsible for enabling sexual assault are mentioned. Kymlicka reasons from a case 
of two people with identical talent, background and resources.226 Knight analyses the 
 
224 Thatcher (1987). See footnote 275 (p.101) on neoliberal waverings between the individual and 
the family as the basic unit of society. 
225 Mills (2005: 168) argues that this ontological individualism is a hallmark of ideal theory more 
generally, and that it serves to abstract away from structural domination. 
226 Kymlicka (2002: 72-73).  
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case of initially identical Bill and Ben.227 Shlomi Segall goes so far as to set the agents of 
one of his examples (‘Prudent and Lazy’) on a desert island; this constrains our 
reasoning about responsibility to a context lacking not just other collective agents, but 
any other agents at all.228 Two-person, two-outcome cases such as these, which 
predominate in this literature, instantiate a kind of political ontological individualism 
via the back door.229  
 
This individualism comfortably mirrors the common-sense political ontology that 
forms an important part of our dominant neoliberal political schema. Recall this 
section’s guide quote: Thatcher’s famous statement of neoliberalism’s individualist 
political ontology in which she asserts that there is no such thing as society. Using this 
ontology, neoliberalism presents individuals as the only relevant, accountable political 
agents. And, by reducing collectives to nothing but the sum of individuals’ 
membership choices (and resultant contractual obligations), neoliberal rationality 
erodes the very possibility of socio-political collectives as living political bodies with 
collective power and agency.230 ‘Choice’ is thus often used in Conservative discourse to 
promote anti-statism.231  
 
 
227 Knight (2015: 126-128). 
228 Segall (2013: 44) adapts this example from Vallentyne (2003), adding the desert island setting. 
229 Though it could be claimed that these cases instantiate methodological rather than ontological 
individualism, our methodological choices are informed by our underlying ontologies; if 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarians recognise collective political agents’ capacities for intentional 
action, why systematically leave such agents out of their examples and discussions? Some 
egalitarian theorists explicitly state their individualistic grounding assumptions: e.g. Knight 
(2009: 5); Temkin (1993: 92).  (For discussion of the similar methodological individualism 
common within neoclassical economics and its political effects, see Chapter 8, Section 3.2.) 
Lippert‐Rasmussen (2011) is one important exception to this individualistic norm; he argues that 
the possibility of group agents complicates the role that choice and fault can play in 
responsibility-sensitive approaches to distributive justice since individual members of groups 
may behave in certain ways due to fairness considerations or attempts to cooperate.  
230 See Brown (2016).  
231 See Phillips (1998: 855).   
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I do not think it coincidental that the background political ontology assumed by the 
philosophical literature on responsibility so often mirrors the dominant political 
ontology of neoliberalism. After all, the express goal of responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarians was to incorporate into egalitarian thought ‘the most powerful idea in the 
arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility.’232 As 
Thatcher’s quote suggests, this powerful idea was always based on individual, rather 
than collective, choice and responsibility. On what basis might egalitarians be able to 
challenge this ontological individualism?  
 
(ii)  Egalitarian Political Ontologies 
Until now I have mentioned only dominant schemas. But, of course, a sphere’s 
dominant schema is never uncontested or static, and they are often internally 
contradictory, incomplete, or both. Since the political ontology enshrined in schemas 
helps set the parameters of our responsibility attributions, contesting a dominant 
ontology generates different parameters. Contesting common-sense political ontologies 
can therefore create space for different authorship attributions. Now, deciding on the 
units that comprise political reality and their capabilities is clearly a political question 
in the sense that political scientists and philosophers engage these topics.233 But, more 
than this, adjudicating between political ontologies can legitimately involve normative 
political judgements.  
 
To see why, first note that empirical investigation alone will never conclusively 
determine whether political collectives are agents capable of responsibility. As Colin 
Hay puts it, ‘evidence alone is not ontologically discriminating, though it is often 
presented as such.’234 The same outcome can be accounted for as either the product of a 
 
232 Cohen (1989: 933). 
233 E.g. Hay (2006); Furlong and Marsh (2007); Stanley (2012). 
234 Hay (2006: 86). Furthermore, if ontology could be decided through empirical investigation 
alone, the topic would fall largely to social scientists rather than philosophers and social 
theorists. 
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collective agent or of a group of individual agents, and empirical investigation free 
from question-begging ontological assumptions cannot conclusively discriminate 
between these explanations. We therefore rely on other ways to determine whether an 
ontology is adequate. Furthermore, when determining the adequacy of political 
ontologies, ‘part of what we need to account for and explain… are ‘thick’ or normative 
considerations like injustice and unfairness.’235 In other words, one of the factors that 
can legitimately influence our choice of political ontology is the normative implications 
of the various plausible ontological theories we are adjudicating between.  
 
This claim borrows insights from feminist metaphysicians like Sally Haslanger who 
argue, first, that contemporary metaphysicians commonly adopt an account of 
justification that is ‘holist’ – an account that understands a belief to be justified if it 
‘coheres widely with other beliefs one has.’236 This forms the basis of their second 
claim, that ‘metaphysical inquiry should be responsive to a broad range of 
experience as well as theoretical pressures from other domains, including normative 
inquiry.’237 Haslanger goes on to describe ‘foundationalist’ views of metaphysics – 
views which understand metaphysicians to have unmediated access to reality and 
metaphysical theories to strictly and unquestionably constrain all other modes of 
theorising – as ‘completely outdated.’238  
 
Claiming that normative values can play a legitimate role in theory choice does not 
mean we are free to pick whichever political ontology best suits our normative 
project; we must still assess their internal coherence, fruitfulness, parsimony, unity, 
evidential support (and so on). It means only that the political and moral values that 
 
235 I borrow this quote from Barnes’ (2017: 2420-2421) interpretation of Haslanger’s ‘ameliorative 
project’ in social metaphysics. Though Barnes is here talking about social categories like race and 
gender, I here apply this approach to social ontology more broadly. 
236 Haslanger (2012a: 146).  
237 Haslanger (2012a: 147), my emphasis.  
238 Haslanger (2012a: 146). 
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form the context of our inquiry can also play a legitimate role in our decision about 
which ontological theory looks best justified.  
 
How exactly can these values play a legitimate role in ontological theory choice? As 
Mari Mikkola puts it, metaphysicians aim to produce ‘an organised body of 
significant truths’, rather than to simply stack up as many truths as possible 
regardless of significance.239 Because of this, Mikkola argues, political and moral 
values can legitimately help us rank the significance of various facts and evidence, 
meaning that ‘value judgements… do not necessarily compete with facts and 
evidence.’240 Instead, on this approach, normative and evidential considerations 
interact: certain facts become especially significant because of the normative values 
that contextualise our inquiry. Like Haslanger, Mikkola thus concludes that ‘social 
justice matters to our philosophical theorising even in fields that are prima facie 
value-neutral.’241   
 
This view is not necessarily antithetical to the approach taken towards political 
ontologies by political philosophers. Granted, Cohen seems to endorse the 
foundationalist idea that metaphysical theories function as strict outer limits to 
political theorising.242 But, in contrast to Cohen’s approach, John Rawls’ rejection of 
the political ontologies of libertarianism and utilitarianism is closely entwined with 
his rejection of these views’ normative implications. His rejection of utilitarianism’s 
political ontology, for example, is not separable from his belief that utilitarianism 
distributes rights and duties incorrectly.243 And he backs up his claim that we should 
 
239 Mikkola (2015: 784). 
240 Mikkola (2015: 803). 
241 Mikkola (2015: 804).  
242 Cohen (1989: 934) suggests this by stating that putting agent responsibility at the centre of 
distributive justice may well ‘subordinate’ political philosophy to ‘metaphysical questions.’ 
Matravers (2002: 177) likewise adopts this line.  
243 Rawls (2009: 24). Pettit (2005) argues that Rawls' political ontology is closely tied to his 
normative political beliefs. 
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understand societies not as collections of atomised individuals but rather as 
cooperative ventures for mutual advantage by asserting the normative claim that 
‘social cooperation makes possible a better life for all.’244 Rawls’ approach therefore 
seems to accept the necessity of dialogue between political philosophy and social 
ontology.245  
 
The argument that there is no neat divide between (nor straightforward hierarchy 
of) social metaphysics and normative political philosophy is therefore not 
revolutionary within either discipline. Nonetheless, I include this section’s 
arguments for three reasons. First, to call attention to political ontologies’ role in 
authorship attributions – a role I have not seen acknowledged elsewhere.246 Second, 
to highlight the importance of accounting for the normative costs and benefits of 
different political ontologies; at the very least, egalitarians should recognise the 
normative impact of tacitly accepting the right’s individualist ontology without 
challenge. And, finally, to complicate any misguided attempt to neatly separate 
metaphysics from normative political inquiry in order to make the former 
foundational.  
 
If, as argued, normative political concerns can play a legitimate role in determining our 
political ontology and if our political ontology sets the bounds of our responsibility 
attributions, we have responsibility’s first political dimension. Our dominant neoliberal 
individualist ontology suggests that the state and other collectives do not exist as 
responsible agents. This ontology is overwhelmingly left unchallenged within the 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian literature, which tends to reason from examples in 
 
244 Rawls (2009: 4).  
245 Or, at least, Rawls’ approach to this issue at this point in his work seems to accept this 
necessity.  
246 Though Lippert‐Rasmussen (2011) explores examples involving group agents he does not 
discuss matters of political ontology at all. Rather, he assumes that ‘a group choice… simply is 
the mereological sum of the acts of all members’ (Lippert‐Rasmussen 2011: 114).    
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which a few individuals’ separate choices and resultant outcomes are isolated from 
wider social context and compared.   
 
Though this dominant ontology often underlies authorship attributions, I have argued 
that egalitarian political philosophers can legitimately play a role in challenging it. This 
is because normative debates about the costs and benefits of different ontological 
theories are not neatly separable from, but holistically implicated in questions of social 
ontological theory choice. More specifically, given the centrality of individualism to 
right-wing and neoliberal thought, egalitarians have good reason to explore the 
possibility of authorship attributions informed by a less individualist political ontology 
(and to recognise the costs of not doing so). To start this exploration, I here assume the 
possibility of collective political agents.  
 
However, even assuming that political collectives are capable of responsible agency we 
still need to know how to determine whether responsibility flows from these 
potentially relevant agents’ actions and omissions to our outcomes of interest. In other 
words, the full resolution of the problem of picking the right agents depends on our 
resolving the second problem – that of mapping responsibility’s flow. I therefore turn 
to this indeterminacy next, explaining how we intuitively resolve it in our common-
sense responsibility attributions.  
 
4.4.3. Schemas’ Maps of Actual Causation 
Discussing the sexual assault case in Chapter 3, I said feminists deny that our 
woman co-authors the assault because we deny her causal responsibility for it. We 
classify the idea that the victim did something to cause her rape or sexual assault as 
a common sexist myth in need of dismantling.247 In order to fully defend these 
feminist claims (which I do in Chapter 5), I first need to explain how this sexist myth 
 
247 Fanflick (2007: 17). 
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arises and persists. My next task, therefore, is to explain why the victim and 
perpetrator are so often the only two agents singled out for co-responsibility.  
 
To do so requires our rooting deeper into responsibility’s causal requirement. 
Philosophers often distinguish ‘actual causation’ from wider ‘causal structure’.248 
Judgements of actual causation answer the question: which actions/event(s) were 
causally responsible for a particular outcome?249 Since actual causation equates to 
causal responsibility, actual causation is what is required for agent responsibility.250  
 
To see how actual causation works, return to our assault case. If the perpetrator’s 
parents had not given birth to him, or had closely supervised his leisure time as if he 
were a child, the assault would not have happened. Yet it seems absurd to say that his 
parents are causally responsible for the assault because they gave birth to him and 
allowed him normal adult freedoms – it calls attention to entirely the wrong things. 
Asked, ‘what caused this assault?’ it is almost impossible to think of a situation in 
which ‘his parents’ giving birth’ could ever be anything but an entirely irrelevant and 
unhelpful response.  
 
To capture the wrongness of this answer, philosophers say that though his parents’ 
actions are part of the ‘causal structure’ leading to this event, they are nonetheless not 
amongst its ‘actual causes.’ Put differently, though his parents’ actions are important 
parts of the assault’s background enabling conditions, they are not causally responsible 
for it. This means they cannot be held agent responsible for it either. 
 
Since responsibility requires actual causation rather than merely being part of the 
 
248 E.g. Hitchcock & Knobe (2009); Statham (2018).  
249 Statham (2018). 
250 In this, my account of agent responsibility’s causal condition differs from Vallentyne (2008) 
who understands every choice reasonably foreseeably part of the causal structure of an outcome 
as engendering agent responsibility; no distinction is recognised between choices that count only 
as enabling background conditions and choices that count as ‘actual causes.’  
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causal structure leading to the outcome, we need to know what distinguishes actual 
causes from causal background conditions. A growing body of philosophical and 
empirical work suggests that judgements of actual causation are guided by statistical 
norms (regarding frequency: how often action x precedes outcome y) and prescriptive 
norms (regarding what ought to happen: whether outcome y ought to follow from 
action x, and whether action x ought to be performed). 251  
 
For example, the rain only counts as an actual cause of the flood if it violates the 
statistical rainfall norm of the region in question; if we had exactly average rainfall we 
would look elsewhere for the flood’s actual causes. In normal, peace-time contexts, 
your firing a gun at someone on the street will count as an actual cause of their death 
whereas their leaving the house that day will not because strong prescriptive norms 
prohibit the former but not the latter: getting shot ought not to follow from leaving the 
house, and one ought not shoot people.252 The role of prescriptive and statistical norms 
in guiding judgements of actual causation reveals that actual causation is not the 
paradigmatically non-normative notion it first appears. 
 
Call the networks of dominant statistical and prescriptive norms relating to social 
interaction our common-sense ‘map of actual social causation.’ This map constitutes 
the framework guiding common-sense judgements about what kinds of actions are 
causally responsible for what kinds of outcomes. Like political ontologies, such maps 
are an important part of political schemas.253 I now outline how our dominant map of 
actual social causation shapes our common-sense responsibility attributions. I argue 
 
251 E.g. McGrath (2005). Statham (2018: Sections 1-2) summarises this body of philosophical work. 
Similar claims are made by several theorists of social science: e.g. Hammersley (2014); Marini 
and Singer (1988: 354). See also Hitchcock and Knobe (2009).   
252 Context is crucial, as this example suggests; I discuss this in Chapter 5, Section 2. 
253  Maps of actual social causation’s reliance on norms tallies with my broader argument in 
Chapter 2, Section 3. There, I claimed that schemas become entrenched primarily through 
creative power, which works to govern behaviour through social norms, engendering 
unthinking acceptance through repetition and the intricate webs of reward and sanction that 
such norms often carry.   
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that norms regarding community expectations and political obligations animate 
authorship judgements in the homelessness and assault cases. I then explain how 
norms regarding the public-private divide animate common-sense authorship 




[T]oo many children and people have been given to understand…’I am 
homeless, the Government must house me!’ and so they are casting their 
problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! – Margaret 
Thatcher254 
 
Who is causally responsible for Ben’s homelessness? Recall that in Section 4.3 we were 
unable to give a principled account of which agents’ actions and omissions were 
relevant to this outcome. Did the state’s under-provisioning of emergency housing 
make them causally co-responsible by omission, for example? To answer questions like 
this, and therefore to resolve the problem of picking the right agents, we must know 
what makes an action causally responsible by omission for a certain outcome.  
 
Happily, we now have the resources to explain how this indeterminacy is resolved in 
everyday practice. As outlined, causal responsibility equates to actual causation, and 
causal responsibility by omission is no exception. Unsurprisingly then, what counts as 
causation by omission depends on dominant prescriptive and statistical norms. This 
tallies with philosophical literature on omissions; Patricia Smith, for example, states 
that what counts as an omission depends ‘crucially and exclusively on a context of 
expectations, and very largely on a network of community expectations… about what 
ought to be done or what will be done.’255  
 
 
254 Thatcher (1987).  
255 Smith (1990: 171). 
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For example, I am causally responsible by omission for your plants dying because, in 
promising to water them and failing to do so, I violated the normal expectation that 
one ought to, and will, keeps one’s promises.256 Causal responsibility by omission thus 
depends on what we expect of agents and, especially, on norms regarding what 
responsibilities as obligations individual and collective agents hold to one another. For the 
case in hand – political appeals to agent responsibility – norms of political obligation 
therefore become essential determinants.  
 
To see how, return to Ben. Whether the state is commonly held co-responsible for Ben’s 
homelessness depends on whether there is a strong, pervasive statistical or prescriptive 
norm that the state has a ‘responsibility as obligation’ to help rehouse homeless people. 
Suppose both such norms exist: our state is under a legal obligation to help rehouse 
homeless citizens that they normally fulfil, and our political community tends to think 
this is how the state ought to behave.  In such a context, I contend, an instance of state 
failure to provide this help will commonly be counted as an actual cause of Ben’s 
homelessness, rather than as part of its background causal structure.257  
 
In this way, statistical and prescriptive norms dictating the political obligations agents 
hold towards one another determine who we tend to think caused outcomes by 
omission. And these judgements shape how agent responsibility is understood to flow 
along some reasonably foreseeable intentional causal chains but not others. If the state 
is commonly understood to hold no obligation to help house homeless people, it will 
 
256 What if the relevant prescriptive norm comes apart from the relevant statistical norm? 
Suppose I, or people like me, barely ever keep my promises – I am entirely untrustworthy and 
have failed repeatedly to water your plants in the past. Which norm then governs actual social 
causation – prescriptive or statistical? I suggest (in Chapter 5, Section 2) that this depends on 
conversational context and, especially, on the purposes for which we draw on the notion of 
actual causation.  
257 Likewise, his local authority will commonly be held causally co-responsible if they violated a 
norm that holds them obligated to provide adequate fire-fighting assistance. So too will Adam be 
held causally responsible by omission if he sat next to his garden hose merely watching as the fire 
caught, if we normally think him obligated to take action in such circumstances.  
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not normally be held responsible for Ben’s lack of a house, despite the fact that its 
decision to not provide more emergency housing foreseeably formed part of the causal 
structure leading to Ben’s homelessness. As statistical and prescriptive norms of 
unconditional state housing assistance are gradually eroded, we therefore become 
increasingly quick to accept Ben as the sole author of his homelessness.  
 
It is important to re-emphasise that I am not claiming these common-sense resolutions 
of the indeterminacies of picking the right agents and mapping responsibility’s flow 
are the right ones. I claim only that this is how we unthinkingly resolve these 
indeterminacies when we make instinctive judgements of authorship. (In Chapter 5 I 
use the account advanced here to show how egalitarians can best challenge these 
common-sense resolutions.) For now, however, notice how our attempt to pin down 
how we in fact make determinate agent responsibility attributions has led us to the 
significance of responsibilities as obligations; try as we might to separate out the 
different kinds of responsibility, they soon spring back into a co-dependent tangle.  
 
(ii) Sexual assault 
We can now see why people so often single out the perpetrator and the victim as the 
relevant potential co-authors in the assault case. By perpetrating sexual assault, the 
perpetrator violates strong dominant norms that one ought not to and will not 
assault people. And, more interestingly, we commonly single out the victim as a 
potential co-author because our dominant map of actual causation is sexist: it 
enshrines the expectation that women protect themselves from sexual violence by 
curtailing their basic freedoms if necessary. The potential – realised here – for 
inegalitarian norms and expectations to animate maps of actual causation will prove 
of central importance.  
 
Rape prevention techniques focusing on disciplining women’s behaviour (rather 
than stopping potential perpetrators from committing sexual assault) are a 
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particularly traditional form of responsibilisation. For example, rape statistics are 
often used to threaten women into a ‘healthy caution’, encouraging women to fear 
sexual violence as a form of ‘responsible citizenship.’258 As this language suggest, the 
norm that women protect themselves often weaves back and forth over the line 
between statistical diagnoses – drinking alone as a woman often results in sexual 
assault – and prescriptive warnings – women ought not drink alone.259 This 
intertwining of the descriptive and the prescriptive is key to the naturalisation of the 
prescriptive norm as neutral/natural common sense rather than contestable, 
normative political judgement.260  
 
As Rachel Hall argues, these narrative techniques ‘privatize the woman's body in 
order to refuse the responsibility for safeguarding her freedom to live, move, and 
socialize unharmed.’261 In other words, our dominant political schema works to 
privatise the risk of sexual assault by holding individual women obligated to avoid it 
for themselves. With these implicit norms framing common-sense understandings of 
and discussions about sexual assault, women’s drinking (/mode of dress/choice of 
transport home/friendliness with her assaulter) is understood to constitute an actual 
cause of assaults. Within this dominant map of actual causation, our assault victim’s 
drinking alone makes her causally co-responsible for the assault and thus agent co-
responsible for it too, since the risks she took are common knowledge.  
 
Though this particular form of risk privatisation has a long pedigree, the 
 
258 Hall (2004: 8 & 11). A study by Jago and Christenfeld (2018: 4) confirms that ‘increased victim 
blaming does occur as a result of victim-focused risk avoidance seminars.’ 
259 For example, Yoffe (2013), discussing alcohol and sexual assault, states that ‘the truth’ is that 
women ‘are responsible for keeping their wits about them’, and that young women ‘have to 
understand safety begins with you.’ These sound like prescriptive statements to me. She also 
asserts, apropos of no evidence whatsoever, that ‘nothing is going to be as effective at preventing 
alcohol-facilitated assaults as a reduction in alcohol consumption’ – this sounds more like a 
statistical claim.  
260 As Grossberg (1996: 159) notes, ‘what is natural can be taken for granted; it defines ‘common 
sense.’ 
261 Hall (2004: 7). 
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phenomenon is wider reaching. Similar risk privatisation is also fostered by 
allocating responsibility for Ben’s homelessness to him alone, for example. And, in 
fact, this kind of risk privatisation is central to the neoliberal politics of 
‘responsibilisation’ described in Chapter 2. It functions to reallocate both critical 
attention and liabilities from the state and other collectives to individuals in 
healthcare, housing, education, and elsewhere.262 The neoliberal economist Gary 
Becker’s reasoning is archetypical of this political move; in holding that most (‘if not 
all!’) deaths are  ‘to some extent’ self-authored because we all sometimes make 
choices we know are not maximally healthy, he takes this responsibilisation to its 
extreme.263  
 
Foregrounding individuals’ actions and enlarging their personal obligations goes in 
hand with occluding possibly relevant collective agents and the effects of their 
actions. Becker’s foregrounding of individuals’ personal choices occludes other 
agents whose actions impact people’s health, for example. Similarly, sexist rape 
prevention discourse occludes other agents’ role in reproducing a climate in which 
sexual assault is to be expected, by addressing women as ‘a series of individual 
bodies responsible for protecting their own “stuff”.’264 This is because, in effect, 
picking one or two actions to hold up for attention as the actual causes of an event 
also serves to deflect attention from other potential causes.265  
 
In this way, ontological individualism reinforces and is reinforced by this 
inegalitarian push to allocate responsibility for an increasing range of misfortunes to 
individuals alone. As Wendy Brown puts it, ‘disintegrating the social into 
entrepreneurial and self-investing bits’ – i.e. adopting an individualistic political 
 
262 Rose (1996); Brown (2015). 
263 Becker (2013: 10).  
264 Hall (2004: 7). 
265 Swanson (2010: 227) makes this point when discussing the context-sensitivity of causal talk. 
Young (2011b: 180) makes a similar argument about the ‘liability model’ of responsibility.  
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ontology and a map of actual social causation that holds individuals obligated to 
secure their own wellbeing and prosperity through perfect personal choices – 
‘removes umbrellas of protection provided by belonging, whether to a pension plan 
or to a citizenry.’266  
 
No coincidence, then, that David Cameron repeatedly used the language of 
responsibility to justify his programme of austerity.267 Nor that the UK Health 
Minister insists first and foremost on the need for personal responsibility and good 
choices in healthcare while simultaneously presiding over a ‘severely and 
chronically underfunded’ public healthcare system.268 Ontological individualism 
combined with a responsibilising map of actual social causation provides perfect 
cover for the dismantling of public protections and social goods.   
 
(iii) Carework  
 
Where women are concerned, their labour appears to be a personal service 
outside of capital. - Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James269  
 
Cases of homelessness and sexual assault illustrate the role dominant maps of actual 
social causation play in guiding common-sense authorship ascriptions. Such maps 
have always enshrined sexist responsibilising obligations. And, in the last few 
decades, they have increasingly enshrined neoliberal responsibilising assumptions 
about who holds what political obligations. The case of unpaid carework is slightly 
different, however. Here, common-sense authorship attributions hinge less on 
 
266 Brown (2015: 37). 
267 E.g. this chapter’s first guide quote (p.72).  
268 Donnelly et al. (2018). 
269 Costa & James (2017: 28) 
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enlarging individualist political obligations within the public realm and more on 
norms dividing this social/public realm from the personal/private realm.270  
 
To see this first note that a significant part of Sylvia’s partner’s success at work is a 
foreseeable consequence of her carework at home. It frees considerable time for him 
to undertake paid work and ensures he is fed, rested, and refreshed on returning to 
the office. Yet dominant maps of actual social causation do not hold Sylvia causally 
responsible for her partner’s success at work. Mainstream political economists, for 
example, implicitly define work within the private realm as unproductive, 
reinforcing a ‘distinction between the moral (or private) and the economic (or public) 
world, neatly assigning women and the family to one, men and the market to the 
other.’271 In other words, some of the most influential experts determining these 
maps tell us Sylvia is causally responsible for nothing of public, economic value.  
 
The concept of the unproductive housewife solidified in the 19th century, partly in 
response to male trade unionist arguments that ‘housewives were – or should be – 
“dependents”.’272 (Notice, again, the weaving between statistical and prescriptive 
assertions, helping to naturalise the idea of an unproductive private sphere.) Alongside 
the assumption that feminized caring labour has no productive impact in the sphere of 
public economic value normally comes the denial of any statistical norm connecting 
unpaid carework to a functioning labour force, economy, and society (and the 
accompanying denial that such activities ought to be recognised as work).273  
 
270 Though insofar as women are assumed obligated to do house- and carework for free, 
assumptions about obligations are not absent but rather part-constitute public-private 
imaginaries.  
271 Folbre (1991: 467). 
272 Folbre (1991: 464) – my emphasis.  
273 E.g. ‘home care workers’ in the US employed by private companies are legally paid below 
minimum wage because they do not officially count as ‘employees’ – (Boris and Klein 2012). 
Home care workers employed by private companies in the UK likewise still struggle to access a 
minimum wage (Merrill 2016; Plimmer 2018). (I discuss this case further in Chapters 7 and 8.) In 




Long-dominant norms delineating public from private therefore dictate that the 
productive effects of Sylvia’s carework do not permeate into the public realm’s 
networks of economic production. At best, her work is understood as an enabling 
background condition (not an actual cause) of her partner’s success. Accordingly, we 
tend to instinctively individuate and value Sylvia’s and her partner’s labour 
according to dominant – and sexist – marketized common sense and social practices, 
deeming her the author of only those outcomes which markets, employment law, 
and gendered social norms attribute to her: her clean home, well-fed partner, and 
relative poverty.  
 
Those responsibility-sensitive egalitarians who assume Sylvia authors only her 
carework and her poverty endorse these dominant maps of actual social causation 
by classifying carework as a private leisure choice. Rakowski, for example, thinks 
such caretakers should be left to bear their poverty.274 He describes unpaid carework 
a ‘creed’ or a ‘lifestyle’, and treats childcare as a private leisure choice since parents 
are ‘apt to be by far the major beneficiaries.’275 
 
Even those responsibility-sensitive egalitarians who think unpaid carers ought not 
be left to bear their poverty tend to accept that these carers are agent responsible for 
it. Stemplowska, for example, writes that we ‘assume they [poor carers] really are 
 
realm. As Strathern (1988: 315) puts it, ‘Of course ‘we’ are all sophisticated enough to know that 
genetics requires coupling and that people do not in that sense procreate alone. But the Western 
imagination plays with the idea that mothers make babies in the same way as a worker makes a 
product, and that work is their value. In spite of the input of enabling technology, so to speak, 
the worker joins her labour with natural objects in order to create a thing.’ The gendered public-
private divide generates an invisible boundary keeping private/feminine and public/masculine 
actual causation separate.  
274 Rakowski (1991: 109).  
275 Rakowski (1991: 109, 153). He does not discuss inequalities between parents due to his 
uncharacteristic retreat to a collective agent (‘parents’) when allocating responsibility for 
children. On parallel neoliberal waverings between the individual and family as the basic unit of 
society, see Brown (2015: 100-107). 
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responsible for the choices they made.’276 Similarly, Carl Knight suggests we treat 
‘the choice to perform these socially valuable activities as one type of individual 
choice that we are prepared to subsidize.’277 His recognition of care work’s social 
value is at odds with his assumption that paying carers counts as ‘subsidising’ an 
‘individual choice.’ As with the cases of assault and homelessness, then, political 
philosophers’ instinctive attributions of agent responsibility track wider trends of 
dominant common sense.  
 
Dominant maps of actual social causation help resolve our third indeterminacy too: 
that of ascertaining degrees of responsibility. After all, completely blocking 
responsibility’s flow from an intentional action to a foreseeable consequence is the 
limit case of dividing responsibility between authors; to insist Sylvia holds no 
responsibility for her partner’s economic productivity is just to insist on a certain 
division of responsibility.  
 
Given this, Sylvia’s limit case can shed light on how we instinctively make gradated 
divisions of responsibility too. I mentioned 19th century arguments about how 
housewives were/should be dependents, but such divisions of economic authorship 
are not simply vestiges of the past. Similar divisions are expressed by approaches 
like the ‘marginal productivity theory of distribution’ – a ‘fundamental truth’ of 
neoclassical economics.278  
 
 
276 Stemplowska (2009: 242) – she uses this as further reason to think we are only justly left to 
bear the burdens of what we are responsible for under specific, limited circumstances. 
277 Knight (2005: 60-62). It is unclear whether Knight thinks the carers agent responsible for the 
social value created; seeing caring activities as socially valuable suggests so but talk of 
‘subsidising’ this ‘individual choice’ suggests not. If he does, I would welcome this. (Though I 
would not endorse his approach to assessing such responsibility as outlined in a later article 
{Knight 2006}, which advocates leaving these assessments to a committee of metaphysicians. 
Why think metaphysicians alone are best equipped to determine carework’s productive impact? 
I would prefer some feminist political philosophers and economists were present.)  
278 Pullen (2009: 1). 
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Roughly, this theory states that a worker’s pay tends to be equal to the value of their 
‘marginal productivity’ – the productivity increase resulting from employing that 
worker. In other words, this theory states that wages tend to be of equal value to 
what workers are agent responsible for producing. It thus suggests that markets 
adequately divide and value workers’ authorship of joint products. Since no 
productivity gain would result from employing Sylvia – she already does these 
actions for free – the marginal productivity theory of distribution suggests she does 
not produce anything economically valuable.     
 
In a now-familiar naturalisation move, this theory is sometimes presented as a value-
neutral scientific theorem and sometimes as a prescriptive norm. For example, the 
neoclassical economist J. B. Clark argued that distributions in line with the theory 
are both economically and morally correct since they express natural justice.279 
Though many of its modern presentations are painted as scientific theorems, the 
economist John Pullen argues that they still often contain ‘vestiges of the language of 
normative judgements.’280  
 
Within political philosophy too, market wages are often the assumed mechanism for 
ascertaining to what degree workers’ actions matter for generating outcomes. For 
example, Will Kymlicka assumes that distributions resulting from market 
transactions perfectly reflect degrees of agent responsibility. Comparing someone 
who earns no income because they spend the day playing tennis with someone who 
earns income through selling food that they farm, he attributes the income they 
respectively generate solely to their different choices.281 Even Stemplowska, who 
develops one of the most convincing and nuanced approaches of all responsibility-
 
279 As cited in Pullen (2009: 2).  
280 Pullen (2009: 5 - and see 148-149). 
281 Kymlicka (2002: 72-74). Dick (1975) explicitly argues that the marginal productivity theory of 
distribution is 'roughly' the right measure of agent responsibility.  
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sensitive egalitarians, implies that we can trust markets to reflect degrees of 
authorship in the majority of cases.282  
 
In their resolutions of this third indeterminacy too, then, political-philosophical 
appeals to agent responsibility harmonize with, rather than interrogate or critique, 
wider trends within dominant political common sense.  
 
4.5. Conclusion: Laying the Foundations for Critique 
We can now see how agent responsibility’s three indeterminacies are resolved in 
everyday practice. I have outlined the rationales underlying our instinctive decisions 
about who constitute the relevant agents, how responsibility flows from their 
intentional actions to some foreseeable consequences but not others, and how we 
divide responsibility between agents. We rely on a largely unconscious political 
schema containing a political ontology and a map of actual social causation.283 The 
former sets the parameters of authorship attributions by suggesting which 
responsible agents exist in the political sphere, while the latter provides a framework 
guiding our judgements about to what degree (if any) their responsible agency flows 
from their intentional actions to those actions’ various foreseeable consequences.    
 
These maps play this role because agent responsibility requires ‘actual causation’ 
rather than an action simply being part of an outcome’s wider causal structure. 
Because of this, common-sense understandings of responsibility’s flow rely on the 
narratives and models of ‘actual social causation’ enshrined within dominant 
 
282 Stemplowska (2009: 249). This statement suggests markets implement fair distributions in the 
majority of all socio-political outcomes, the list of which includes things like: distributions of 
clean air, voting, political office, policing, passports, school places, and healthcare; the 
organisation of road traffic, inter-company holiday-day allocations, law-making, and the socio-
political aspects of familial love and care. Gibson-Graham (2009: 19) caution against the 
‘discursive marginalisation’ of the many non-market goods, services, and practices that remain 
fundamental even within advanced capitalist societies.   




political schemas. These maps – the taken-for-granted models and narratives 
guiding our determinations of how causal responsibility flows from some 
intentional actions to their consequences but not others – operate according to 
dominant statistical and prescriptive norms: norms about what outcomes do or 
should follow from what actions. In particular, they rely on norms regarding what 
obligations agents hold towards one another in the political realm, as well as norms 
regarding where the public-political realm begins and ends. 
 
Political philosophers’ instinctive or assumed resolutions to the problems of picking 
the right agents, delimiting responsibility’s flow, and dividing responsibility often 
track wider trends of dominant common sense. But, as argued, these dominant 
beliefs can be unreflectively individualistic and sexist. They are also neoliberal: they 
assign responsibility for an increasing range of outcomes to individuals rather than 
political collectives, and they display a comfortable faith in marketized measures of 
economic productivity.  
 
Having outlined how we do in fact make intuitive determinate authorship 
attributions, I now turn to the implications of this account. Recall that in Chapter 3, 
discussing the sexual assault case, I said feminists rightly deny that our woman co-
authors the assault because they deny her causal responsibility for it. There, I 
suggested that common-sense views about what counts as a cause and what counts 
as merely a background causal enabling condition can be and are affected by 
political power hierarchies. Though I have not made good on this claim yet, this 
chapter provides the essential theoretical grounding needed for explaining and 
defending it in Chapter 5. There, I ask: on what basis can egalitarians best challenge 
common-sense maps of actual social causation so as to arrive at different 
responsibility attributions? And I argue that better, more egalitarian analyses of 










Slowly but surely, neoliberal ideas have permeated and are transforming what 
passes as common sense. More egalitarian and collectivist attitudes of the kind 
that once underpinned the welfare-state era are giving way to a more 
competitive, individualistic, market-driven, entrepreneurial, profit-oriented 
outlook.  
 
But popular common sense also contains critical or utopian elements... 
Common sense and 'good sense' co-exist, and this provides a basis on which 
the left could develop a popular strategy for radical change. – Stuart Hall & 
Alan O’Shea 284 
 
5.1. Introduction  
We now have a far better idea of how we quickly and intuitively make agent 
responsibility ascriptions in everyday practice, despite the indeterminacies left by 
standard attempts to formally map the concept. We know, for example, that victims 
of sexual assault are often attributed some agent responsibility for their assault 
because of the dominance of norms which hold women responsible for protecting 
themselves against such violence even at the cost of their basic freedoms.  
 
 
284 Hall & O’Shea (2013b). 
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Throughout Chapters 3 and 4 I emphasised that common practical resolutions of 
these indeterminacies can and should be challenged by egalitarians. As feminists 
rightly challenged the idea that victims co-author their assaults, I suggested, so 
egalitarians can and must challenge a whole host of other common-sense agent 
responsibility attributions. But I have yet to explain how such a challenge is possible 
or how political philosophers can play a role in it. I now take up this task, illustrating 
how egalitarian critiques of responsibility attributions are possible. I argue that 
egalitarians need not and must not rely on common-sense norms to animate our 
maps of ‘actual social causation’ – those taken-for-granted models and narratives 
which guide our determinations of what counts as an ‘actual cause’ of an event and 
what as a background causal enabling condition. Since these maps, in turn, animate 
our agent responsibility attributions, different maps result in different attributions.  
 
These alternative attributions are possible because of how the conceptual tool of actual 
causation functions: it works to give us the best – most incisive and helpful – picture of 
what matters for normal purposes. Since what constitute ‘normal purposes’ vary 
widely according to context, actual causation too is thoroughly context-dependent. 
What counts as an actual cause for normal scientific purposes may be a background 
enabling condition for the purposes of day-to-day life, for example.  In the context of 
normative political debates, I argue, what matters are not the relevant statistical norms 
but rather the right prescriptive norms for the given problem. This means that in this 
context, authorship attributions have important and inescapable normative political 
dimensions.  
 
In this chapter I continue to work from the three cases analysed in Chapter 4: sexual 
assault, homelessness, and unpaid carework.285 For each case, I contrast the common-
sense responsibility attributions outlined in Chapter 4 with more egalitarian ‘good-
 
285 For a full outline of these cases see Chapter 4, Section 2.  
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sense’ ones. Because of this, I suggest that taking agent responsibility ascriptions as our 
supposedly apolitical starting point and then assessing how they matter for justice 
obscures significant ethico-political decisions – decisions about how we should live 
together, what we collectively and individually owe to one another, and how we 
should understand and value various social activities, for example.  
 
Political philosophers who want to use the concepts of choice and agent responsibility 
must therefore engage in debates concerning who is agent responsible for what, rather 
than leaving these determinations to common-sense or to metaphysicians. Egalitarians 
especially, since otherwise agent responsibility can act as a ‘trojan horse’: reliance on 
insufficiently critical conceptions of agent responsibility can smuggle inegalitarian 
political judgements into supposedly egalitarian theories.  
 
As before, when I talk of responsibility without specifying which kind, I mean agent 
responsibility. Since I work from a definition of agent responsibility which understands 
me to be responsible for those outcomes I ‘author’, I continue to use authorship and 
responsibility synonymously.286 Since us political philosophers are in the business of 
improving our collective normative political judgements, in what follows I assume it is 
possible to make right or wrong – or, if you prefer, better and worse – such 
judgements.  
 




5.2. Common-sense as Performative Depoliticisation 
I was never really into politics… I don’t feel myself a politician even now. – 
Tony Blair (then UK Prime Minister)287 
 
In an opportunity society, as opposed to the old welfare state, government does 
not dictate; it empowers. It makes the individual - patient, parent, law-abiding 
citizen, job-seeker - the driver of the system, not the state… Choice is not a 
Tory word. – Tony Blair288 
Common sense presents itself as apolitical – a ‘product of Nature rather than of 
history.’289 But this appearance is deceptive. As argued, the common-sense judgements 
of social causation that our intuitive responsibility attributions rest on are often socially 
conservative and/or neoliberal.290 For example, recall that Sylvia is not formally 
employed but cooks for her partner, cleans their house, washes his clothes, administers 
household bills and repairs, provides emotional care when he gets home, and 
disproportionately maintains their social and familial networks. Common sense 
dictates that since unpaid carework is socially and economically unproductive – a 
personal, private lifestyle choice – people like Sylvia who intentionally undertake 
unpaid carework are agent responsible for all and only the outcomes of their clean 
houses, happy partners, and personal impoverishment.  
 
Assertations of common sense in this setting are performative: endorsing norms as 
‘common sense’ in normative political debates legitimises and reinforces them. Worse, 
asserting a norm as apolitical common sense naturalises it, setting it outside the bounds 
of political contestation. For example, asserting as an apolitical premise the idea that 
 
287 Blair in 2000, as quoted in Mair (2013: 4). 
288 Blair's (2004b) speech to Labour Conference.  
289 Hall and O’Shea (2013a: 9). 
290 See Chapter 4.  
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unpaid carers author nothing but their immediate, private caring activities and their 
poverty tacitly suggests it is a simple apolitical fact that such carework is not an activity 
of any public social or economic value.  
 
Such depoliticisation occurs in political philosophy as well as public discourse: when 
discussed at all, the job of analysing agent responsibility is often cast as a metaphysical, 
and therefore not political-philosophical, problem.291 In this way, apolitical 
understandings of responsibility can legitimise and naturalise conservative, neoliberal 
narratives and evaluations – narratives and evaluations that I will argue are anything 
but apolitical or incontestable. Because of this, ‘[t]he battle over common sense is a 
central part of our political life.’292 It is therefore vital we critically appraise apparently 
apolitical common-sense responsibility attributions, replacing them with egalitarian 
good sense attributions wherever appropriate. Let’s see how such critiques might 
work.   
 
5.3. Egalitarian Responsibility Attributions 
Recall the case of a woman who went to a bar alone to have a drink despite knowing 
that doing so was risky. On leaving, she is followed and sexually assaulted. In 
Chapter 3 I asserted that feminists were right to deny this woman co-authorship of 
the assault. We deny her authorship because we deny her causal responsibility (e.g. 
‘No matter what someone has done or failed to do, they did not cause their sexual 
assault’293). Feminists classify the idea that the victim did something to cause her 
 
291 E.g. Cohen (1989: 934) and Arneson (2004: 10) suggest that the concept falls outside the remit 
of political philosophy. Others suggest the problem of understanding what we are agent 
responsible for is reducible to the metaphysical problem of free will (e.g. Knight 2006: 185; 
Smilansky 1997: 157-158). If political philosophers do not take this route, they often simply flag 
the difficulty of analysing agent responsibility before bracketing the issue (e.g. Segall 2013: 3; 
Stemplowska 2009: 240; Tan 2008: 669) – such a move implicitly assumes the political import of 
agent responsibility can be safely separated from analysis of the concept’s workings. I discuss 
these positions at greater length in Chapter 3, Section 2.  
292 Hall and O’Shea (2013a: 1). 
293 Eastern Michigan University (2018).  
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rape or sexual assault as a common sexist myth in need of dismantling.294  
 
On what grounds can feminists claim that our woman’s decision to risk drinking 
alone in public is a background enabling condition but not an actual cause of the 
assault? Recall from Chapter 4 that common-sense maps of actual social causation 
rely on a dominant but implicit set of statistical and prescriptive norms to 
differentiate actual causes from background enabling conditions. But we need not – 
must not – uncritically accept these norms as the right ones on which to base 
judgements of actual social causation. This is because, as philosophers of causation 
point out, our concept of actual causation works as it does to enable us to give the 
most incisive picture of which acts and omissions in the broader causal structure 
matter for normal purposes.295  
 
Note that what constitute ‘normal purposes’ is thoroughly context-dependent: the 
normal purposes of scientific investigation differ from those of normative political 
enquiry or interpersonal relationships, for example. The context in which we ask, ‘what 
is causally responsible for x?’ therefore affects which answers are appropriate. For 
normal day-to-day life (and friendship) purposes, my breaking a promise to water your 
plants is causally responsible for their death. But suppose you are an amateur plant 
scientist busy hybridising drought-resistant spider-plants; you think your latest batch 
will easily last a fortnight without water but want to test this while home, so you 
nonetheless ask me to water them while you are away. When you ask what is causally 
responsible for their death with your scientist hat on, you learn nothing helpful if 
pointed towards unreliable waterers; you want to know about soil composition, 
 
294 Fanflick (2007: 17). 
295 I adapt this from Swanson (2010: 231) who explains the context sensitivity of causal statements 
in terms of our selecting what 'matters most for normal purposes'. Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) 
make the stronger, more explicitly forward-looking claim that actual causation works like this to 
enable us to design effective interventions.  
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sunlight hours, hybridisation processes, and their relationships to plant cell 
breakdown.     
 
This pragmatic, contextual component of causal responsibility helps explain why 
practices of attributing agent responsibility are themselves so context-dependent. For 
example, when judging who authored an artwork within creative contexts, the artist’s 
original creative input strikes us as what matters, even above the creative inputs of her 
teachers and muses. Within this context, the artist’s intentional causal chains are what 
matter. Yet within an economic context, we would likely characterise the editor, 
publisher and printer as responsible for the artwork too, since their actions also 
produced it in economically valuable ways.296  
 
Now, we are investigating normative political-philosophical and normative public-
political appeals to agent responsibility; for these purposes, what matters are 
normative (/prescriptive/evaluative) issues. Maps of actual causation animating 
political appeals to agent responsibility therefore have a normative dimension because 
they depend on our selecting what we think matters for ethico-political analyses and 
proposals – and in this context what matters is primarily a normative judgement.297  
 
 
296 Far smaller contextual changes can have big effects on standard practices of attributing 
authorship too. In academic philosophy departments, students tend to claim sole authorship for 
published papers even when these are written under close supervision and guidance from other 
staff members; within science labs, it is much more usual for such supervisors to be understood and 
listed as co-authors.  
297 This selecting amongst causal chains for the ones that matter to normative political enquiry is 
similar to the role that I argued normative concerns can legitimately play in ontological theory 
choice (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.ii): normative concerns need not compete with causal evidence 
but rather help us rank its significance. In this way, certain causal facts and evidence become 
especially significant because of the normative values contextualising our enquiry.  
114 
 
This all suggests that, for our purposes, maps of actual social causation should be based 
on the relevant prescriptive norm rather than the relevant statistical norm.298 As a 
consequence, ethico-political judgements are necessarily intertwined with our 
judgements of actual social causation when we are drawing on actual social causation 
in contexts of ethico-political debate and discussion.299 Furthermore, political 
philosophers are well-placed to critically assess common-sense evaluations of what 
matters for normative political enquiry.  
 
To make this rather dry theory more digestible, I now return to our three cases. Using 
them, I defend this approach to responsibility attributions. I show how animating maps 
of actual social causation using egalitarian prescriptive norms results in different 
attributions of causal responsibility and therefore different, more egalitarian, 
attributions of agent responsibility. In each example, I argue that we can and must 
replace the common-sense maps of actual social causation outlined above with more 
egalitarian, good sense maps. As we have already begun to discuss it, I start with the 
case of sexual assault.  
 
5.3.1. Sexual Assault 
 
I ask just the men: What steps do you guys take, on a daily basis, to prevent 
yourselves from being sexually assaulted? At first there is a kind of awkward 
silence as the men try to figure out if they've been asked a trick question. The 
silence gives way to a smattering of nervous laughter… before someone finally 
raises his hand and soberly states, 'Nothing. I don't think about it.'  
 
298 Of course, certain statistical norms will bear on our investigations about what constitutes the 
right prescriptive norm. McTernan (2019) explores how facts about how the world is might bear 
on normative political arguments about how it ought to be.   
299 For arguments that normative factors legitimately influence causal judgements tout court see 
McGrath (2005), Hitchcock and Knobe (2009), and Statham (2018). 
5.  EGALITARIAN RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS 
115 
 
Then I ask women the same question… As the men sit in stunned silence, the 
women recount safety precautions they take as part of their daily routine… 
Hold my keys as a potential weapon. Look in the back seat of the car before 
getting in. Carry a cell phone. Don't go jogging at night. Lock all the 
windows when I sleep, even on hot summer nights. Be careful not to drink too 
much. Don't put my drink down and come back to it; make sure I see it being 
poured. Own a big dog. Carry Mace or pepper spray. Have an unlisted phone 
number. Have a man's voice on my answering machine. Park in well-lit 
areas… Vary my route home from work. Watch what I wear. Don't use 
highway rest areas. Use a home alarm system. Don't wear headphones when 
jogging. Avoid forests or wooded areas, even in the daytime. Don't take a first-
floor apartment. Go out in groups… Don't make eye contact with men on the 
street. Make assertive eye contact with men on the street. – Jackson Katz300 
 
In this case, both statistical norms and common-sense prescriptive norms point to our 
assault victim’s drinking alone while female as an action that matters in normative 
debates about how to understand and handle such assaults. The statistical norm points 
this way because the activity of drinking in general – and therefore, more specifically, 
drinking while female – correlates with assault outcomes.301 And a common 
prescriptive norm points towards our woman’s action by suggesting that because of 
this danger, women ought to be more careful.302 Our assault victim is so often deemed 
 
300 Katz (2006: 2-3). 
301 Abbey et al. (2004: 275-276) survey the research and find consistent evidence that around 50% 
of both perpetrators and victims of sexual assault had been drinking alcohol. As they note, ‘the 
strong correlation between perpetrators’ and victims’ alcohol consumption makes it difficult to 
examine the independent effects of each individual’s intoxication’ (Abbey et al. 2004: 276). 
302 E.g. Yoffe (2013): ‘College women: Stop getting drunk’. Yoffe goes on to write that ‘the truth’ 
is that women ‘are responsible for keeping their wits about them’, and that young women ‘have 
to understand safety begins with you.’ Schulte (2015) reports ‘expert’ advice under the following 
headings: ‘As a freshman girl, be on guard during the first few weeks of school… Always have a 
“battle buddy” when going out. Don’t go off alone…. Don’t drink.’ 
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co-responsible for her assault because common-sense maps of actual social causation 
are animated by one or both of these norms.  
 
Since we commonly judge her action as one that matters in the production of the 
assault outcome, she is deemed causally responsible for it and therefore agent 
responsible too. To translate this view into everyday parlance, these women are seen as 
‘asking for it’ (to some degree at least) through the risks they intentionally take.  In 
philosophical parlance, they are seen as co-responsible to some degree because, by 
intentionally and knowingly taking risks, the assault ‘stems appropriately from’ or 
‘suitably reflects’ their agency.303  
 
We can now explain and vindicate the feminist claim that ‘no matter what someone has 
done or failed to do, they did not cause their sexual assault.’304 Feminists strongly deny 
that the action of drinking alone while female is one that matters for ethico-political 
enquiry since our woman simply exercised the same freedom that many men exercise 
without second thought. Her drinking alone is an irrelevant background condition, not 
an actual cause; assault does not stem appropriately from nor suitably reflect our 
victim’s intentional actions. Pointing to the action of drinking alone in public as 
causally responsible for assault is like pointing to the presence of oxygen as causally 
responsible for a wildfire; it impermissibly calls attention to entirely the wrong thing. 
Because of this, feminists hold that the dominant prescriptive norm is misguided: 
women should not be required to curtail their basic freedoms in order to avoid sexual 
assault.  
 
We likewise insist that in normative political debates about how we, as a society, 
 
303 E.g. Stemplowska (2009: 245) - for a fuller discussion of Stemplowska's position on cases like 
this see Chapter 3, Section 3. Knight and Stemplowska (2011b: 12-13) define agent responsibility 
by drawing on the idea that an outcome must ‘stem appropriately’ from an intentional action; 
Vallentyne (2008: 58) says that the outcome must ‘suitably reflect’ one’s agency. 
304 DC Rape Crisis Centre (2016). 
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collectively understand and handle sexual assault, the current statistical norm is 
irrelevant. These debates are about what we as a society ought to do, and one of the 
things we ought to do is to ensure that women living their lives in perfectly normal, 
acceptable ways does not put them at risk. Basing authorship ascriptions on the 
statistical norm that drinking alone while female risks assault grounds these debates 
on the assumption that this norm cannot be challenged or changed – it naturalises 
the current situation.  
 
For example, Susan Griffin writes that, ‘[f]rom a very early age I, like most women, 
have thought of rape as part of my natural environment’, and she argues that this 
fear serves to keep women modest and out of public spaces (among other things).305 
The feminist approach assumes stopping sexual assault is possible – and that while 
assault remains so commonplace, women cannot necessarily avoid it no matter how 
much they curtail their lives.306 
 
It is therefore the right prescriptive norm on which we must base our map of actual 
social causation – and thus our authorship attributions. Prescriptive norms about 
what various agents ought to have done regarding the outcome in question are what 
matter in ethico-political debates about how we, collectively, ought to handle cases 
of sexual assault. Because of this, authorship attributions used in normative political 
debates like these themselves have important ethico-political dimensions.   
 
In this case, the right prescriptive norm insists that drinking alone while female 
ought not produce sexual assault. Within functioning political communities women 
ought not be obligated to protect themselves from assault by curtailing their basic 
freedoms. Feminist authorship attributions fight the dominant naturalisation of 
 
305 Griffin (1979: 3). 
306 For a classic argument about the value-laden nature of political science’s explanatory 
frameworks, including the normative significance of assumed possibilities and impossibilities, 
see Taylor (1973). 
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sexual assault by insisting that women should not be expected to shoulder extra 
costs because other groups shirk their basic obligations: the perpetrator his obligation 
to respect others’ rights, and the state its obligation to protect people from this kind 
of violence.307  
 
Picking everything in the causal structure leading to the assault as an actual cause 
(as Peter Vallentyne does308) impermissibly draws attention in very many 
counterproductive directions – the bar owner’s opening that night, the perpetrator’s 
parents’ allowing their adult son normal independence, and the woman’s choice to 
have a drink. Worse, mentioning only the perpetrator’s and victim’s actions (as Zofia 
Stemplowska and much rape prevention discourse does) impermissibly focuses even 
more attention on our women’s actions as one of just a couple that matter for 
producing sexual assaults.  
 
Due to how closely we often associate agent responsibility with consequential and 
moral responsibility (i.e. holding that authorship of an outcome implies justly 
shouldering its benefits and burdens and being praiseworthy or blameworthy for it), 
these agent responsibility ascriptions can have serious implications. A study by Jago 
and Christenfeld, for example, found that ‘increased victim blaming does occur as a 
result of victim-focused risk avoidance seminars’ – if we are told that what matters 
for the production of assaults are victims’ actions and omissions, we are more likely 
to blame victims for assault.  
 
Now, in response to this we could do as Stemplowska does: bite the bullet on 
 
307 We can generalise this logic: in most cases, potential victims of rights infringements are not 
obligated to curtail their basic freedoms to avoid these infringements, meaning they are not 
causally co-responsible for infringements if and when they occur. The caveat of ‘most cases’ 
reflects the possibility that we might be co-responsible for intentionally sought rights 
infringements – but many rights infringements (like sexual assault) violate the victim’s consent 
by definition. 
308 Vallentyne (2008: 61, 64). For discussion of Vallentyne’s position see Chapter 3, Section 3. 
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victims’ co-authorship but then deny that authorship justifies the resulting 
disadvantage in cases like this. 309 I am not averse to this latter denial, having no 
strong attachment to the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian goal of a theory of justice 
centred, first and foremost, around the relationship between agent responsibility and 
what distributive shares we each deserve. But Stemplowska’s position concedes too 
much to start with. By accepting this common-sense authorship attribution, she 
unintentionally endorses common sexist beliefs about who holds what socio-political 
obligations – even if she then explicitly denies that women who do not shoulder 
these obligations can be justly left to shoulder the burdens of their refusal.310  
 
In contrast, feminist good sense dictates that the actions that matter for producing 
sexual assaults include the action of sexually assaulting someone and any actions 
that (re)produce patriarchal legal and social practices which enable or promote such 
assaults. By allowing this feminist good sense to inform our background political 
schema, we articulate a more egalitarian conception of responsibility.311  
 
5.3.2. Homelessness 
What of Ben, who is homeless and normally deemed solely agent responsible for this 
outcome because his flat burned down when he left a candle alight unattended? As 
argued in Chapter 4, whether or not Ben is commonly held solely responsibility for 
his homelessness hinges on our assumptions about what various agents’ 
responsibilities-as-obligations were regarding this outcome. But egalitarians must 
make these assumptions explicit, interrogate them, and rewrite them wherever 
 
309 Stemplowska (2009: 245).  
310 As with this case, so with the cases of unpaid carework and homelessness too: Stemplowska’s 
approach implicitly accepts inegalitarian norms by endorsing common-sense responsibility 
attributions. Since Stemplowska takes common-sense authorship attributions for granted, she 
would also struggle to account for the dynamics of political responsibilisation; here too I believe 
that my political account fares better.   
311 In this paper and throughout this thesis I assume that any proper conception of egalitarianism 




appropriate. Again, we can do this because what matters for the normal purposes of 
normative political enquiry is not current statistical norms, nor currently dominant 
prescriptive norms, but the right prescriptive norms.  
 
Suppose we live in a state that standardly leaves homeless people on the streets after 
catastrophic accidents so that no one expects otherwise. When undertaking ethico-
political debates about how we, as a political collective, ought to deal with 
homelessness in general or Ben’s homelessness in particular, this statistical norm is 
not what matters.312 If we are using Ben’s authorship to guide normative political 
arguments about how our society should function, animating his authorship using 
current statistical norms insidiously bakes the status quo into our conclusions.313  
 
Instead, we need to know what the right prescriptive norm is in this situation. In 
other words, we need to know whether Ben’s state ought to help rehouse homeless 
people like him.314 If our answer is yes, the relevant prescriptive norm conflicts with 
the relevant statistical norm. In such cases, it is the prescriptive norm on which we 
must base our map of actual social causation – and thus our authorship attributions 
– since prescriptive norms about what various agents ought to have done regarding 
the outcome in question are what matter in ethico-political debates about how our 
society ought to function.  
 
Note that determining what obligations individuals and collectives hold towards 
 
312 As argued in my introduction, when political debates hinge on individual cases it is often 
because these cases are presented as architypes from which broader conclusions can be drawn.  
313 There is, of course, interesting political philosophical work to be done on what individuals 
ought to do if stuck living in an unjust or malfunctioning society (e.g. Miller 2011). However, 
most responsibility-sensitive egalitarian political philosophy is not aimed at this problem but 
rather at determining how our society ought to function (e.g. Arneson 2004; Cohen 1989; Knight 
2009, 2015; Segall 2013; Stemplowska 2009, 2013; Tan 2008).  
314 Of course, people will disagree about what the right prescriptive norm is. But that is politics; 
political philosophers are supposed to be experts at advancing arguments for their preferred 
position in the face of substantive normative political disagreements of exactly this kind.  
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one another is a paradigmatically political question. Ben’s sole responsibility is 
therefore not a politically neutral fact carrying independent ethico-political weight in 
determining state responsibilities towards him. Egalitarians who try to use Ben’s sole 
responsibility for his homelessness as a factor in normative debates about who ought 
to do what (if anything) to remedy his situation beg the question at hand. 
 
At this point, a classic responsibility-sensitive egalitarian objection goes as follows: 
Statistical norms tell Ben what he could reasonably expect from risking lighting a 
candle – an uninhabitable home and no state help to get another. Ben could have 
purchased housing insurance to guard against these risks. If he had done so he 
would not be homeless, but he chose not to. Since he chose not to insure, he is solely 
agent responsible for his current homelessness and therefore the state ought not help 
him.  
 
This objection assumes that the availability of private insurance secures Ben’s sole 
responsibility for his lack of a home. In other words, it takes Ben’s failure to buy 
private insurance to be the only actual cause of his homelessness, thereby assuming 
the state’s failure to help rehouse him is not an actual cause. It supposes this state 
omission is merely an irrelevant background enabling condition of the outcome, not 
one which matters for the purposes of normative political debate about who ought to 
help house Ben and people like him. Otherwise given the reasonable foreseeability of 
current state policies leaving people like Ben homeless, the state would be co-
responsible for his position, which this objection rules out. In short, it assumes that 
the only action that matters for the purposes of this kind of normative political 
debate is Ben’s failure to buy insurance.  
 
The objection assumes the statistical norm ‘people who buy private home insurance 
rarely end up homeless’ is the one that matters for mapping actual social causation 
in this context, but that is exactly what I have argued against. In normative political 
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debates, what matters are prescriptive norms: what ought to have been done by 
whom. Thus, we need to know whether or not Ben ought to have bought private 
housing insurance: did he – do we all – have a responsibility as obligation to 
privately insure against these risks? Or are there some risks we all run that are so 
catastrophic, so unpredictable, and so enmeshed in how wider society functions, that 
we ought to collectively insure against them in the form of public support for 
anyone who falls afoul of them? To work out whose actions and omissions are 
causally responsible for Ben’s homelessness, we are therefore forced back to our 
original question: ought we treat homelessness as a private problem or a public one? 
 
Nor is it question-begging to suggest citizens may have basic rights to housing (or 
housing assistance) since even responsibility-sensitive egalitarians think states 
should secure some bundle of inalienable basic rights such as equality before the law, 
freedom from discrimination and other ‘liberal-democratic’ rights.315 If political 
collectives have some basic responsibilities as obligations towards their members, we 
can surely dispute where these begin and end. By simply assuming that social and 
economic rights cannot have this inalienable normative status, we elide important 
political debates. The force of the ‘private housing insurance’ objection trades on the 
fact that such an assumption has gained intuitive acceptance in large swathes of the 
centre-left in the last few decades.  
 
If you remain unconvinced of the need to rely on prescriptive rather than statistical 
norms, imagine a parallel case of voting. Suppose you ought to have a vote, but the 
statistical norm is that you are often barred from voting because of your skin colour. 
No egalitarian would say ‘sorry, but you in fact authored this outcome by failing to 
obtain private insurance against unfair voter disenfranchisement.’ Nor does the 
assumed fungibility of housing set it apart from voting; ‘voter insurance’ need not 
 
315 Stemplowska (2009: 245, 254). Arneson (2004: 9-10) similarly suggests that we, as a collective, 
have at least some baseline responsibilities as obligations to one another. 
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pay out in money – it might grant you two votes at the next election, for example.316 
As this case shows, when statistical and prescriptive norms come apart, statistical 
norms attribute inappropriate outcomes to my agency, and appeals to the 
availability of private insurance do not change this.  
 
Basing our map of actual social causation on statistical norms in normative debates, 
then, can disguise the unjust status-quo as the outcome of victims’ own supposed 
‘responsible agency’. This is especially problematic when the statistical norms in 
question are based on increasingly ‘responsibilised’ societies where weak and 
relatively powerless individuals are handed increasing amounts of personal 
responsibility for surviving societies with turbulent economies, crumbling welfare 
services, and resilient hierarchies of race, class, and gender. The statistical norms 
arising from such contexts have no place setting the parameters of egalitarian 
debates about how our society ought to function.  
 
Furthermore, by analysing cases of just one or two individuals, the collective and 
individual agents we write out of our foundational examples struggle to re-enter the 
picture undiminished. If we start by assuming Ben the sole author of his homelessness 
by imagining away the political community and collectives he is embedded within – or 
assuming they hold no relevant obligations, at least – we struggle to justify anything 
but highly conditional public housing assistance schemes, for example.317 An implicit 
political schema shapes these examples’ very framing, singling out who the relevant 
agents might be and, by excluding all collective political agents, begging the question 
at hand. Examples tacitly assuming the state’s (and other political collectives’) complete 
 
316 Furthermore, some responsibility-sensitive egalitarians do not demand in-kind compensation 
for political goods. For example, Segall (2013: 126-27) argues that someone denied a job because 
of her skin colour but offered an ‘adequate’ compensation package – defined as one that they 
would choose above the job – no longer suffers discrimination.  
317 See e.g. Knight (2015).  
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lack of obligations for remedying misfortunes unsurprisingly cause us to struggle to 
justify the state having any such baseline obligations.318 
 
Acknowledging the political dimensions of authorship attributions is not a retreat into 
relativism; rather, it helps ensure that these attributions enshrine the right political 
values. If we think the state has an obligation to help rehouse Ben, for example, this can 
articulate an egalitarian conception of responsibility at odds with neoliberal common 
sense (since we will no longer see Ben as sole author of his homelessness). Nor are we 
stuck trading intuitions in a circle, as you say, ‘but he is solely responsible, so the state 
ought not help him’ and I reply, ‘but he is not solely responsible, because the state 
ought to help rehouse homeless people.’ For, luckily, debates about whether the state 
has these kinds of obligations need not hinge on attributions of agent responsibility.  
 
To see this, take Jeremy Waldron’s persuasive argument that the state of homelessness 
seriously jeopardises people’s freedom (and dignity).319 He points out that the legal 
performance of actions like sleeping, cooking, urinating, and so on are often denied to 
homeless people since they lack the legal right to a space in which to do them; these 
actions, however, are essential preconditions ‘for the sort of autonomous life that is 
celebrated and affirmed’ by liberal-democratic bundles of rights like those contained in 
the US constitution.320 These considerations make no appeal to agent responsibility for 
homelessness.  
 
Or take Katy Well’s arguments for a certain basic right to housing. She argues that 
anyone who is homeless or living in substandard, insecure housing has a 
 
318 For a survey of this struggle within the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian literature, see 
Knight (2015); I briefly assess Knight’s conclusions in footnote 194 (p.73).  
319 Waldron (1991). Similarly, McTernan et al. (2016) suggest that the precarity and vulnerability 
of many in the UK housing market harmfully jeopardises social relations of equality, and they 
use this as a reason to motivate greater state intervention in housing to mitigate this precarity.  
320 Waldron (1991: 320). 
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socioeconomic right to housing, and that this right is held against the state.321 Her 
arguments for this do not simply assert that the state has such an obligation, or that 
people are not solely agent responsible for their homelessness. Rather, she bases such a 
right on the need to protect people’s interest in being able to develop and execute ‘a life 
plan that is in some sense one’s own.’322 We can and must have productive debates 
about whether or not socioeconomic rights held against the state exist. Once we have 
done so we are far better placed to make determinate and fair authorship attributions 
in cases like Ben’s.  
 
More egalitarian authorship attributions are therefore both possible and important. 
Drawing on common-sense authorship attributions in political debates about how 
society ought to function risks placing conservative limits on these debates, by tacitly 
and mistakenly invoking current statistical norms or common-sense prescriptive norms 
as if they are apolitical facts. In these contexts, authorship attributions should be 
animated by the right prescriptive norms: those which hold the various agents 
involved to fair, egalitarian expectations and obligations regarding the outcome in 
question.  
 
5.3.3. Carework: Determining Responsibility’s Flow 
How does this argument bear on unpaid carework cases? Dominant authorship 
attributions rest on the assumption that Sylvia’s carework only matters within the 
private realm; recall the widespread assumption that feminized caring labour has no 
productive impact in the sphere of public, economic value.323 For this reason, these 
dominant authorship attributions attribute to Sylvia all and only the outcomes of her 
happy partner, clean house, and poverty.  
 
 
321 Wells (2018: 3). 
322 Wells (2018: 4). 
323 Folbre (1991:464) – my emphasis.  
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Again here, the dominant norms underlying common-sense authorship attributions 
contradict egalitarian good sense: those egalitarian prescriptive norms which value 
labour activities fairly and do not endorse a sexist public-private cut. And, again, 
egalitarians can and should challenge dominant norms that contradict this egalitarian 
picture, rather than tacitly endorse them as apolitical ‘common sense.’ For they are 
neither apolitical or incontestable; whether and how to draw such a public-private 
divide and how to demarcate valuable work from unproductive leisure are 
paradigmatic political questions.  
 
Moreover, political philosophers already have resources to challenge such 
assumptions. For example, socialist feminists and feminist political economists have 
long argued that Sylvia’s unpaid, undervalued carework is of fundamental 
importance to the maintenance of both formal economic productivity and a properly 
functioning society. As Wendy Brown notes, women ‘are the invisible infrastructure 
sustaining a world of putatively self-investing human capitals.’324  
 
This feminist perspective challenges common-sense understandings of the public-
private divide, insisting that carework is work, and redefining the private sphere as 
one of relations of production and reproduction.325 It argues that men benefit 
economically from unwaged carework and that capitalism relies on it to depress labour 
costs. And it challenges the idea that capitalist market mechanisms fairly individuate 
and value carework’s productive impact; some socialist feminists argue that women 
should be paid a wage for this work by the state.326 
 
 
324 Brown (2015: 106-7). And some women more than others: home care workers in the US are 
disproportionately women of colour (Boris and Klein 2012). Similarly, domestic work is 
increasingly outsourced to migrant women in the UK (Lutz 2011). 
325 Federici (2012: 97). Folbre (1991) gives historical context. 
326 On the former, see Folbre (1995). Federici (2012: 15-22) adds the latter claim.   
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Note that Silvia did not choose her poverty - she was never offered a wage for carework 
which she declined. Rather, her poverty is seen to ‘stem appropriately’ from her 
intentional carework by the dominant actual causation map but not by the dissident 
feminist one.327 These answers differ over which actions in the causal structure matter 
for producing her poverty and why; the common-sense one begins and ends with her 
decision to risk poverty to do unpaid, apparently unproductive work. A more 
egalitarian map, however, does two things differently.328  
 
First, it insists that Sylvia authors more than common sense dictates. It holds Sylvia co-
responsible for her partner’s economic success and other social and economic benefits, 
notwithstanding that current practices do not reward her for these. As such, any 
money given in recognition of her work would not be a ‘subsidy’ for an ‘individual 
choice’ but a wage earned for a vital social contribution.329  
 
Second, a more egalitarian map of actual social causation interrogates the idea that 
Sylvia is the sole author of her poverty. For the purposes of normative political 
debate, Sylvia’s carework may not even make the list of actions that matter in the 
causal structure leading to her poverty. At very least, this map would likely insist 
that her actions were one of many that matter in generating this outcome; it would 
likely call attention to all the (collective and individual) actions which create and 
reproduce practices ensuring the socio-economic benefits of her work systematically 
flow to others, leaving her financially vulnerable and impoverished.  
 
In cases of homelessness, sexual assault, and carework, then, we can and should 
challenge common-sense authorship attributions and articulate egalitarian good-
 
327 I limit discussion to two ‘maps’ for simplicity. There will likely be many more, each with their 
own areas of dominance.     
328 If we are egalitarian, we might ask, why concern ourselves with agent responsibility at all? If 
it has all these problems and tricky pitfalls, why not simply theorise without it? I address this 
issue in Chapter 6, Section 2. 
329 Cf. Knight (2005: 60-62).   
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sense alternatives. More generally, this is the case wherever the common-sense norm 
animating actual causation judgements (be it statistical or prescriptive) fails to match 
the relevant egalitarian good sense norm.  
 
5.3.4. Carework: Determining Degrees of Responsibility  
Drawing on egalitarian actual causation maps lets us attribute causal responsibility 
to the right agents. And it lets us correctly map responsible agency’s flow as 
travelling from an action to all and only those outcomes it is fair for agents to expect 
to arise from those outcomes; it is not fair to expect drinking alone while female to 
result in sexual assault, for example. This leaves one last indeterminacy to resolve in 
a more egalitarian fashion than common-sense dictates: that of dividing agent 
responsibility between multiple authors.330  
 
Happily, we are now well placed to explore what an egalitarian resolution of this 
indeterminacy involves. Blocking responsibility’s flow from intentional actions to 
some of their nonetheless foreseeable consequences rests on an actual causation map 
outlining what in the causal structure matters for our purposes. This picture helps 
illuminate gradated divisions of responsibility since completely blocking 
responsibility’s flow from an intentional action to a foreseeable consequence is the 
limit case of dividing responsibility between authors; to insist our assault victim 
holds no responsibility for the assault is just to insist on a certain division of 
responsibility.  
 
Let’s return to the carework case to explore the implications of this. Suppose we 
accept Sylvia co-authors some part of her partner’s firm’s economic productivity.331 
 
330 For a full explanation of these three indeterminacies see Chapter 4, Section 3. 
331 If so, she will of course be one of many that do so: cleaners, delivery drivers, employees’ 
healthcare workers, etc. These activities are standardly evaluated as economically productive 
and therefore relevant to the firm’s success – that is why no one questions that they warrant a 
wage from either the firm or their individual employers.   
5.  EGALITARIAN RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS 
129 
 
What degree of authorship does she have over this outcome? Our dominant political 
schema individuates and values her activities by appeal to capitalist market 
mechanisms, norms and practices. These set her degree of authorship at zero 
because they evaluate her activities as economically unproductive and therefore 
irrelevant: recall old arguments about how housewives were/should be dependents 
and newer ‘truths’ of neoclassical economics which see an individual’s market wage 
as indicative of productive output.  And recall how within political philosophy, too, 
market wages are often the assumed mechanism for ascertaining to what degree 
workers’ actions matter for generating outcomes.  
 
But, given the large and growing inequalities and the entrenched undervaluation of 
feminised (and raced) forms of labour within capitalist market economies, 
egalitarians should be wary of assuming markets adequately solve all or most of the 
problems of dividing responsibility.332 At the bare minimum, we must first specify 
carefully what kind of market mechanisms animated by what kind of property and 
legal systems we think can divide responsibility fairly.333  
 
This is a question of fair division – a normative political question – because again the 
appropriate norms to animate our actual social causation map are the right 
prescriptive norms about what actions matter, and to what degree, in producing 
what kind of outcomes. There is no value-neutral way to divide authorship amongst 
the individuals whose actions contribute to a joint outcome. For one thing, it is 
impossible to tell whether it was the additional worker who solely caused the 
 
332 Piketty (2014). Chapters 7-8 discuss the undervaluation of raced and feminised labour in 
greater depth. 
333 Despite her suggestion that markets can still solve the majority of puzzles of dividing 
responsibility, Stemplowska (2009: 247) goes furthest towards acknowledging this within the 
responsibility-sensitive paradigm; she refers to a marketized society with equal initial 
distributions as ‘neutral’ but not ‘entirely neutral’ because, she explains, though market 
mechanisms themselves can be neutral, the initial divisions cannot be. I would also contest the 
idea that market mechanisms can be ‘neutral’ in any meaningful sense of the word (see Chapter 
7, Section 3.3, and Chapter 8, Section 3).    
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increase in productivity, or whether the machines and other workers functioned 
more efficiently or worked harder themselves because of her extra input.334,335  
 
To divide their authorship, we must make judgements about the degree to which 
their actions mattered in producing the final product. There is no value-neutral way 
to ‘unscramble the eggs’ as it were; with jointly produced outcomes, there is no 
purely descriptive way to ascertain whose individual contribution produced what 
exact degree of output. The necessary judgements remain evaluative, even if they are 
hidden within the background assumptions of complex economic formulae.     
 
Since there is no way to make these authorship divisions without evaluative 
judgements, we might as well ensure we use the right ones. The carework case adds 
support to Anne Phillips’ argument that market mechanisms necessarily operate 
through historically specific conventions and norms336 – in this case sexist ones. For 
what is the market price of care without these sexist norms demarcating the 
public/productive from the private/unproductive? No such price exists.337 Even if we 
think markets adequate for assessing what inputs matter and to what degree, we 
must specify what kind of markets, given shape by what social relationships, norms, 
institutions, and conventions, we think adequate for this role. 
 
We might also want to address what limits ought to be placed on these markets. We 
may think certain kinds of market (underlain and animated by a certain set of 
norms, relationships and institutions) adequate for assessing what inputs matter to 
what degree for outcomes like industrial food production. Yet we may well balk at 
 
334 For further discussion see Pullen (2009: 134-144).  
335 Nor need market price be a good measure of the socio-political value of an action, as the case 
of carework illustrates so well. For discussion see Olsaretti (2009: 68-70). 
336 Phillips (2008). 
337 Even if we try to arrive at a price through a hypothetical, idealised market (following 
something like Dworkin’s approach) the question remains: in the idealised market, how do 
participants understand and value carework? I discuss this in Chapter 6, Section 2.1.  
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using these to assess authorship for outcomes like large-scale environmental 
destruction, road traffic, gendered violence, education, friendship, or flourishing 
democratic communities, for example. Surely we do not want to evaluate all 
responsibility attributions through market mechanisms (however ameliorated their 
form)? 
 
We must also consider how we might secure such social relations, institutions, and 
market limits, given our failures to do so in real life (and the profoundly 
inegalitarian results of these failures). Here it seems fruitful for political 
philosophers to acknowledge the close connection between markets and capitalism. 
The creep of marketization did not occur at random because we took our eye off the 
ball. Rather, the process is driven by capitalist incentives to exploit new sources of 
profit and establish new orders of political reason to justify such expansion and 
exploitation. Egalitarians investigating how we might go about putting marketized 
divisions of authorship in their place would therefore do well to recognise this 
practical connection between market mechanisms and capitalism338 – if they are 
interested in realising their theoretical conclusions in the real world, that is.339        
 
The responsibilisation of the last few decades has gone hand in hand with an 
unshakable, almost unremarked, faith in the ability of capitalist markets to 
individuate and value agents’ inputs fairly.340 I have tried to show how this faith has 
sometimes seeped into parts of political philosophy.  Feminists and socialists have 
long pointed out the flaws in such faith, struggled to de-naturalise and repoliticise 
 
338 Brown (2014) discusses the importance of this issue in greater depth.   
339 I think part of the point of doing political philosophy is to promote justice. Cf. Swift (2008: 
367) who argues that political philosophers need not aim at promoting justice any more than 
violinists, say. I recognise that my argument here will not touch those political philosophers only 
interested in collecting politically useless but elegant truths about justice in imagined worlds. For 
discussion see Chapter 1 (‘A Note on Methodology’).  
340 Brown (2015, 2016) outlines how this faith in markets has operated to transform practices and 
modes of political reason in euro-Atlantic societies. 
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market mechanisms and outcomes, and to reconnect marketization to capitalism.341 
Egalitarians drawing on responsibility in normative political debate cannot duck 
these thorny issues. Not least because to satisfactorily resolve our third and last 
indeterminacy – that of determining degrees of responsibility – we need to settle on 
fair methods of individuating and evaluating agents’ inputs into joint outcomes. 
Without very careful specification, markets cannot be presumed to resolve this 
indeterminacy in egalitarian ways. 
 
5.4. A Note on Reasonable Foreseeability 
Agent responsibility requires both causal responsibility and that the outcome be a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of an intentional action. In Chapter 3 I argued 
that reasonable foreseeability relies on causal responsibility: if we think action x risks 
causing or will cause outcome y, it is reasonable to foresee that doing x risks or will 
result in y. This means that the political dimensions of responsibility’s causal 
condition transmit directly to its reasonable foreseeability condition. In other words, 
to determine what is reasonably foreseeable, we must look to the good-sense actual 
causation maps discussed above.  
 
There is an inbuilt conservatism in supposedly apolitical common-sense interpretations 
of reasonable foreseeability as agents only commonly foresee what dominant 
understandings and practices render visible to them. (If they foresee differently it is 
despite and in the face of dominant common sense.)  If a dominant map of actual 
causation delimits casual responsibility in a way that unfairly undervalues or ignores 
 
341 The work of Folbre (1995) and Federici (2012) are good examples of the former. E.g. 'an 
emphasis on rewarding caring has somewhat anti-market implications, simply because the 
market does not elicit caring' - Folbre (1995: 85). Likewise, Federici (2012) and Brown (2015) both 
insist on the latter connection.  
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an oppressed group’s social contributions, we cannot expect the oppressed group to 
easily trace the benefits their undervalued contributions produce.342  
 
Our dominant map hinders women’s ability to foresee the wider social and economic 
benefits of their carework, for example. Silvia’s financial dependence leaves her 
particularly vulnerable but casting her as the only ‘dependent’ in this relationship 
occludes her partner’s and wider society’s fundamental dependence on unpaid 
carework.343 The unconscious, naturalised operation of common-sense schemas and 
practices renders this occlusion all the more effective. Do less benefits really ‘stem 
appropriately’ from Silvia’s work because, given dominant understandings, she and 
women like her may not (nor could we fairly expect them to) currently foresee these 
benefits? Such a position unfairly privileges the status quo.344  
 
Reasonable foreseeability must therefore play a role in our understanding of 
responsibility in a way that accounts for the epistemic effects of unequal power 
relations. Specifically, it should deem the consequences of our actions reasonably 
foreseeable if our good-sense map of actual causation identifies that action as a cause of 
the outcome. A map based on egalitarian good sense holds carework to be an 
important cause of a wide range of social and economic goods. Likewise, it does not 
 
342 This is another way in which ‘practices of ignorance are often intertwined with practices of 
oppression and exclusion’ (Tuana and Sullivan 2006: 1) (also discussed on p.65). Egalitarians 
must take seriously the insights of feminist social epistemology when epistemic concepts 
animate their theories of justice. In this, I follow Mills’ (2005: 169) critique of ideal theorists’ habit 
of not recognising, let alone theorising, the ‘consequences of oppression for the social cognition 
of agents.’  
343 Folbre (1991); Brown (2015: 106). Even Anderson’s (1999: 297-298) powerful critique mentions 
only one-way dependency. 
344 Hence my scepticism about Dworkin’s (2002: 289-90) reliance on ‘ordinary ethical experience’ 
to distinguish ‘choice’ from ‘circumstance.’ Some carers might view their financial vulnerability 
as personal choice, others as unfair circumstance. Carrying the ‘familiar structure of our personal 
morality… into politics intact’ (Dworkin 2002: 294) and considering this problem solved 
sidesteps essential political debates over how to understand care work. Political philosophy 
should interrogate ‘ordinary’ views on the distinction between personal choice (’private’) and 
circumstance (‘public’), not uncritically adopt them while simultaneously denying their political 
nature.      
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deem assault a reasonably foreseeable consequence of drinking while female; agents 
within functioning political communities should not reasonably expect this action to 
result in assault.  
 
The ‘reasonableness’ in question therefore has important ethico-political dimensions. 
More specifically, the reasonable foreseeability condition inherits the causal condition’s 
normative foundations. The foreseeability condition therefore fits neatly with the above 
resolutions of our three indeterminacies and inherits these resolutions’ political 
dimensions: it is reasonable to foresee our action resulting in a certain outcome if and 
only if our good sense map deems this action an actual cause of the outcome. 
 
At this point it is useful to re-situate my conception of agent responsibility within the 
wider responsibility taxonomy I have been working with. Recall that this taxonomy 
distinguishes agent responsibility from four other kinds: causal (I caused x), 
consequential (the burdens/benefits that stem from x are justly mine to shoulder/enjoy), 
moral (I am blameworthy/praiseworthy for x), and responsibility as obligation (I have 
obligations regarding x).345 To end this section, I outline how my proposed 
understanding of agent responsibility relates to these other forms of responsibility in 
order to show why my understanding is still a form of agent responsibility (rather 
than, for example, a rejection of the very idea of agent responsibility or an argument 
that the concept collapses into some other kind of responsibility).  
 
First, on my analysis agent responsibility remains a subset of causal responsibility: the 
subset of intentional causal outcomes and the reasonably foreseeable parts of the causal 
chains stemming from these outcomes. As discussed, I understand causal responsibility 
to be extremely context-dependent: maps of actual causation pick out the actions that 
matter for a particular context or enquiry. Agent responsibility remains a subset of 
 
345 I borrow these definitions from Knight and Stemplowska (2011b: 11). 
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causal responsibility since, even in political-philosophical enquiries, intentional actions 
are not all that matter.  For example, material structures, social rules, technologies, and 
cultural tropes can all matter enormously in political-philosophical enquiry, meaning it 
often makes sense to judge these things actual causes of political outcomes. Agent 
responsibility does not collapse into causal responsibility, then.  
 
The subset of causal chains picked out by common-sense agent responsibility is 
determined by dominant social norms regarding what outcomes ought to and/or tend 
to follow from what intentional actions (and therefore which intentional actions are 
commonly taken to matter in producing which outcomes). Egalitarian agent 
responsibility picks out a different subset of causal chains – a subset determined by an 
egalitarian map of actual social causation designed to understand and evaluate intentional 
actions in a way that treats all agents with equal respect and concern. This principle informs 
its judgements of social productivity – its judgements about which actions matter in the 
production of which outcomes.   
  
How does agent responsibility relate to responsibility as obligation? Responsibilities as 
obligations are an important input into determinations of authorship, but the concept 
of agent responsibility again remains distinct. Obligations are an important input 
because one of the important ways we treat one another as equals is by expecting us all 
to fulfil a set of social obligations towards one another that express our equality.346 For 
example, in the assault case the victim’s lack of an obligation to curtail her basic 
freedoms to avoid assaults is a key reason for her lack of agent responsibility; it is 
inegalitarian to expect some portion of the population to curtail their basic freedoms to 
avoid sexual assault. To treat her with the same respect and concern we treat others in 
society with, we cannot expect her to fulfil this sexist obligation.  
 
 
346 This need not mean everyone has exactly the same obligations; we might think those lucky 
enough to amass the most wealth are obligated to pay the most back into society, for example. 
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Still, this egalitarian set of political obligations does not fully determine the concept of 
agent responsibility. Take someone who spends 50 hours a week undertaking socially 
valuable but underpaid carework. He remains agent responsible for this work, but not 
because he fulfils or violates a set of responsibilities as obligations – no one could fairly 
be obligated to perform so much underpaid work. Instead, he is agent responsible 
because of our egalitarian understanding of the social value of the work he performs – 
an understanding and an evaluation of carework practices that treats all agents with 
equal respect and concern (rather than devaluing carework because of its patriarchal 
association with women).  
 
As this case suggests, determinations of agent responsibility are influenced by far more 
than obligations alone. Our political understandings of social identities, social ‘spheres’ 
(like the public-private divide), and socio-political actions and practices (like caring) 
can and do all influence agent responsibility attributions. An egalitarian map of actual 
social causation will draw on all of these elements and more in order to understand 
and evaluate social actions in a way that treats all agents with equal respect and 
concern. 
 
Of course, in cases of structural injustice, all these elements – socio-political identities, 
social demarcations, political-economic evaluations of actions, and political obligations 
– often work together. Our public-private divide works with our evaluation of caring 
activities, a gendered set of social obligations, and our political understandings of 
womanhood as a social identity to keep women locked into a subordinate social role, 
for example. But it flattens far too much to reduce all these important determinants of 
agent responsibility to a set of responsibilities as obligations.  
 
How does my analysis of agent responsibility relate to moral responsibility? I argue 
that all determinations of agent responsibility within ethico-political contexts 
importantly involve moralised judgements. But this does not make agent responsibility 
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the same as moral responsibility, nor can the former be reduced to the latter, for agent 
responsibility attributions need not rest on moral responsibility judgements 
specifically. Suppose you spend weeks painting a self-portrait. You are the primary 
person agent responsible for the picture, regardless of whether you are morally 
praiseworthy or blameworthy for your actions.  
 
Rather, this authorship ascription rests on our understandings of how important 
various actions were in producing this outcome: understandings that revolve around 
interpreting the social importance of things like time, energy, skill, and individual 
creativity. These understandings need not evaluate your moral praiseworthiness or 
blameworthiness. Therefore, though agent responsibility is a moralised concept – it 
draws on ethico-political evaluations of which actions matter for the production of 
which outcomes – it is not the same as, nor does it collapse into, the concept of moral 
responsibility.  
 
What of consequential responsibility? One might assume that insisting on the ethico-
political dimensions of agent responsibility strengthens the foundational responsibility-
sensitive egalitarian assumption that agent responsibility implies consequential 
responsibility – i.e. that if I am agent responsible for outcome x, the burdens and 
benefits of x are justly mine to shoulder and/or enjoy.  
 
Granted, my politicised understanding of agent responsibility aims to facilitate a re-
evaluation of overlooked and undervalued work by oppressed groups and to widen 
theoretical space for arguments in favour of unconditional, collectively provisioned 
goods and services grounded in egalitarian political obligations. And this could be 
used as a first step in reasserting the more general responsibility-sensitive egalitarian 




However, in the next chapter I will argue that my analysis of agent responsibility gives 
us good reason to move away from theories of justice primarily centred around the 
concepts of choice and agent responsibility. As a result, I suggest we move beyond the 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian paradigm rather than focusing attention on 
resuscitating their foundational premise as the cornerstone of distributive justice.347  
 
My conception of agent responsibility cannot therefore be reduced to one of causal, 
moral, responsibility as obligation, though it is importantly animated by ethico-
political concerns, causal webs, and networks of political obligations. Rather, my 
conception ties issues of political obligation, morality, and causality together, while 
preserving the foundational model of agent responsibility: that of causation, intention, 
and reasonable foreseeability. For this reason, my analysis is not a reductio of the 
concept, but rather an argument for an alternative, expanded understanding of how the 
concept works – and, certainly, an argument that the concept cannot serve as a 
foundational building block for ethico-political theorising.348   
 
5.5.  In What Sense ‘Political’? 
Determinate authorship attributions within the political sphere rest on ethico-
political judgements. I emphasise the need for critical normative interrogation of 
these judgements, and in this I depart from some other ‘political’ approaches within 
philosophy; I do not seek stability or political neutrality in an ‘overlapping 
 
347 See Chapter 6, section 2. Note that regardless of whether or not we are interested in 
reasserting the foundational responsibility-sensitive egalitarian belief that agent responsibility 
implies consequential responsibility and building a theory of distributive justice around it, agent 
responsibility does not collapse into consequential responsibility, since I remain consequentially 
responsible for, e.g. basic social duties without necessarily being agent responsible for them. On 
this point see p.122, especially footnote 315.  
348 One of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism’s chief appeals is that it appears to deliver a 
whole distributive framework from a few apparently simple foundational premises; as 
Stemplowska (2012: 389) puts it, it is attractive because it delivers ‘radical conclusions’ from 
‘relatively weak assumptions’. But I hope to have shown that assumptions of authorship are far 
from weak or simple, nor are they foundational. The responsibility-sensitive project therefore 
loses this source of appeal.   
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consensus’ on responsibility attributions, nor do I uncritically look to social practices 
to inform my account.349 Rather, I impress the importance of making the influence of 
political schemas and practices explicit in order to critique their fairness. What my 
account does have in common with other political accounts (of justice, or human 
rights, say) is a broad insistence that the basic social institutions and collectives we 
live within unavoidably shape us; we cannot ‘subtract ourselves’ from this socio-
political background.350  
 
Some responsibility-sensitive egalitarians understand themselves to be doing ‘pure, 
context-free philosophizing’ by drawing on agent responsibility under the idealised 
circumstances of an initially equal opportunities baseline.351 But the preceding 
arguments show the importance of recognising that ‘all theorising – moral and non-
moral – takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, 
norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experiences and group 
interests of the privileged group.’352 Since the concept of agent responsibility –  like 
all politically laden concepts – is deeply shaped by its real-world conditions of use, 
the promise of ‘context-free’ philosophising is a mirage.353  
 
As argued, recognising this need not lead to relativism; it is not contradictory to 
emphasise both our social embeddedness and the importance of first-order 
normative critique. However, admittedly doing so relies on the possibility of some 
form of ‘ideology critique’: it must be possible to sensibly argue about which 
 
349 On the relevance of these ideas to other ‘political’ accounts, see Valentini (2012: 185-87).  
350 Valentini (2012: 184). 
351 Swift (2008: 372). Dworkin’s instruction to abstract away all preferences tainted by raced, 
gendered, and classed ‘prejudice’ means he similarly aims to theorise distributive equality free 
from the context of structural injustice.   
352 Mills (2005: 175). 
353 As McTernan (2015: 6) asks, ‘from where but our experience of ordinary practices of 




political schema is best – fairest, most egalitarian – despite how deeply they 
structure our orientation to, and understanding of, the world.354  
 
Not everything goes here. Ideology critique does not disregard truth; rather, good 
theorising necessitates ‘select[ing] from the mass of truths those that address our 
broader cognitive and practical demands.’355 Every socio-political outcome is 
enmeshed in multiple complex causal webs; we must select from this mass of causal 
truths by asking which contributions matter for normative political debate. We do 
not retreat into relativism, therefore, but prompt the critical interrogation of 
authorship attributions to ensure they enshrine the right values.  
 
My account suggests that arguments which defend the fairness of particular 
methods of structuring social cooperation by appeal to the normative significance of 
respecting particular ‘choices’ are circular. For example, arguing from the 
assumption that our unpaid carer authors none of her partner’s economic output to 
the conclusion that currently dominant marketized practices are uniquely placed to 
respect responsibility, hits this circularity; she lacks this authorship only on the 
assumption that current market mechanisms instantiate an actual causation map that 
fairly individuates and values agents’ inputs.  
 
Acknowledging this encourages us to open our common-sense responsibility 
ascriptions to critical interrogation by our fairness intuitions. I believe our ideas of 
egalitarian fairness retain greater recognition of our social interconnectedness, and 
can help balance the inegalitarian, overly individualistic, patriarchal, and marketized 
tendencies of our dominant responsibility attributions – tendencies which give the 
idea of responsibility pride of place in right-wing thought.  
 
354 Discussing this possibility, Haslanger points to the power of consciousness raising to disrupt 
dominant schemas, acknowledges that a challenge remains ‘to justify when a change in 
consciousness is genuinely emancipatory’ (2012a: 427), and suggests avenues for exploring this.  
355 Haslanger (2012d: 226). 




5.6. Conclusion: A Political Account of Agent Responsibility 
Though agent responsibility is invoked frequently in political philosophy and practice, 
then, it is a tricky concept to be handled with care. In Chapter 3, I introduced the 
concept and argued that it warranted further investigation. In Chapter 4, I outlined 
how standard philosophical understandings of the concept left it problematically 
indeterminate in three ways. I analysed how, in everyday practice, we navigate these 
indeterminacies to unthinkingly make determinate common-sense responsibility 
attributions by drawing on intuitive maps of actual social causation. Forming an 
important part of our political schemas, these maps guide our judgements on what 
kinds of actions are causally responsible for what kinds of outcomes (and what actions 
only constitute an outcome’s background enabling conditions). 
 
In this chapter I showed how egalitarians can critique these common-sense 
responsibility attributions in order to make them fairer and less conservative. This is 
possible because the concept of actual causation functions to single out what matters 
for normal purposes. What matters for the purposes of normative political debates - for 
example, on what political obligations we hold to one another, how our society should 
function, and how we, as a political collective, ought to understand and value social 
activities – are the right prescriptive norms, not common-sense prescriptive nor current 
statistical norms. In this context, normative judgements therefore saturate 
determinations of actual social causation. And our views on what is reasonably 
foreseeable, in turn, rest on these determinations. 
 
Given this, political philosophers can and should argue about what the right 
prescriptive norms are in the cases of agent responsibility they want to employ. Doing 
so lets us articulate a concept of agent responsibility shaped by egalitarian good sense. 
If we are responsible for those consequences that ‘stem appropriately from’ or ‘suitably 
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reflect’ our agency, then ‘appropriateness’ and ‘suitability’ in this context are 
judgements with important, inescapable political dimensions.    
 
The dangers of occluding the political dimensions of responsibility should worry 
egalitarians especially. If these dimensions are overlooked, the concept can quietly 
smuggle assumptions, norms and values from dominant inegalitarian schemas into 
supposedly egalitarian theorising. Assuming away possibly relevant collective 
agents, and making inegalitarian cuts between choices that matter for outcomes and 
those that do not, risks legitimising unjust outcomes under the cover of victims’ own 
supposed ‘responsible agency’.  
 
Characterising these judgements as apolitical, as suggested by those who set 
responsibility attributions outside political philosophy, compounds this harm – it 
naturalises a world in which women are held responsible for protecting themselves 
from violence at the cost of their basic freedoms, people made homeless due to 
catastrophic accidents are owed no assistance from their political communities (even 
if community bodies shaped the catastrophes), and the fundamental social and 
economic contributions of unpaid carers are ignored. To mischaracterise authorship 
ascriptions as apolitical raw data is to dangerously depoliticise them. 
 
Political philosophers are well placed to make the prescriptive norms contained in 
dominant political schemas explicit and to challenge them where necessary. Our 
goal, then, must not be to incorporate into egalitarianism ‘the most powerful idea in 
the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian Right: the idea of choice and responsibility.’356 If we 
are to use choice and agent responsibility in our theorising, we must form our own 
critical conceptions of responsibility based on egalitarian good sense instead. 
 
 
356 Cohen (1989: 933).  
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This conclusion raises new questions, however: What use, if any, is the concept of 
agent responsibility, given this chapter’s arguments? Should egalitarians not simply 
give it up altogether? The next chapter explores this issue in order to outline the 










Agent responsibility is certainly no political-philosophical shortcut: it cannot serve as a 
neutral political foundation from which to build a theory of justice without begging 
important questions. Determinate responsibility ascriptions are themselves based on 
many complex political judgements – about political obligations, political-economic 
productivity, and the fairness of mechanisms for socio-political evaluation, for 
example. Given this, what role (if any) can choice play in egalitarian thought? And how 
else are we to theorise distributive justice if not through the lens of choice?  
 
This chapter answers the first question and suggests a new route of investigation to 
help us answer the second. I argue that we do indeed need to decentre the concepts of 
choice and agent responsibility from egalitarian thought. This is because approaches 
designed to make these concepts the central animating motors of our theory of 
distributive justice lack the theoretical resources necessary for articulating a political 
schema based on egalitarian good sense – a requirement of articulating egalitarian 
responsibility attributions. Therefore, I argue, theories dominated by these concepts 
lack the necessary tools for the critical egalitarian work urgently needed to challenge 
structural injustices of race, gender, and class.   
 
However, I argue that we need not banish the concepts of choice and agent 
responsibility from egalitarian work altogether. As long as we understand their 
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political dimensions and use them critically, they can still serve as useful shorthand 
– precisely because they distil complex webs of ethico-political judgements into such 
short, simple statements. They can be of much use in the context of discussions of 
exploitation, for example.  
 
Given the limited role I advocate for the concept of choice, I then leave the 
theoretical current of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism in search of approaches 
better equipped to understand and challenge structural injustice. Investigating these 
different approaches, the second half of the chapter (and the next half of the thesis) 
focuses on how they conceptualise and integrate a traditional egalitarian concern 
with economic-distributive justice, and why this matters.  
 
Relational egalitarianism is the obvious alternative to responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism and looks promising in many regards. However, I argue that 
relational egalitarianism nonetheless lacks clarity in its theorisation of the role and 
political significance of economic distributions. For example, Elizabeth Anderson’s 
relational egalitarianism is not always clear on how economic-distributions relate (or 
do not relate) to social status hierarchies. I end by suggesting that the framework of 
her approach mirrors that of Nancy Fraser’s ‘perspectival dualism’ in certain 
suggestive ways. Because of this, Chapter 7 then looks to perspectival dualism to see 
if it can improve on Anderson’s theorisation of distributive justice in ways 
compatible with the relational egalitarian paradigm.  
 
This topic has more than just theoretical relevance. As I discuss in greater depth in 
Chapters 6 and 7, the idea that within left-wing thought economic-distributive 
concerns have become overshadowed by feminist and anti-racist ‘identity politics’ 
has resurfaced in the wake of popular votes for Brexit and Trump.357 This argument 
 
357 For older statements of this view, see Coole (1996); Fraser (1995); Rorty (1998). For more recent 
restatements see Dean (2016a, 2016b); G. Fraser (2016); Goodhart (2016).  
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assumes that economic-distributive issues are separable from issues of identity and 
problematic social status hierarchies; the rest of the thesis argues that this dualism 
oversimplifies the relationship between distributions, status hierarchies, and 
identities, and suggests an alternative approach.  
 
6.2. What Use is Agent Responsibility? 
In Chapter 3 I noted that responsibility-sensitive egalitarians do not much discuss 
structural injustices like race, gender, and class; on the whole, they leave these issues 
to be dealt with by other theorists. In this section I first argue that theorists who use 
the concepts of choice and agent responsibility have good reason to avoid this 
division of labour and engage critically with problems of structural injustice.  
However, doing so necessitates moving away from theories of justice primarily 
centred around the concepts of choice and agent responsibility. As a result, I suggest 
we need to move beyond the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian paradigm.  
 
Given this argument for the decentring of choice and agent responsibility, and given 
these concepts’ conservative and neoliberal genealogies, I then ask: ought 
egalitarians cut these concepts out of our work altogether? I argue that doing so is 
not necessary. As long as the political dimensions of these concepts are recognised, 
they can serve as useful shorthand, distilling a whole complex web of judgements 
about political obligations, political-economic evaluations, and socio-political 
understandings into simple and direct statements. I suggest that this can be 
particularly helpful for egalitarian discussions of exploitation.   
 
6.2.1. The Need to Decentre Choice 
To focus on one problem always requires leaving others to one side. In Chapter 3, I 
suggested responsibility-sensitive egalitarians tend to leave the problems of 
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structural injustice aside for two main reasons.358 First, some theorists believe it 
possible to safely idealise away these problems through the imagined set up of their 
initial problem; they route around these issues using idealisation. At other times, they 
express the belief that these problems can be dealt with straightforwardly through 
their preferred choice/circumstance framework; they route around these issues using 
choice.  With the arguments of Chapters 4 & 5 in hand I can now better assess these 
rationales – and neither looks convincing. I argue that there are good reasons for any 
egalitarian theorist drawing on agent responsibility to explore the problems of 
structural injustice instead of thinking that their work can be safely and neatly 
separated from this. Let’s assess the two routes in turn.  
 
Responsibility-sensitive egalitarians normally begin to theorise from an imagined 
egalitarian baseline from which everyone starts their adult lives with access to equal 
opportunities359 – and racism, sexism, and classism are often assumed to be 
incompatible with this imagined starting point. Ronald Dworkin, for example, 
simply stipulates that we guarantee people’s tastes and preferences are not 
prejudiced along racial lines before egalitarian redistribution occurs.360 In contrast, he 
is ‘neutral’ about those people disadvantaged because their skills are not valued by 
others and so cannot command as much market income.361 
 
As a reason for sidestepping the problems of structural injustice, however, this does 
not look fruitful. To see why, it is helpful to start with non-ideal cases. Take US 
home care workers, whose work is not valued by the market: they earn the lowest 
 
358 These reasons are not mutually exclusive. As discussed below, Dworkin appears to endorse 
both, for example. 
359 Miller (2017) defines responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism as ‘a family of theories… that treat 
equal distribution as a starting point but allow for departures from that baseline when these 
result from the responsible choices made by individuals.’  
360 Dworkin (2002: 161–62). 
361 Dworkin (2002: 162).  
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average hourly wages of all healthcare jobs.362 They are disproportionately women of 
colour, and the raced and gendered history of this work and workforce has long 
become part and parcel of the meaning and value of the labour they do: it is 
devalued because of its association with women of colour, and women of colour are 
actively channelled towards these jobs.363 The low market valuation arising from its 
status as ‘racialized feminized labour’ means that even men who engage in this 
home care work suffer this ‘wage penalty.’364 In other words, the real-world market 
valuation of this labour looks inseparable from raced and gendered ‘prejudice.’ 
 
Similarly, recall the ‘spiralling effects’ of choice highlighted in Chapter 2, where 
unequal material/social contexts push certain social groups towards, or constrain 
them to, ‘bad choices.’ This cements negative representations of these groups as 
irresponsible agents – representations which then have negative effects on how 
others treat this group, including further retrenching their limited, unequal access to 
goods, services, and opportunities. When, for example, black men are treated as bad 
or risky customers (the makers of ‘bad choices’) these racist representations entrench 
their exclusion from a wide range of economic goods, services, and opportunities – 
ones essential to their ability to function as ‘good choosers/citizens/consumers.’ This 
case again suggests that there is no straightforward cut between how we, as a polity, 
value certain economic-distributive activities and the structures of domination that 
Dworkin labels ‘prejudice.’365  
 
 
362 Boris and Klein (2012: 6). 
363 See Boris and Klein (2012); England et al. (2002) undertake more detailed analysis of this 
carework wage penalty for women and men, arguing that this work’s cultural association with 
women partly explains the penalty. This case casts doubt on the idea that a market wage is 
simply or only a function of its scarcity and the utility that others derive from it. Rather than 
assuming such judgements of social utility are pre-political givens, the case raises the question of 
what political factors shape these judgements. A full political theoretical analysis of markets and 
market pricing is beyond the scope of this thesis, however; for this see Olsaretti (2009). For 
further discussion of this case, see Chapters 7 and 8. For UK parallels see p.203.  
364 Boris and Klein (2012: 8). 
365 See Chapters 7-8 for a longer argument for this point, and its significance.  
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Of course, Dworkin may argue that these market valuations are invalid because they 
instantiate racist prejudice. He is not necessarily interested in how we do, in fact, 
collectively value activities like these, but rather in how we should value them as 
worked out via thought experiments using hypothetical market valuations. When we 
are undertaking these thought experiments – imagining ourselves as a 25-year-old 
man deciding how to value certain social goods, for example366 – how are we to 
value activities like caring labour?  
 
Dworkin has little to say to help us here. Perhaps we just estimate what ‘we’ think is 
a reasonable, non-racist, non-sexist estimation of how our hypothetical 25-year-old 
man would value this work. If so then, as Anne Phillips argues, Dworkin’s 
hypothetical market mechanism does ‘less of the normative work than was 
originally proclaimed.’367 Instead, what appears to be doing the normative work is 
Dworkin’s (or our) own common-sense beliefs about how to individuate and 
evaluate this labour. (Common-sense beliefs are all that can do the work here 
because Dworkin spends hardly any time analysing the functioning of gendered or 
raced injustices.368) The arguments of Chapters 4 and 5 give us reason for serious 
concern about this kind of uncritical reliance on common-sense evaluations of socio-
political activities.  
 
Dworkin’s comments about how, in his hypothetical insurance market, insurers 
would be ‘alive to the commercial importance of discouraging poor and unmarried 
women from becoming pregnant’ cements this concern.369 Such a view endorses the 
sexist supposition that women alone carry the obligation to avert unwanted 
 
366 This is what Dworkin (2002: 313) suggests we do to work out what kind of health care 
insurance a society ought to provide.  
367 Phillips (2008: 456). 
368 Recall, for example, Dworkin’s belief that his theory can handle gender inequalities by asking 
whether or not a woman would take a pill to transform her into a man (reported in Robeyns 
2003: 541).  
369 Dworkin (2002: 339). For discussion see Armstrong (2005: 468–469). 
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pregnancies, as well as the tired assumption that women raising tomorrow’s citizens 
and workers do nothing of ‘commercial importance.’ The belief that it is 
straightforward to idealise away ‘prejudice’, coupled with a lack of interest in or 
awareness of exactly how ‘prejudice’ functions, can result in theorising which 
rehashes harmful inegalitarian assumptions. The ‘idealisation’ rationale for not 
needing to explore problems of structural injustice therefore looks unconvincing.  
 
One common responsibility-sensitive reply to arguments like these states that 
Dworkin is focusing on the ideal – distributive justice within prejudice-free societies 
– but that work like his can open the way for others to focus on the non-ideal. As 
John Rawls puts it ‘an omission is not as such a fault.’ 370 To this I have two replies. 
First, my previous arguments about the mirage of ‘pure, context-free’ 
philosophising371 along with the complexity of fully idealising away prejudice cast 
some doubt on the viability of this division of labour. Just because our theories 
idealise away concrete distributions and unequal opportunities does not make them 
context-free, given how they inevitably build on concepts, practices, and intuitions 
grounded in the here and now.  
 
Second, the spiralling effects of choice and the devaluation of caring labour occurs 
because distributive effects work together with recognitive effects; the dialectical 
nature of these processes means that idealising away one half of the spiral makes the 
phenomenon drop out of our theoretical picture altogether.372 This matters because it 
facilitates Dworkin’s oversimplification of racism by reducing it to ‘prejudice.’ As 
Bonilla-Silva argues, ‘if the core of the phenomenon coded as “racism” is prejudice, 
 
370 Rawls (2001: 66). See also Swift (2008). 
371 See Chapter 5, Section 4. 
372 Chapters 6 and 7 build on this idea, arguing against a distributive-recognitive dualism. 
Anderson (2010: 5) makes a similar but more generalised argument about how ‘starting from 
ideal theory may prevent us from recognizing injustices in our nonideal world.’ 
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then education and time should have cured this disease a long time ago.’373 Rather 
than a problem reducible to individual prejudices, racism is embedded in our 
knowledge frameworks, our social relationships, our material contexts, our 
distributive mechanisms, and our habitual practices. Assuming away prejudice 
without taking some time to investigate how it functions or how deeply and 
furtively engrained it remains does not give us the critical resources to understand, 
let alone address, the problems raced (and gendered, and classed) domination 
present.374  
 
Perhaps the second responsibility-sensitive egalitarian reason for setting aside 
injustices of race, gender, and class fares better? This is the idea that these injustices 
can be easily translated into these theorists’ preferred choice/compensation 
frameworks, meaning that their resultant theory can take care of these injustices in a 
fairly straightforward manner. We see this in Carl Knight’s confidence that ‘one 
could hardly choose better cases to bring out the attractions of luck egalitarianism’ 
than racism.375 And we see it in Dworkin’s belief that his theory can handle gender 
inequalities by basing the need for compensation on whether or not a woman would 
take a pill to transform her into a man.376   
 
In light of Chapters 4 and 5, we can see that naturalised common-sense 
responsibility attributions are often shaped by real-world structural injustices – 
 
373 Bonilla-Silva (2015: 76). 
374 Cf. Valentini (2009: 346), who argues that ‘by assuming socially generated inequalities away, 
[Dworkin’s] theory enables us to appreciate that a just distribution must not be affected by 
prejudices and stereotypes.’ In contrast, I think we only understand race-based inequalities as 
‘socially generated’ if we already see them as unjust; much contemporary racism implicitly or 
explicitly portrays such inequalities as arising through people of colour’s inferior choices or 
effort levels rather than through unjust social institutions or raced prejudice (Bonilla-Silva 2017: 
especially pp.32-34). This is why I understand apolitical notions of choice/responsible agency 
coupled with a lack of theorisation of the mechanisms of white supremacy as, at best, unhelpful.  
375 Knight (2009: 149) 
376 As reported in Robeyns (2003: 541). For a critical discussion of Dworkin’s conception of 
‘authentic choice’ and gender socialisation, see Mason (2000: 240–42).  
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harmfully reproducing and depoliticising sexist obligations and expectations, for 
example. Talk of ‘choosing’ the burdens of gender or race masks the fact that though 
someone might deeply identify with their gender or race – in some very loose sense, 
‘choosing it’ – they do not thereby choose the social burdens accompanying these 
identities. By flattening matters of structural injustice into common-sense 
choice/compensation frameworks, we reduce complex social facts and relations to 
matters of personal tastes, de-politicised intelligence tests, and overly-naturalised 
responsibility attributions.377 
 
Where does this leave us? Debating the normative significance of choice while 
idealising away structural injustices risks artificially omitting important mechanisms 
of injustice and leaving us reliant on common-sense evaluations of socio-political 
activities themselves tainted by sexism, racism, and classism. And supposing we can 
deal with structural injustices through appeal to a common-sense choice-
circumstance distinction hits the same issue: it risks naturalising racist, sexist, and 
classist political obligations, expectations, evaluations, and understandings.   
 
At this point the obvious responsibility-sensitive egalitarian response goes as 
follows: we need only develop and plug in ‘good sense’ models of agent 
responsibility to animate our theories – models which reject racist, sexist, or classist 
maps of actual social causation and responsible agency.378  On such a model, women 
who would not choose to transform into men would not be seen to thereby author 
all the gendered inequalities they go on to suffer. And we could ensure that IQ tests 
to determine when someone is capable of responsible agency would not be racist.  
 
 
377 Knight (2009: 128) suggests we use IQ tests to decide when someone is capable of agent 
responsibility. For discussion see Chapter 3, Section 2. 
378 For a full explanation of ‘actual social causation’ and how it animates our attributions of 
responsible agency, see Chapters 4 and 5.  
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This line of thought claims there is nothing lacking in the responsibility-sensitive 
paradigm that cannot simply be fixed by a more adequately politicised 
understanding of agent responsibility and choice. The problem is that the 
supplementary theorising required to develop an egalitarian political schema 
necessitates a fundamental shift away from the defining feature of the paradigm 
these theorists are so deeply invested in: the centrality of choice. Attributions of 
agent responsibility are themselves the conclusion of many important political 
debates – about political ontology, political norms and obligations, and the 
boundary between the private-unproductive/public-productive realms, among 
others. And we cannot resolve the debates by asking what we are agent responsible 
for, since to do so begs the question at hand.   
 
It is not only that making race-, class-, and gender-neutral cuts between choice and 
circumstance is more complicated than it first appears. It is that making such cuts 
itself must build on careful analysis and critique of the workings of structural 
injustices. To see this, notice how my arguments for more critical, egalitarian 
responsibility attributions in Chapter 5 rested on feminist theorisations of patriarchal 
violence and socialist feminist critiques of mainstream economic practices.379 A 
critical awareness of the workings of structural injustice is essential to any successful 
articulation of good sense responsibility attributions.  
 
Accordingly, my arguments entail a comprehensive decentring of choice/agent 
responsibility; they can no longer serve as the foundational or primary conceptual 
 
379 I went into less detail on the arguments needed to defend the socio-economic right to housing 
(or housing assistance) but Waldron’s discussion of the relationship between homelessness and 
freedom similarly starts from a careful analysis of why the state of homelessness in 
contemporary liberal democracies is so fatal to a huge range of important freedoms. McTernan et 
al. (2016) motivate greater state involvement in securing decent housing on the basis of their 
analysis that the precarity and vulnerability of many in the UK housing market harmfully 




mechanisms of egalitarian theorising.380 The work of the responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarians discussed above (and others381) is so dominated by these concepts that 
they do not appear to have, or see much need for, other political-theoretical tools 
with which to construct theories of distributive justice. Recall Shlomi Segall’s 
argument that a victim of raced discrimination given a compensation package that 
they would choose above the initial good denied to them no longer suffers 
discrimination.382 Or take Dworkin’s handling of racial ‘prejudice’ and gender. Faced 
with the task of trying to animate an egalitarian political schema – a task for which 
the choice/circumstance distinction is of scant help – we must, at the very least, 
compliment the responsibility-sensitive focus on choice with far broader theoretical 
resources.  
 
How to start building an egalitarian political schema, then? This depends on what 
inequalities we are most concerned to combat, since I suggest we design our schema 
through careful attention to those injustices. If we accept my suggestion that raced, 
gendered, and classed injustices are primary candidates for this role, we would then 
work to identify the dominant political ontologies and maps of actual social 
causation that most centrally serve to (re)produce these inequalities, and the 
 
380 Cf. Stemplowska (2009; 2013), who recognises that responsibility-sensitive egalitarians must 
look beyond the simple choice/circumstances division in order to build theories of distributive 
justice, but maintains that choice can still play a ‘systematic and central’ role (2009: 238).  
381 E.g. Rakowski (1991). The same cannot be said of responsibility-sensitive egalitarians who 
argue for significant ‘relational’ components to their overall theories of justice, e.g. Lippert-
Rasmussen (2018: 181-210). 
382 Segall (2013: 126–27). In fact, Segall ends his discussion of raced discrimination by suggesting 
our intuitive recoiling from the idea that an adequate compensation package (i.e. one the agent 
would choose to accept above the initial good) eliminates racial discrimination might be 
motivated by considerations of efficiency. Specifically, it is more efficient in the long run to restrict 
anti-discrimination efforts to ‘in-kind’ measures, since these prevent future discrimination better 
than individual compensation does. In keeping with this paradigm’s forays into economism, this 
suggests efficiency is the only other resource available to him to argue for less individualised 
measures of dealing with raced discrimination (see also the belief that justice can be expressed as 
a ‘currency’ (Cohen 1989) and the reliance on market mechanisms (as argued in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.3.iii and Chapter 5, Section 2.4) 
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practices accompanying them.383 We would investigate how a more egalitarian 
ontology and map could animate different responsibility attributions and generate 
and entrench more egalitarian practices.  
 
For example, the 1970s ‘Wages for Housework’ campaign analysed how the 
dominant political schema and practices (re)produced gendered inequalities. They 
highlighted the valuable consequences of women’s activities previously occluded by 
the dominant schema and, in doing so, critiqued prevalent responsibility 
attributions.384 For example, ‘while it does not result in a wage for ourselves, we 
[women] nevertheless produce the most precious product to appear on the capitalist 
market: labour power.’ Or take Wendy Brown’s more recent statement that women 
‘are the invisible infrastructure sustaining a world of putatively self-investing human 
capitals.’385  
 
These responsibility attributions serve to make visible and insist on the vital 
importance of inputs from oppressed groups. They also help reveal how systemic 
inequalities are maintained through widespread social practices which funnel the 
fruits of these inputs certain ways while the corresponding dominant schemas deny 
their importance.386 This approach starts from the puzzle of stable structural 
 
383 Other obvious candidates include heterosexism and ableism though these lie beyond my 
scope. In Chapter 2, Section 4.1 I argue that we should displace the individual chooser as the 
primary locus of political theorising; this informs my suggestion here that we switch from a 
focus on single individual choices to a focus on social practices. Admittedly, this shift makes the 
boundary between causal and agent responsibility less distinct given that, as argued in Chapter 
2, our individual undertakings of social practices are perhaps better understood as falling 
somewhere along a spectrum ranging from numb, unconscious habit to fully conscious, 
carefully-thought-out intentionality.  
384 Federici (2012: 15-22). 
385 Brown (2015: 106–7).  
386 As this focus on schemas and practices suggests, I am very sympathetic to McTernan’s 
‘practice-based’ view of responsibility, especially her contention that ‘political philosophers must 
get their hands dirty and determine for themselves which responsibility practices are valuable 
given their normative commitments’ (2015: 5). However, our arguments for this conclusion 
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inequalities and focuses on the ideas and practices that reproduce these in an 
attempt to help diagnose their roots; it does not focus on two individuals in need, 
one of whom has imprudently lit a candle or climbed a mountain without a helmet, 
for example. This focus is therefore far removed from centring adjudication between 
the deserving and undeserving poor, as ‘Adam and Ben’-type examples attempt.  
 
6.2.2. The Remaining Uses of Choice / Agent Responsibility 
If the concepts of choice/agent responsibility can no longer serve as the foundational 
mechanisms of egalitarian philosophy, why not cut them from our theorising 
altogether? What use remains for them, given their slippery nature and largely 
conservative pedigree? I do not advocate removing them from egalitarian theorising 
altogether because, as I now explain, when used in a certain way they can serve as 
useful shorthand – especially in discussions of exploitation.  
 
Responsibility attributions are useful shorthand precisely because of the many 
complex webs of judgements that underlie each one: all those judgements about 
what matters for normal purposes and to what degree (including the tricky analysis 
of exactly what constitute these purposes). In ethico-political debates, these include 
judgements about which agents capable of responsible agency exist in the context in 
question, what we can expect of them and what their obligations are, how we 
individuate and attribute social value or disvalue to various outcomes, and so on. 
Once we recognise the political nature of many of these underlying judgements, 
drawing on this shorthand need not always be problematic.  
 
For example, sometimes it is sufficient to simply say ‘what happened to me had 
nothing to do with where I walked or what I wore, and everything to do with the 
 
differ, not least because she does not aim to analyse agent responsibility specifically (see 
McTernan 2015: 15, footnote 1).    
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actions of two men.’ 387 Or to state that ‘this oppression occurs though a steady 
process of the transfer of the results of the labour of one social group to benefit 
another.’388 Sure, these attributions – refusing responsibility for assault and 
attributing responsibility for valuable work outcomes – necessarily rest on important 
debates about political value, norms, and obligations. But agent responsibility lets us 
knit together this intricate web of judgements and invoke it simply and quickly.     
 
This makes the concept especially useful in discussions of exploitation’s role in 
reproducing structural injustices. The quote above comes from such a discussion: Iris 
Marion Young states that ‘the central insight expressed in the concept of 
exploitation… is that this oppression occurs through a steady process of the transfer 
of the results of the labour of one social group to benefit another.’389 Without some 
concept of agent responsibility we cannot talk about the ‘results of labour’ of any 
particular social group since this is an attribution of authorship for specific outcomes 
to the actions of the group. 
 
Young’s concept of exploitation is avowedly normative and she recognises that 
exploitative relations are enacted by ‘social rules about what work is, who does what 
for whom, how work is compensated, and the social processes by which the results 
of work are appropriated.’390 These claims harmonise with my arguments about 
carework and suggest that Young understands these kinds of agent responsibility 
attributions to be political statements rather than foundational value-free claims.  
Young’s conception of exploitation therefore looks to draw on a politicised 
understanding of agent responsibility – one explicitly developed to capture the 
 
387 Remeikis (2018). 
388 Young (2011a: 49). 
389 Young (2011a: 49). 
390 Young (2011a: 50). 
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problems of structural injustice391 – as a shorthand to help facilitate her discussion of 
exploitation and exploitative relations.  
 
In defending this use of a concept of agent responsibility within egalitarian 
theorising, I contradict Elizabeth Anderson. Arguing against Young’s concept of 
exploitation, Anderson argues that since ‘everyone’s efforts causally contribute to 
others’ productivity, it makes no normative sense to credit bits of production to the 
independent efforts of specific producers.’392 By invoking the notion of ‘causal 
contribution’ Anderson denies any sensible division can be made between actual 
causes and background enabling conditions. Because of this, she denies that the 
concept of agent responsibility can be of any use (for, in a functioning society all 
outcomes will causally depend on multiple agents’ actions).  
 
Because Anderson believes the concept of agent responsibility makes no normative 
sense, she strips Young’s concept of exploitation of what she perceives as its 
‘definition in terms of productive contributions’ and re-forms it as a ‘procedural’ 
concept referring to ‘the interactions of the parties.’393 On this new procedural 
 
391 On the applicability of her concept of exploitation to various structural injustices see Young 
(2011a: 50-52). 
392 Anderson (2010: 13). She makes a slightly different argument in Anderson (1999: 321 – my 
emphasis), writing that ‘the attempt, independent of moral principles, to credit specific bits of 
output to specific bits of input by specific individuals represents an arbitrary cut in the causal 
web that in fact makes everyone’s productive contribution dependent on what everyone else is 
doing.’ I argue that we need not try for a concept of agent responsibility independent of moral 
principles; Anderson’s (2010: 13) later position suggests she does not think this path viable.   
393 Anderson (2010: 13). Importantly, this section discusses Young’s (2011a {first published 1990}) 
earlier analysis of exploitation (and Anderson’s rejection of this), not engaging with Young’s 
later (2011b) work on responsibility. Anderson may or may not accept Young’s later proposals 
for how egalitarians should reason with/about responsibility; since my approach to 
responsibility differs from Young’s later proposals, I do not explore this. (Though I share many 
of Young’s wider concerns, I avoid her emphasis on distinguishing forward-looking 
responsibility from backwards-looking blame {Young 2011b: 92-122}. I understand forward- and 
backwards-looking considerations as entwined. First, the ‘normal purposes’ animating maps of 
actual causation will often include forward-looking considerations – we look back in order to 
change future outcomes. Second, and related, I do not think backward-looking responsibility 
attributions need necessarily descend into unhelpfully individualising, defensive distractions; 
6.  DECENTRING CHOICE, RECENTRING RELATIONS? 
159 
 
account, exploitation is instead equated with interactions like fraud, discrimination, 
breach of contract, and coercive imposition of contractual terms. It can no longer be 
described as a relationship in which one person/group’s productive output is 
unfairly valued, transferred to, and controlled by another person/group for the 
latter’s benefit, since we can no longer sensibly make the initial responsibility 
attribution.  
 
However, Anderson’s belief in the impossibility of making any agent responsibility 
attributions is unwarranted. For example, we can say that child-carers 
author/produce a certain set of valuable socio-political outcomes because their 
actions matter for purposes of normative-political debates about the functioning of a 
fair society. The act of caring for a child is not normatively indistinguishable from 
the act of donating sperm that conceived that child, for example, notwithstanding 
that both are causally necessary for producing the outcome of a well-cared-for child.  
 
Rather, contra Anderson, it makes no normative sense not to credit the carer with a 
larger productive contribution to this outcome. The carer’s ongoing labour matters 
more than the initial sperm donation (at least in ethico-political debates about how a 
fair society ought to function and how it ought to understand and value various 
social practices and activities). Perhaps sperm donors have some agent responsibility 
for any resultant cared-for children; conceivably they too provide a valuable social 
service. But, in normative political debates, the people who provide ongoing care for 
these children have greater agent responsibility for this outcome because these hours 
of caring labour are of central importance to the outcome (and to the reproduction of 
wider society more generally). Distinctions like this are not arbitrary or empty 
simply because they are laden with political evaluations.  
 
 
with Nussbaum {2011: xxii}, I find it ‘hard to see how we ever get to the future without a critique 
of the past.’)   
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Furthermore, I am unpersuaded by the wisdom of Anderson’s stripped back concept 
of exploitation. Her position removes the possibility of any kind of social group 
defined to any degree by its experiences of exploitation (traditionally understood), 
insofar as such terms imply one group unfairly taking the results of another group’s 
labour. This possibility, along with the understanding of exploitation accompanying 
it, continue to prove useful in many analyses of structural injustice.394 Furthermore, it 
seems extremely likely that some groups suffer fraud, discrimination, and breach of 
contract so systematically precisely because the steady, unfair transfer of the results 
of their labour to others leaves them relatively powerless to resist these breaches. I 
worry that Anderson replaces the concept of exploitation with some of its common 
accompanying effects.  
 
Last but not least, Anderson’s critique of Young overlooks the fundamentally 
procedural/relational basis of Young’s understanding of exploitation. A more 
charitable and fruitful interpretation of Young is readily available – one which does 
not understand her talk of ‘productive contributions’ to be problematically 
foundational to her normative analysis of the wrong of exploitation. Instead, as 
suggested, we can understand Young’s talk of productive contributions as a 
shorthand way to invoke a complex web of problematically exploitative social 
practices and relations.  
 
394 Exploitation, in the sense of a transfer of surplus value from workers to capitalists, is central to 
Marxist theory; more specifically ‘it is not that the capitalist gets some of the value the worker 
produces, but that he gets some of the value of what the worker produces’ (Cohen 1979: 354). For 
the continuing centrality of exploitation to Marxist class analysis see Dean (2012). Fraser (2016) 
builds on Marx’s view that the crux of the capitalist system is the exploitative relation between 
classes, putting exploitation on a continuum with expropriation in an attempt to illustrate 
contemporary raced and classed domination. Mills (2004: 47) examines raced exploitation and 
discusses ‘cultural exploitation’: where ‘some important cultural innovation or breakthrough’ is 
represented as ‘owing to’ white people when it ‘really comes from’ people of colour.’ Discussing 
the role of economic exploitation in systemic white supremacy he cites the classic line that ‘white 
American wealth historically rests on red land and black labour’ (Mills 2003: 12). Of course, these 
theorists could all be misguided – I only highlight the rich historical and contemporary strand of 
thought we give up by following Anderson’s redefinition of exploitation to exclude any idea of 
productive contributions.  




There is ample evidence for such an interpretation. For example, recall Young’s 
argument that exploitative relations are enacted by ‘social rules about what work is, 
who does what for whom, how work is compensated, and the social processes by 
which the results of work are appropriated.’395 Here, she recognises that the 
processes through which we attribute productive output to specific agents are 
ethico-political ones, and she suggests that exploitation be understood as a 
relationship constituted by unfair labour, wage, and distributive practices. What’s 
more, she explicitly criticises other analyses of exploitation for reducing ‘institutional 
relations and structural relations’ to mere monetary transfers or wealth levels.396 
 
Therefore, though Young discusses exploitation ‘in terms of productive 
contributions’, her deeper theorisation of it relies on an analysis of a certain set of 
inegalitarian social norms – norms about how we value and reward social activities, 
and how we individuate their outputs – and the social practices and relations which 
accompany these norms. On my interpretation, an analysis of the exploitative 
wage/labour/distributive relations that define and enact exploitative transfers 
therefore underlies Young’s discussion of the unfair transfer of productive 
contributions.397 (In contrast, the set of social practices Anderson bases her new 
conception of exploitation on – fraud, breach of contract, coercive imposition of 




395 Young (2011a: 50). 
396 Young (2011a: 53). 
397 In interpreting Young thus, I agree with Elster (1982 :364) that the concept of exploitation has 
both causal and normative aspects and that ‘exploitation is a theoretical rather than a primitive 
concept, so that for any given theory of distributive justice, we can define a notion of exploitation 
to go with it.’ 
398 This suggests Anderson thinks it impossible to analyse wage, labour, and distributions in 
relational/practice-based terms. I argue against this in Chapter 8, Section 4.   
162 
 
In sum, then, and contra Anderson, a political conception of agent responsibility can 
still play a role in egalitarian theorising – despite the fact that responsibility 
attributions cannot serve as an apolitical foundation of our theories of justice. The 
concept captures many complex political judgements and distils them into 
deceptively simple statements; as long as we are aware of its potential traps, we 
need not eschew it altogether. Nonetheless, as argued, to avoid unintentionally 
reproducing inegalitarian responsibility ascriptions we must inform our use of this 
concept with some critical awareness of the mechanisms of structural injustice. To 
animate a critical, egalitarian ‘good-sense’ political schema we are forced to move far 
beyond a narrow focus on choice and agent responsibility as the primary motors of 
distributive justice.  
 
Accordingly, I now leave the theoretical current of responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism in search of approaches better equipped to understand and challenge 
structural injustices of race, gender, and class. The remainder of this chapter (and the 
thesis) focuses on alternative ways to conceptualise and integrate economic-
distributive issues into egalitarianism, and on why doing so matters. I begin by 
suggesting that one of the most promising alternatives to responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism – relational egalitarianism – does not always manage to theorise the 
role and political significance of economic distributions clearly enough.  
 
6.3. Relational Egalitarianism and Distributions 
Relational egalitarianism is a conception of social justice that aims to end oppression 
and to create a community in which people stand in relations of equality.399 
Relational egalitarians think social justice is instantiated if society’s ‘basic social and 
political institutions enable individuals equally, and adequately, to avoid relations 
such as domination and marginalisation, and discourage the emergence of 
 
399 The classic statement of this position is Anderson (1999). See also Scheffler (2003); Schemmel 
(2011); Elford (2017). 
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objectionable status hierarchies.’400   
 
Relational egalitarianism explicitly aims to re-attach egalitarian theory to egalitarian 
political movements and struggles; it unabashedly advocates keeping the 
‘distinctively political aims of egalitarianism’ in sight.401 Against the uncritical 
adoptions of right-wing conceptions of choice and responsibility that characterise 
much responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, relational views challenge the idea that 
‘individual choice’ ought to be central to justice.402  
 
They also turn away from the political ontology of atomised individualism. Take, for 
example, one of the most influential articulations of relational egalitarianism – 
Elizabeth Anderson’s. Discussing unpaid carework, Anderson ‘rejects the atomistic 
norm of individual self-sufficiency as based on a failure to recognise the dependency 
of wage earners on the work of those whose labour is not for sale.'403 She insists that 
egalitarians look at the relationships within which goods are distributed, not only at 
the distribution of goods themselves.404 In these ways Anderson provides a welcome, 
inspiring, and rich alternative to currents of egalitarian thought dominated by the 
concept of choice. Her relational egalitarianism looks a promising framework from 
which to articulate and argue for a more egalitarian political schema. 
 
Furthermore, relational egalitarianism’s theoretical approach tallies with many more 
specialised analyses of raced, gendered, and classed injustices. For example, Chen 
understands race as a ‘relation of domination’;405 Bonilla-Silva understands society’s 
racial structure as ‘the totality of the social relations and practices that reinforce white 
 
400 Schemmel (2011: 366). Cf. Elford (2017), who employs a less negativistic conception of 
relational egalitarianism (though I do not believe this difference to affect my arguments).  
401 Anderson (1999: 288).  
402 E.g. Anderson (1999: 308-309); Scheffler (2003: 31). 
403 Anderson (1999: 324).  
404 Anderson (1999: 314). 
405 Chen (2013), my emphasis. 
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privilege’;406 Haslanger discusses the ‘pattern of social relations that constitute the 
social classes of men as dominant and women as subordinate’;407 and Marxists, too, 
commonly understand class in relational terms.408 The relational paradigm therefore 
looks a promising overarching framework from which to unite concerns about these 
kinds of injustices.  
 
6.3.1. The Ambiguous Role of Distributions Within Relational Egalitarianism 
Anderson insists that her egalitarianism is ‘sensitive to the need to integrate the 
demands of equal recognition with those of equal distribution.’409 However, the place 
and significance of distributions and distributive justice within Anderson’s 
egalitarianism has not always been clear, nor entirely convincing. I will argue that 
we can trace this ambiguity (which I identify predominantly in Anderson’s early 
work410) back to one central question: how to understand the relationship between 
economic distributions and hierarchies of socio-political status? Our answer to this 
importantly affects how traditional egalitarian concerns about distributive 
inequalities are either integrated into or excluded from relational egalitarianism.  
 
In earlier pieces, Anderson seems committed to a ‘sufficiency’ conception of 
distributive justice: she suggests that distributive inequalities above a certain 
‘sufficient’ level do not trouble relational egalitarianism. She argues that people need 
effective access to enough resources to function as equal human beings, equal 
participants in a system of cooperative production, and equal citizens of a 
democratic state.411 Inequalities above this threshold are deemed unthreatening to 
equal relations.  
 
406 Bonilla-Silva (2017: 9), my emphasis.  
407 Haslanger (2012d: 228), my emphasis. See also Allen (2015: 514).  
408 See Wright (1980: 325-326) for discussion. 
409 Anderson (1999: 314). 
410 I identify some shifts in Anderson’s arguments after 2008, coinciding with the aftermath of the 
economic recession. I discuss the changes identifiable in her post-2008 work in footnotes below.  
411 Anderson (1999: 317-318). 




Worryingly, Anderson’s view of what distributive shares count as ‘enough’ is at 
times ‘decidedly unambitious’, as Christian Schemmel puts it.412 Schemmel points 
out that Anderson’s view of how much distributive equality is required to achieve 
equal relations seems fairly conservative. For example, on Anderson’s view, most 
people will achieve a sufficient distributive share through a wage earned by ‘filling 
some role in the division of labour’ (as long as they are capable of working).413 But if 
we were imagining some pretty profound changes might be required to the 
mechanisms of wage setting and valuing labour, Anderson does not comply; rather, 
her suggestions are limited to minimum wage laws.414  
 
Elsewhere, she goes slightly further, arguing for universal health care, ‘a modest 
increase in the [US] minimum wage, and a more generous Earned Income Tax 
Credit’, as well as paid dependent-care leave, as provided by many European 
states.415 The UK minimum wage is modestly bigger than the US one416, we have a 
system of free health care417, and parents are entitled to paid dependent-care leave 
(or, failing that, to other social benefits418). This makes the UK a decent test case for 
Anderson’s package of policy proposals. 
 
Now, measured by income distribution, the UK is the fourth most unequal country 
in Europe. Anderson may be unconcerned by this since she at one point suggests 
that she views the accumulation of ‘vast fortunes’ as unproblematic as long as they 
 
412 Schemmel (2011: 369). 
413 Anderson (1999: 321). 
414 Anderson (1999: 325). Cf. Anderson (2018) where she talks (for the first time, I believe) about 
the need to explore sharing economic rents more equitably rather than retaining focus on 
channelling income through waged work.  
415 Anderson (2004b: 253).  
416 OECD (2017). 
417 Albeit a chronically underfunded one, increasingly limited to EU citizens only (Citizen’s 
Advice 2019a). 
418 Citizen’s Advice (2019b). 
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are accompanied by generous social insurance programmes.419  But she will certainly 
be concerned by the fact that the UK’s class, gender, and race hierarchies are 
flourishing.420 Because of this, Anderson’s extended distributive policy proposals do 
little to reassure those of us worried that relational egalitarianism requires more 
decisive economic-distributive reforms. The case of the UK suggests Schemmel is 
right to argue that early Anderson’s sufficiency conception of distributive justice 
‘cannot satisfy the requirements of relational equality.’421  
 
Furthermore, as Anderson makes access to the resources needed for equal 
functioning conditional on undertaking ‘responsible work’ (if the person in question 
is capable of work) she must make some cut between productive/reproductive 
labour and unproductive leisure.422 Her comments about the possible need for 
‘subsidies’ for unpaid carework suggest she knows she cannot simply rely on 
conventional marketized valuations to make this cut.423 But she seems happy to rely 
on markets for valuing all other forms of labour.424 
 
Part of the problem stems from some residual naturalisation within Anderson’s 
understanding of the economic sphere; she takes certain economic practices and 
 
419 Equality Trust (2018); Anderson (2008: 256, including footnote 31); cf. Anderson (2019) where 
she sounds a markedly different tone. 
420 See Dorling (2015) on class; the gender pay gap among all UK employees is 17.9% (Office for 
National Statistics 2018); there is an ‘ethnicity pay gap’ of 19% between white and black men in 
the UK (Henehan & Rose 2018). Hate crimes are increasing in England and Wales (Crime Survey 
for England and Wales 2018). Gendered and raced discrimination continues in education, 
politics, and in the workplace (e.g. Gillborn 2008; Shabi 2019; Adams et al. 2016). Issues of classed 
hatred and discrimination also remain (Chambre 2017; Jones 2016; Tyler 2008). For more on the 
position of women and people of colour in the UK see Chapter 2, Section 3.   
421 Schemmel (2011: 370). I am not here arguing against the possibility of any adequate relational 
egalitarian distributive sufficientarianism; rather, I argue that Anderson’s position on what 
counts as sufficient distributive reforms to secure equal political relations is too conservative.    
422 Anderson (1999: 312, 321).  
423 Anderson (1999: 328). 
424 Anderson (2008) argues that we should let markets set the price of labour and then, if the 
resultant distributive outcomes jeopardise equal social relationships, constrain the range of these 
outcomes.  
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understandings for granted, treating them as pre-political givens. This naturalisation 
is most evident in her discussion of low-wage workers. Here, she writes that 
relational egalitarianism ‘focuses on appreciation for the roles that low-wage 
workers fill’.425 Yet she here accepts the association of low wages with low 
productivity; such appreciation is warranted, apparently, because low-wage tasks 
(which she also here equates with ‘low-skill tasks’ without further comment) free 
others up for ‘more productive’ work.426 
 
Such an approach de-couples the socio-political status of low-wage work (in 
Anderson’s terms, the social ‘appreciation’ it warrants) from the wage it commands 
and accepts that low wages reflect low skill and productivity. Here we might use 
Anderson’s own arguments against her: surely people must regard ‘every product of 
the economy as jointly produced by everyone working together’?427 In the article in 
question she does not explain how we can sensibly talk about low productivity roles 
and high productivity roles given her assumption of joint production. Furthermore, 
my arguments in Chapters 3-5 suggest the fundamental importance of politicising 
the notion of ‘productivity’ rather than accepting it at face value as a pre-given, 
objective and politically neutral calculation.  
 
Relatedly, Anderson never explains how real social ‘appreciation’ can manifest while 
such workers remain paid less than everyone else. Surely the obvious way to express 
the social importance of and appreciation for certain labours is to reward them with 
a decent wage? As my argument in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest, recognition of certain 
work activities as agent responsible for productive output is, in part, a matter of 
normative judgements about what causal inputs matter in generating what 
 
425 Anderson (1999: 326). Cf. Anderson (2019: 138) where, discussing abuses of power in the 
workplace, she acknowledges that ‘the amount of respect, standing, and autonomy they get is 
roughly proportional to their market value.’  
426 Anderson (1999: 326). These comments are made stranger by Anderson’s reluctance to make 
claims about productive outputs elsewhere (e.g. 1999: 321; 2010: 13).   
427  Anderson (1999: 321).  
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outcomes. If low paid jobs matter as much as Anderson suggests they do, why 
accept at face value the assumption that markets correctly individuate and value 
their productivity?428  
 
Elsewhere, Anderson outlines some answers to this question, writing that differing 
market pay levels are justified because: first, markets are efficient epistemic tools for 
helping us convert our partial individual knowledges and self-interest into outcomes 
that advance others’ interests;429 second, markets safeguard individual freedom;430 
third, and most relevant for current purposes, she argues that wage differentials 
‘apply only at the enterprise level, not that of the basic structure.’431 However, she 
does not explain what exactly the ‘enterprise level’ is, nor why it remains separate 
from the basic structure; is it unclear whether it is supposed to coincide with what 
 
428 Recently, Anderson (2019) seems to have recognised that socio-political status is closely 
connected to economic position at least in the sense that one’s (classed) employment position 
importantly determines one’s vulnerability to the despotic ‘private government’ of workplace 
relations. Anderson argues convincingly that ‘public and academic discourse has largely lost 
sight of the problem that organized workers in the nineteenth century saw clearly: the 
pervasiveness of private government at work’ (Anderson 2019: 62). However, her description of 
these despotic workplace relations as ‘communist dictatorships’ frustratingly presents a power 
relation at the core of capitalism – workers’ need to earn a wage to survive, and the vulnerability 
this engenders – as, in fact, antithetical to capitalism, disavowing it to another socio-economic 
system altogether (Anderson, 2019: 39). Furthermore, a gap remains within the relational 
egalitarian corpus regarding the other problems organised workers in the nineteenth century – 
and beyond – saw: wage, ownership, and wealth levels, and their connection to classed social 
status, power, and domination. (Anderson’s {2018} most recent, as yet unpublished work takes 
some steps towards redressing this gap.)  
429 Anderson (2008: 249). This argument ignores how market price can reflect many things apart 
from our individual pre-political interests – for example: first, the balance of power between 
workers and capital owners (including the role of trade unions), monopolies and monopsonies; 
second, the value accorded to that good only by that section of the population who purchases or 
may purchase it; and third, what we are willing to pay for something need not represent how we 
value it in a broader, non-economic sense. On these issues, see Olsaretti (2009: 68–70).    
430 Anderson (2008: 249-253). Anderson’s later work (2019) on abuses of power within the 
workplace is a helpful corrective to this claim; here, she shows that contemporary labour 
markets, far from securing the individual freedom of working-class people, cement their harmful 
domination by ‘private governments’ of capitalist firms.   
431 Anderson (2008: 253). For further discussion on separating ‘the economy’ from the rest of 
society see Chapters 7 and 8.  
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we might normally call ‘the economy’ or ‘the labour market’ or whether it is some 
new, narrower term.  
 
Underlying these answers to the question of why, if low paid jobs matter so much, 
we should accept marketized equations of low wages with low productivity, is early 
Anderson’s view that there is no alternative to a capitalist market economy.432 After 
all, if capitalist markets are the only way to arrange the ‘enterprise level’, then 
Anderson’s preference for focusing on ‘anti-materialist and non-materialist grounds 
for esteem’ in order to undermine discriminatory class snobberies and classed 
hierarchies of esteem makes sense.433  
 
These attempts to separate economic distributions from issues of political power and 
social hierarchies are mainly but not entirely confined to Anderson’s earlier work. 
For example, her argument that we strip the concept of exploitation of any 
distributive content comes in a later book (one which otherwise offers a more 
integrated account of the role of economic distributions in US racial inequality).434 
Here, again, she suggests that a focus on distributive issues is misplaced or 
unnecessary.  
 
Especially in earlier pieces Anderson often starts or ends her discussion of economic 
distributions by stating something like the following: ‘Egalitarians support 
distributive constraints that prevent the conversion of wealth inequality into an 
 
432 Anderson (2004a: 359): ‘in the post-Cold War era (if it was not already obvious decades 
before), capitalism is the only viable form of economic organisation’; in a 2008 symposium 
Anderson labels socialism and anarchism ‘dead ends’ (quoted in Finlayson {2015: 18}). Contrast 
this with her remarks in the Q&A of a recent lecture in which she states that ‘TINA’ – ‘there is no 
alternative’ – operates to shut down political imaginaries of different possible worlds (Anderson 
2018). I draw attention to this change because it is another important reason to, first, distinguish 
early Anderson’s position on economic-distributive issues from later (especially 2018-2019) 
Anderson’s position, and second, to interrogate her earlier position in light of the classic status of 
these early works. 
433 Anderson (2008: 266). 
434 Anderson (2010: 13).  
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unjust social hierarchy, and ensure that everyone… has enough to stand in relations 
of equality to others.’435 But, by unlinking social appreciation – and therefore social 
status – from wage levels, by separating the ‘enterprise level’ from the basic 
structure of society, and by stripping the concept of exploitation of any connection to 
political-economic (re)productivity and wage levels, Anderson assumes certain 
answers to the question of how separable economic-distributive issues are from 
unjust social hierarchies. For the reasons outlined, her answers are not immediately 
persuasive.436 
  
In contrast to Anderson, Schemmel – also a relational egalitarian – argues that to 
truly relate to one another as equal participants in reciprocal cooperation, we must 
limit inequalities in the goods produced by such cooperation. This gives relational 
egalitarians an ‘intrinsic reason for limiting distributive inequality: that it expresses 
respect for people’s equal status in the overall relationship of social cooperation.437 
Schemmel therefore suggests relational egalitarians endorse a defeasible presumption of 
distributive equality so that those relationships governing the production and 
distribution of goods express equal respect for all participants.  
 
Schemmel’s argument is compelling, and it allows us to explain the importance of 
economic-distributive equality from within the relational paradigm since it focuses 
on the relationships that govern the production and distribution of goods. Unlike 
Anderson, he implicitly assumes such relationships must form part of the basic 
structure; there is no appeal to a separate ‘enterprise level’ here.   
 
Yet a puzzle remains in Schemmel’s view of the relationship between social status 
 
435 Anderson (2008: 263). See also Anderson (2008: 267; 1999, 326). 
436 Chapters 7 and 8 provide an in-depth argument for a different answer to this question. 
437 Schemmel (2011: 374). He writes that ‘exactly how much distributive equality relational 
egalitarianism requires on intrinsic grounds may remain an open question’ (Schemmel 2011, 
375).  
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and economic distributions. Take his discussion of a case in which justice-relevant 
reasons necessitate permitting distributive inequalities, but where these inequalities 
risk engendering unequal status norms; specifically, he explores a case where 
children’s social status is linked to the wearing of brand name clothes. Schemmel 
suggests the problem is ‘not inequality in income and wealth, but a… spirit of 
“possessive individualism” which connects status too closely to possession of 
material goods.’438 Because of this, attempts can be made to challenge such norms 
and to encourage ‘the formation of a plurality of different social groups with 
divergent standards for assigning status.’439 
 
Such a solution assumes distributions can be unlinked from social status with the 
right ‘sociopsychological strategy.’ But this seems at odds with Schemmel’s claim 
that there is a defeasible presumption of distributive equality intrinsic to relational 
egalitarianism. If we can transform status-goods into non-status-goods with the right 
sociopsychological intervention, where does that leave relational egalitarians’ 
intrinsic reason for limiting distributive inequality? Why not focus on transforming 
all goods into non-status goods and adopt Anderson’s conservative distributive 
proposals?     
 
This puzzle again has roots in the problem of determining the exact relationship of 
economic distributions to socio-political status and power. Do economic 
distributions, by materially/distributively instantiating the ‘overall relationship of 
social cooperation’, themselves express equal or unequal social relations?440 If so, 
distributions engendering problematic status hierarchies seem intrinsically at odds 
with relational egalitarianism; Schemmel’s presumption of distributive equality 
stands, and his school example fails. Or can problematic social hierarchies be 
 
438 Schemmel (2011: 384). 
439 Schemmel (2011: 384). 
440 Schemmel (2011: 374). 
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eliminated through non-distributive sociopsychological interventions and far less 
demanding distributive changes since minimum wage laws and a basic social 
security net are enough to secure relations of equality? If so, then Schemmel’s 
argument for a defeasible presumption of distributive equality intrinsic to relational 
egalitarianism does not get off the ground.  
 
Perhaps Schemmel thinks socio-political hierarchies are more or less tightly linked to 
distributive outcomes depending on context; at one point he writes that 'status 
norms and their relation to distributions vary across societies; detailed empirical 
research is needed in order to answer the questions' of when distributive inequality 
gives rise to unacceptable status differences and when distributive change is the 
correct remedy for these differences.441 There is surely much truth to this. Yet since 
his paper is arguing for a particular view about the importance of equal distributions 
for relations of equality, it is confusing to see him suggest that this matter is in fact 
an empirical one.442   
 
This turn to empirical context also raises the question of the socio-historical roots of 
the ‘possessive individualism’ Schemmel discusses. Possessive individualism is not 
simply a free-floating psychological orientation to the world; rather, it is an 
ideological orientation to and understanding of the world engendered by a 
particular socio-economic context (amongst other things).443 As Beverley Skeggs 
argues, ‘property and personhood have long been closely connected’ through the 
liberal idea of the possessive individual, and this idea has been ‘institutionalised into 
 
441 Schemmel (2011: 383). 
442 I here assume that social status is part and parcel of relative social standing and therefore an 
important constituent part of equal/unequal social relations. Perhaps Schemmel understands 
social status differently – this might explain away some of my confusion on this point – but he 
does not say.  
443 Macpherson coined the term, exploring how the emergence of a ‘market society’ in the 17th 
century birthed a conception of the subject defined through his capacity to work for a wage and 
his supposed self-possession and self-reliance: ‘the individual as essentially the proprietor of his 
own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them’ (1964: 3).  
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the English social contract and transported around the world.’444 Self-understandings 
do not pre-exist their wider social contexts and in the case of possessive 
individualism, systems of economic exchange and distribution are central to their 
reproduction.445 To try to change the self-understanding without changing the 
distributive/economic institutions that help form and reproduce it would therefore 
face problems.      
 
These puzzles in the writings of Anderson and Schemmel suggest that there is room 
for further work investigating the relationship between economic distributions and 
socio-political status hierarchies. 446 To end this chapter, I argue that these relational 
egalitarian discussions are implicitly framed by assumptions that can be traced back 
to the work of Nancy Fraser. Therefore, I suggest we would do well to look to Fraser 
to help us think through how to conceive of the relationship between economic 
distributions, hierarchical social status, and political power.  
 
 
444 Skeggs (2019: 32). 
445 See also Skeggs (2003: 19–20). 
446 I interpret Martin O’Neill’s work as sitting within the broad relational egalitarian family of 
views. O’Neill’s development of the Rawlsian idea of a ‘property-owning democracy’ also 
challenges many of Anderson’s missteps, though less directly than Schemmel (2011). O’Neill 
treats the economy as a key part of the basic structure and accordingly argues that to treat people 
as equals requires structural economic transformations that go far beyond European welfare 
state-style reforms (O’Neill 2012: 93). He follows Rawls in assuming that significant economic 
inequalities are ‘often associated’ with inequalities of social status but, like Schemmel, he notes 
rather than explores this association (O’Neill 2012: 88). As in Schemmel’s work, this occasionally 
result in puzzles. For example, at one point O’Neill tells us we cannot ‘simply… assume that 
economic power and political power must always go together’ but in the next section he builds 
an argument for property-owning democracy around Rawls’ assertion that ‘we should care 
about [economic] inequality in part because of its effects with regard to status, power, 
domination, and self-respect’ (2012: 87). He clearly takes economic inequalities to have an 
important relationship to political power and status hierarchies, then, but leaves the nature of 
this relationship unexplored. Similarly, O’Neill’s work on ‘predistribution’ persuasively 
refocuses attention on the character of economic relationships (rather than distributive 
outcomes). But though he understands economic relationships as ‘sites for the exercise of power’ 
(O’Neill 2019: 88), he does not discuss why this is the case nor what forms of power – economic, 
political, social – are at play. A gap in the relational egalitarian cannon therefore remains to 




6.3.2. Looking to Nancy Fraser’s Perspectival Dualism? 
In her first (and most influential) paper on relational egalitarianism, Anderson cites 
both Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth on the relational egalitarian imperative to 
‘integrate the demands of equal recognition with those of equal distribution.’447 
However, Fraser and Honneth disagree in important ways on how to conceptualise 
the relationship between distributive and recognitive justice. Honneth understands 
recognition as the fundamental category of social justice; for him, distributions are of 
only derivative importance. Thus, for Honneth, distributive demands are not to be 
integrated with, but rather deduced from, recognitive demands.  
 
In contrast, Fraser denies that we can subsume distributive concerns within a 
recognitive framework. Instead she articulates a theory of ‘perspectival dualism’ 
designed to recognise the importance of both distributive and recognitive 
approaches, and to integrate their demands into one harmonious project.448 Fraser’s 
core aim is that this project delivers ‘parity of participation’: distributive and 
recognitive transformations which ‘permit all (adult) members of society to interact 
with one another as peers.’449 She clearly imagines participatory parity along 
egalitarian lines, writing that ‘participatory parity simply is the meaning of equal 
respect for the equal autonomy of human beings qua social actors’ and ‘entails the 
real freedom to participate on a par with others in social life.’450 Fraser’s desire to 
integrate the demands of recognition and redistribution into one project aiming to 
secure equal participation and interaction therefore sounds far closer to Anderson’s 
project than Honneth’s does.451  
 
447 Anderson (1999: 314). 
448 Fraser and Honneth (2003). 
449 Fraser (2003: 36). 
450 Fraser (2003: 231).  
451 It is a question of closeness since important theoretical and political differences between 
Anderson and Fraser remain. Though Fraser’s ‘participatory parity’ and Anderson’s relational 
equality have similarities, their consequences are developed quite differently at points by the 
two theorists. For example, Fraser has always been more interested in socialist root-and-branch 




Furthermore, Anderson’s view of the importance (or lack thereof) of distributions for 
equal social relationships appears to mirror one of the central contentions of Fraser’s 
work on this issue. This is that economic inequalities are ‘relatively autonomous’ and 
‘partially uncoupled’ from status hierarchies in contemporary capitalist societies.452 
This relative uncoupling would explain why social appreciation may not always 
match waged rewards, yet the remaining possibility of their connection might 
explain Anderson’s claim that greater appreciation for low-waged work might still 
‘squeeze the gap between the highest- and lowest-paid workers.’453  
 
Fraser’s work therefore offers a promising (and vast) resource for those of us 
attracted to the relational egalitarian paradigm but unsure of the place of distributive 
justice within it.454 Fraser assumes a far less individualist, more ‘structural’ analysis 
of economic inequality than the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian literature tends to 
do.455 Relatedly, rather than discussing market mechanisms in the abstract, she tends 
to reconnect current market workings and outcomes to their capitalist context and 
form. In these ways, she fits well with the concerns raised in the first half of the 
thesis.456  
 
transformation of the economy (e.g. Fraser 1995), whereas Anderson – at least until very recently 
– has been more interested in economic ‘range constraints’ to keep capitalist inequality within 
what she regards as safe bounds (e.g. Anderson 2008). Since I regard this aspect of Anderson’s 
approach questionable, it provides another reason to look to Fraser.  
452 Fraser (2003: 21-24, 35).  
453 Anderson (1999: 326). I am not claiming perspectival dualism can be unambiguously 
categorised as a relational egalitarian view; only that Anderson’s own understanding of 
distributive issues, and their place within relational egalitarianism, seems influenced by 
perspectival dualism – particularly in its part-separation of distributive and recognitive issues. 
Further work would be needed to fully integrate perspectival dualism into relational 
egalitarianism, but as I think perspectival dualism mistaken in some ways, I do not attempt this. 
In understanding participatory parity as an aim somewhat similar to equal social relations, I run 
counter to Elford (2012); he understands Fraser’s ideal of recognitive justice to roughly map onto 
relational egalitarianism’s ideal of equal social standing. 
454 E.g. Fraser (1995; 1997; 1998; 2000; 2003; 2004).  
455 E.g. Fraser (1995). 




Finally, some parts of Fraser’s work suggest that she can help us rethink the place of 
distributive justice within the relational egalitarian paradigm. If early Anderson 
pays lip service to the imperative to ‘integrate the demands of equal recognition with 
those of equal distribution’, she nonetheless focuses far more on the former – to the 
detriment of her theorisation of the latter. In contrast, Fraser asserts that social 
movements which ‘ignore or truncate the distributive dimension are likely to 
exacerbate economic injustice, however otherwise progressive their aims.’457 Her 
more uncompromising line on these matters suggests that her work might help 
overcome the worries raised above about Anderson’s handling of distributive 
matters.  
 
Accordingly, the next chapter is devoted to analysing Fraser’s arguments about how 
economic distributions relate to socio-political status hierarchies. There, I argue that 
though we can learn a huge amount from Fraser’s approach, egalitarians should not 
follow her conception of the relationship of wealth and income to status and power. 
Instead, I suggest that distributions and recognition importantly co-constitute one 
another, and I then explore the consequences of this view for how we understand 
the economic distributions and their political significance.  
 
6.4. Conclusion: Motivating a Closer Look at the Political 
Significance of Economic Distributions 
Approaches which use choice as the primary theoretical tool with which to develop 
theories of distributive justice, then, are non-starters. To challenge some of the most 
serious inequalities we face, we need far more strings to our bow. In particular, some 
working knowledge of the mechanisms of structural injustice is invaluable. If we 
move away from responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, where should we look for 
 
457 Fraser (2003: 87). 
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theoretical resources to allow us to discuss the role and significance (or lack thereof) 
of distributive concerns for structural injustices? The primary alternative to 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism – relational egalitarianism – has much to 
recommend it. But puzzles remain about its theorisation of the role and political 
significance of economic distributions.  
 
Granted, responsibility-sensitive egalitarians too often attempt to solve the riddles of 
distributive equality by assuming they can abstract away recognitive issues – issues 
of racist ‘prejudice’ for example. But, in reaction, Anderson’s relational 
egalitarianism swings too far the other way, stripping the concept of exploitation of 
any distributive angle, decoupling wage levels from ‘social appreciation’, and 
proposing a surprisingly limited package of redistributive proposals. Even 
Schemmel, who argues convincingly that greater distributive equality is needed to 
secure equal social relations, is not always clear about how exactly socio-political 
status and power relate to economic distributions. Further work on this topic 
therefore looks worthwhile.  
 
There are signs that Anderson’s framing of this problem was informed by, and 
tallied with, some of the key claims in Nancy Fraser’s work on economic 
redistribution and cultural recognition. Because of this, I next turn to Fraser to 
explore how economic distributions relate to issues of cultural recognition and socio-
political status. In Chapter 7, I focus on perspectival dualism’s conception of 
distributive justice. Chapter 8 presents a ‘non-dualist’ alternative conception of 
distributive justice: one that does not separate cultural recognition from economic 
distributions, and then assesses how this conception could inform a different 






7.  AGAINST ECONOMY-CULTURE 
DUALISM: PERSPECTIVAL DUALISM 




Everyone talks about the need for diversity and yet nobody seems to worry 
about poor white boys. We need to stop obsessing with particular minorities – 
Liam Fox, Conservative MP458 
[A]s we’ve tried to deal with some of the issues around race and women’s 
agendas, around tackling some of the discrimination that’s there, it has 
actually had a negative impact on the food chain [for] white working boys. – 
Angela Rayner, MP & Labour Shadow Education Secretary459 
 
As we process recent political events, one narrative has become commonplace. This 
holds that a ‘cultural politics of identity’ has long overshadowed class and the 
economy, and, via Brexit and Trump, the working class wreaked revenge for being 
so ignored.460 Pitting class against identity like this is not new.461 Facing this latest 
 
458 Fox (2016). 
459 As quoted in Maidment (2018). See also Stephen Kinnock’s similar remarks (Simons 2016). 
460 E.g. G. Fraser (2016); Jenkins (2016). Goodhart (2016) similarly talks of Brexit as a classed 
'peasants’ revolt' of the ‘left behind.’ These explanations whiten the working class and ignore the 
driving role of white elites and middle classes (Virdee and McGeever 2017: 2; Bhambra 2017). 
They majority of Trump voters were middle class, though white working class voters then 
tipped the scales in Trump’s favour (Lamont et al. 2017: 154). Similarly, ‘Leave voters among the 
elite and middle classes were crucial to the final outcome, with almost three in five votes coming 
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upswell, feminists and anti-racists have again denied that their politics must take a 
step back to regain supposed balance. 
 
Identity politics is ‘the anti-hero with a thousand faces’ and I certainly do not defend 
everything ascribed to this loose category.462 Following Suzanna Danuta Walters’ 
claim that ‘identity politics is where intersectionality lives’, I defend what I see as the 
best of identity politics: intersectional ideas on how forms of oppression, and the 
‘structural identities’ arising from them, operate as interwoven and mutually 
mediating categories.463  
 
For those of us interested in Walter’s intersectional project, left critiques of identity 
weigh heavier than centrist calls for ‘post-identity liberalism’ – calls which neither 
re-centre class nor confront raced or gendered oppression.464 The core of left critiques 
is often the accusation that identity politics directs attention towards superstructural 
cultural issues which leave economic structures intact.465 Such charges are 
underpinned by a dualism that sees economy and culture as mutually exclusive 
categories, and economy as more ‘real’, ‘material’, or ‘objective’ than culture.  
 
Economy-culture dualism remains common-sense in political philosophy, theory, 
and public discourse.466 And, though many key intersectional theorists investigate 
class, economy-culture dualism likely contributes to how class sometimes sits 
 
from those in social classes A, B and C1’ (Virdee and McGeever 2017: 2) – however, this picture is 
complicated by the fact that the ‘NRS’ system of categorising social class (the A/B/C1/C2/D/E 
categories) puts 55% of the UK population in these top three classes (Butcher 2019).  
461 E.g. Rorty (1998). 
462 Bickford (1997: 112) quoting Geertz.  
463 Walters (2018: 482); Cooper (2016: 390). 
464 E.g. Lilla (2018). 
465 E.g. Dean (2016b) - I discuss Jodi Dean's work in Chapter 8. Heyes (2002) likewise 
characterises this as the crux of left-critiques of identity politics.  
466 For discussion see Robeyns (2003); Ives (2005). 
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uneasily apart from listings of race, gender, sexuality, ‘etc.’ 467 Walby et al. diagnose 
'ambivalence as to the location of class’ in intersectional analyses and think the 
intersection of gender and class 'relatively neglected in current debates’.468 While 
noting that none of race, class, or gender are ‘obviously analogous’, Heyes states, 
‘class in particular has a distinctively different political history.’469 Yet all agree that 
class must be part of intersectional analyses. 
 
Given this, and given current restagings of the identity versus class debate, it is 
worth looking at economy-culture dualism as key in reproducing these arguments 
every decade or so. I argue that to move beyond this debate – and to best theorise 
the intersections of class with race, gender, and sexuality – we must abandon 
economy-culture dualism.  
 
Yet how to examine a position often implicitly assumed rather than argued for? 
Here, Nancy Fraser's work on how to understand and integrate left economic-
redistributive projects with feminist and anti-racist cultural ‘recognitive’ projects is 
an invaluable source. Her 'perspectival dualism' is the best – most plausible, fully 
articulated, and influential – form of economy-culture dualism around.470 
Perspectival dualism understands economic distributions and cultural recognition as 
two different dimensions of, and perspectives on justice – both of which are 
important and neither of which is reducible to the other.  
 
 
467 E.g. Carby (1982); Collins (2000); Combahee River Collective (2005). 
468 Walby et al. (2012: 231).  
469 Heyes (2002). Better reasons for the relative de-emphasis of class compared to gender and race 
lie in intersectionality’s origins in black feminist thought (Cooper 2016). 
470 Fraser’s recognition/redistribution paradigm looms indicatively large in topic introductions 
by Markell (2018) and Squires (2008). Walters (2018: 481) borrows terms from Fraser when she 
calls identity versus class as ‘a battle between a politics of recognition and a politics of 
redistribution.’ Fraser’s framework structures studies ranging from the welfare state (Dahl 2004), 
and disability (Dodd 2016), to social work (Boone et al. 2018), and education (Öchsner & Murray 
2018). 
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Arising from a late-1990s schism between the ‘cultural left’ and the ‘social left’, 
perspectival dualism is explicitly designed to heal identity versus class schisms by 
retaining focus on economic injustices without indulging sexist, racist, 
heteronormative backlash. I argue that perspectival dualism struggles to illuminate 
the intersection of race and class, and that better analyses do not pit the importance 
of economy and culture against one another, nor view the economy as an a-cultural, 
value-free zone.  
 
Then, in Chapter 8, I turn to Jodi Dean’s contemporary left restaging of identity 
versus class debates, arguing that Dean’s implicit economy-culture dualism repeats 
some of Fraser’s mistakes. Building on the lessons of Fraser and Dean, I outline an 
anti-dualist approach which understands the economy as a harmful theoretical 
objectification of certain practices and resources – an objectification which shores up 
and naturalises raced, classed, and gendered relations of domination. I then suggest 
how we might build a better, counter-hegemonic understanding of the economy.  
 
I start this chapter with an outline of perspectival dualism and then discuss three 
important sources of ambiguity within the theory. I argue that even on the most 
charitable understanding, perspectival dualism struggles to capture some important 
lessons from black feminist thought about the intersectionality of different injustices. 
But the features that make it hard for the theory to capture these lessons are also the 
features that keep it distinct from what Fraser calls ‘deconstructive anti-dualism’- a 
position which understands economy and culture as importantly co-constitutive. 
Therefore, I argue, we should give up economy-culture dualism and embrace anti-
dualism.  
 
This argument has implications for how we might best incorporate economic-
distributive concerns into relational egalitarianism. Recall, from Chapter 6, that the 
role and political significance of economic distributions is not always clear in 
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relational egalitarian thought. While Anderson and Schemmel agree that economic 
distributions matter insofar as they affect equal relations and equal social status, 
they disagree about the degree to which distributions did so affect relations and 
status. At points Anderson wholly or partly decouples structures of social 
recognition from structures of economic distribution. Even Schemmel, arguing for a 
more ambitious relational egalitarian program of economic-distributive reform, is 
not always clear about how exactly socio-political status hierarchies relate to 
economic-distributive structures.  
 
We can learn much about this topic from exploring Fraser’s clear and well-
developed position on it. However, I ultimately argue that we should not adopt 
Fraser’s understanding of economic-distributive justice nor her view on how the 
economic-distributive and cultural-recognitive elements of justice relate to one 
another. Building on this chapter’s arguments for moving away from Fraser’s 
perspectival dualism, I develop an alternative proposal in Chapter 8.  
 
The next two chapters focus on the intersections of race and class because I believe 
this topic, and work on it by critical race theorists, deserve wider attention. Similar 
conclusions could be reached by centring class and gender, however.  
 
7.2. Perspectival Dualism 
As Walters suggests, the academic version of the ‘class backlash’ electoral 
explanation discussed above invokes ‘a battle between a politics of recognition and a 
politics of redistribution.’471 Both Walters and Fraser think this a false binary, since 
all political mobilisations call for both recognition and redistribution.472 Fraser aims 
to overcome this framing of recognition and redistribution as ‘either/or’ competitors, 
 
471 Fraser (1995); Walters (2018: 481).   
472 It is unclear whether Walters follows Fraser any further, though I suspect not given that she 
frames her approach from within an intersectional paradigm rather than a dualist one. 
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and to restore an emphasis on class politics without sidelining the ‘politics of 
recognition’. I agree: we must resist any simplistic, antagonistic binary of class and 
‘identity politics’.  
 
7.2.1. Overview 
For Fraser, the politics of redistribution maps on to ‘the economic’, and the politics of 
recognition onto ‘the cultural’. She insists we theorise traditional economic injustices 
without erasing injustices of race, gender or sexuality, or giving reductively 
economistic accounts of them. But she insists the ‘politics of recognition’ is not 
enough either; we must not deny or overlook economic-distributive injustices.  
 
Fraser offers perspectival dualism as the foundations of a huge project. She wants 
the theory to help us do three things.473 First, to articulate an overarching conception 
of justice accommodating ‘defensible’ recognitive and redistributive claims. Second, 
to envision institutional arrangements to remedy both kinds of injustices, 
minimising ‘mutual interferences’ between remedies. Third, to understand the 
complex relations between economy and culture in contemporary society.  
 
Perspectival dualism is offered, then, both as normative political philosophy – as a 
framework to help articulate a unified vision for the left – and as social theory – as 
an account of economy and culture and their relation.474 Since perspectival dualism 
arises out of Fraser’s desire to avoid the extremes of anti-dualism and substantive 
dualism, examining why she views them as dangerous is instructive.  
 
473 Fraser (2004: 455-456). 
474 This sits comfortably within Fraser’s (1989: 113) ‘critical social theoretic’ approach which 
‘frames its research program and its conceptual framework with an eye to the aims and activities 




Fraser Against Deconstructive Anti-Dualism 
Fraser understands anti-dualism to view culture and economy as so mutually 
constitutive as to make meaningful separation impossible.475 She associates it with 
Judith Butler and Iris Marion Young, and harbours two main concerns about it. First, 
she worries that if culture and economy cannot be meaningfully distinguished, then 
all injustices are necessarily both cultural and economic. Fraser argues that such an 
approach paints ‘a night in which all cows are grey’, eliding ‘actually existing 
divergences of status from class’ by seeing all class injustice as status injustice and 
vice versa.476    
 
Second, Fraser thinks anti-dualists view capitalist society as ‘so monolithically 
systematic that a struggle against one aspect of it necessarily threatens the whole.’477 
Her worry seems to be that if the economy is cultural and culture economic, we risk 
collapsing different systematic injustices into one well-oiled, neatly and necessarily 
unified system. For example, she argues that calling struggles against sexist social 
structures ‘economic’ risks collapsing any difference between patriarchy and 
capitalism. This collapsing of differences creates an ‘overtotalized’ view of society as 
a ‘monolithic ‘system’ of interlocking oppressive structures.478   
 
Fraser thinks this overtotalized view politically paralysing and over-simplistic. 
Paralysing for implying that progress on one kind of injustice requires progress on 
all. And over-simplistic for assuming any blow to patriarchy, for example, will 
necessarily be a blow to capitalism and racism; she thinks anti-dualism makes 
synergising our fight against these systems look far too easy.479 Thus, Fraser thinks 
 
475 Fraser (2003: 60). 
476 Fraser (2003: 60–61). 
477 Fraser (1999: 51). 
478 Fraser (1998: 147). 
479 Fraser (1998: 146). 
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anti-dualism is to be avoided at all costs. But she also thinks substantive dualism a 
non-starter, and it is to her rejection of this alternative that I now turn.  
 
Fraser Against Substantive Dualism  
Substantive dualists view economy and culture as substantively distinct ‘domains’, 
matching substantively distinct ‘spheres of justice.’480 Redistribution and recognition 
are presented as mutually exclusive qualities of social relations; economic injustices 
arise from economic-distributive relations, and cultural injustices from relations of 
recognition.481  
 
Fraser sees this ‘substantively separate spheres’ view as inadequate ‘both 
conceptually and politically’ (and I agree).482 First, it inscribes contingent social 
categories that emerge historically from capitalism onto the world itself, helping 
naturalise them. Second, these domains are neither entirely separate nor rigidly 
bounded, even under capitalism; to paint them so reinforces the disassociation of the 
politics of recognition and redistribution that we are trying to undo. These realms 
are, in fact, ‘more or less permeable’ – the cultural realm is not free from economics, 
nor vice versa.483  
 
Exactly how does Fraser view the economic as permeated by culture? She writes, 
‘the economy is not a culture-free zone, but a culture-instrumentalizing and 
resignifying one.’484 She suggests economic mechanisms often take cultural inputs, 
when those inputs are useful for capitalist interests – as with a gendered division of 
 
480  Fraser (1999: 44; 2003: 61). 
481 Fraser (1999: 44). Though Fraser does not name any substantive dualists, Mitchell (1998) gives 
a wonderful genealogy of this modern understanding of the economy. 
482 Fraser (1999: 44). 
483 Fraser (1999: 44). 
484 Fraser (1999: 44). 
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labour or a particularly marketable part of culture, for example.485 For Fraser, culture 
thus permeates the economic zone as inputs, but economic ‘mechanisms’ themselves 
remain a-cultural. In fact, she often emphasises that ‘in practice’ or ‘for practical 
purposes’, economic and cultural injustices are almost always ‘interimbricated so as 
to reinforce one another dialectically.’486 Substantive dualism denies these complex, 
multiple overlappings. In this respect it is the antithesis of anti-dualism, which views 
economy and culture as always co-present and co-constitutive. 
 
Talk of the ‘imbrication’ of two nonetheless fairly ‘autonomous’ social orders show 
Fraser navigating between these positions. For her, these social orders overlap in 
multiple complex ways yet remain ‘relatively autonomous’ and ‘partially 
uncoupled.’487 Understanding how this partial uncoupling and autonomy sits with 
her acknowledgement that economic and cultural injustices almost always ‘reinforce 
one another dialectically’ is tricky. I ultimately argue she fails to walk this tightrope.  
 
Perspectival Dualism  
Fraser presents perspectival dualism as a way out of this substantive dualism dead-
end. It understands justice as requiring two different perspectives - economic-
redistributive and cultural-recognitive. It sees virtually every injustice as, ‘for 
practical purposes’, two dimensional – as having both an economic and cultural 
dimension.  
 
However, injustices are not assumed to have each ‘dimension’ equally. Rather, they 
sit somewhere along a spectrum. At one end sit ‘ideal-type’ purely economic 
injustices - working class exploitation as understood by ‘orthodox, economistic 
 
485 Fraser (2003: 62). 
486 Fraser (1995: 72). 
487 Fraser (2003: 90). 
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Marxism’ is Fraser’s preferred example.488 At the other end sit ideal-type purely 
cultural injustices – here her preferred example is injustices suffered by ‘despised 
sexualities.’489 In between lie injustices that are ‘at root’ economic or cultural to 
varying degrees. Injustices of gender and race sit somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum, for example.  
 
How are we to tell how big an economic or cultural dimension an injustice has? 
Fraser suggests ideal-type one-dimensional economic injustices are ‘at core’, 
‘ultimately’, ‘at bottom’, ‘rooted in’ the economy.490  For an injustice to sit towards 
the economic end of the spectrum, it must thus be at its ‘core’, predominantly rooted 
in the economic social order. It may have accompanying recognitive injustices, but 
these will be largely indirect, ‘derivative’ effects of redistributive injustice, rather 
than ‘primary’ or ‘co-original.’491  
 
Fraser thinks an injustice can be predominantly rooted in one social order because of 
the ‘partial uncoupling’ of the economic and status orders that capitalism 
engenders.492 Under capitalism, she writes, ‘economic mechanisms’ are ‘relatively 
decoupled from structures of prestige and… operate in a relatively autonomous 
way.’493  Importantly, Fraser restricts the term ‘economic’ to ‘its capitalist meaning’, 




488 Fraser (2003: 17-20). 
489 Fraser (2003: 17-19). 
490 Fraser (1999: 27; 2003: 17–19). 
491 Fraser (2003: 17-19). 
492 Fraser (2003: 21-24, 35). 
493 Fraser (2003: 35). 
494 Fraser (1998: 146); Fraser (2003: 58).   
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7.2.2. Three Ambiguities  
Fraser developed perspectival dualism over many years. Within this work lie at least 
three ambiguities. First, her understanding of the economy remains brief and 
gestural, with the role of materiality appearing to shift. Second, her understanding of 
cultural recognition appears to have broadened. Third, over time, the causal 
ontology underlying Fraser’s theory shifts and remains ambiguous. The centrality of 
these ambiguities makes them worth exploring.  
 
(i) Conceptualisation of the economy 
Fraser rarely explicitly defines the economy and the economic.  One of her few 
statements on this responds to Butler’s arguments for including the production of 
humans themselves in the category of the economic, making heterosexism and the 
regulation of sexuality economic too.495 Discussing Butler’s different approach, Fraser 
writes, ‘I fail to see how this improves on my simpler strategy of restricting the term 
economic to its capitalist meaning.’496 And she often uses ‘the economy’ and 
‘capitalism’ synonymously.497  
 
What is this ‘capitalist meaning’ of the economy? Fraser often talks as if the economy 
is synonymous with markets. She labels an imagined society in which the economic 
order entirely subsumes the cultural order as ‘fully marketized’; markets decide 
everything, fully determining status and class.498 And markets alone are described as 
the economy’s ‘core institutions.’499 
 
 
495 Butler (1998). 
496 Fraser (1998: 146). 
497 Fraser (1998: 285; 1999: 36). 
498 Fraser (2003: 52). 
499 Fraser (2003: 58). 
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Economic and cultural perspectives, and their respective social orders, are described 
as ‘analytically distinct’ from one another.500 For Fraser, the economy is ‘objective’, 
while the cultural zone, ‘intersubjective.’501 But she does not directly explain what is 
more objective about the economy, or more intersubjective about culture. Young and 
Butler both at times interpret Fraser’s definition of the economy to rest on an 
‘economic as material / culture as immaterial’ division – an understandable 
interpretation given how Fraser sometimes used ‘material’, ‘distributive’, and 
‘economic’ synonymously in earlier work.502 But she has since explicitly and 
forthrightly rejected this ‘economic materialism’, meaning the economic objectivity 
she seeks cannot be based on materialist foundations.503 
 
Instead, it appears the objectivity of the economic rests on its value-free, impersonal, 
autonomous mechanisms, ‘logic’, and structure, as opposed to the value-laden, 
intersubjective ‘patterns’ of the cultural zone. For example, status subordination is 
‘rooted in institutionalised patterns of cultural value’, and economic subordination 
in ’structural features of the economic system.’504 Economic ‘mechanisms’ are 
‘decoupled from cultural value patterns and… operate in a relatively impersonal 
way.’505 Markets ‘decontextualize and rework cultural patterns’, resulting in ‘a 
specialised zone’ in which cultural values do not directly regulate social 
 
500 Fraser (2003: 50). 
501 Fraser (2003: 49, 53). 
502 Young (1997); Butler (1998); Fraser (1995). 
503 Fraser (1998). There are good reasons for this rejection. First, understandings of the economy 
which represent it as material (in contrast to the cultural realm’s immateriality) often borrow 
heavily from physics and, as such, encourage the naturalisation of ‘the economy’ (Mitchell 1998: 
86; Mirowski 1988). Second, it struggles to recognise practices of provisioning so-called 
‘immaterial goods’ like data and knowledge as important parts of the economy. It is common to 
view at least some kinds of immaterial goods as economic; the value of the European data 
market was estimated at over €59 million in 2016, for example (IDC & Open Evidence 2017). Nor 
ought we revise this inclusion given feminist arguments about the economic importance of 
‘immaterial’ labour and goods like affective care and time (Coote & Himmelweit 2013; Fortunati 
2007). Finally, it wrongly suggests the immateriality of the realm of culture (Williams 1977; 
Butler 1998).  
504 Fraser (2003: 50). 
505 Fraser (1999: 36). 
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interaction.506 Thus, though economic mechanisms can ‘instrumentalize’ cultural 
values, the mechanisms themselves remain objective, relatively autonomous, and 
value-free.507    
 
How are we to distinguish the economic social order, ‘in which interaction is 
regulated by the functional interlacing of strategic imperatives’, from the cultural 
social order, ‘regulated by institutionalized patterns of cultural value’?508 Fraser’s 
answer returns to markets: economic ordering is ‘typically institutionalized in 
markets; cultural ordering may work through a variety of different institutions, 
including kinship, religion, and law.’509  
 
(ii) Conceptualisation of culture 
Similarly, Fraser does not define ‘culture’ head-on. We glean her understanding 
from various definitions of recognition, which maps onto the cultural social order.  
In earlier work, recognition was associated with difference and identity politics, and 
the redistributive paradigm with equality.510 However, in later work Fraser states 
that cultural recognition need not end here. As well as differentiated identity 
construction, she sees culture as concerning social status, meanings and norms more 
generally.511  I take Fraser to draw on this broad understanding of the cultural zone, 
rather than tying cultural recognition to differentiated identity claims alone.  
 
(iii) Background causal ontology 
As Chris Armstrong argues, Fraser’s background causal ontology has shifted over 
the course of her work and remains ambiguous even in recent writings. Fraser 
 
506 Fraser (1999: 42). 
507 Fraser (2003: 49). 
508 Fraser (2003: 50). 
509 Fraser (2003: 51). 
510 Fraser (1995). 
511 Fraser (2000; 2003: 62). 
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explains the ontological separation between economic and cultural injustices in at 
least three different ways. First, and most prevalent in early work, Fraser suggests 
that while many injustices are two-dimensional, at least some are purely economic or 
cultural.512 As Armstrong notes, Fraser’s repeated insistence that gender and race are 
particular in being bivalent injustices also implies that others are not.513 It is likewise 
hard to understand her repeated claims that the economy and culture are ‘partially 
uncoupled’ without drawing on this first causal-ontological theory.514 If no areas of 
economy or culture are one-dimensional, where could we find any uncoupling of the 
‘zones’?  
 
Elsewhere, Fraser invokes a second, different causal-ontological story. Here, she 
writes that though any given injustice will likely be two-dimensional, its ‘ultimate 
origins’, ‘ultimate cause’ or ‘fundamental root’ will nonetheless lie in either economy 
or culture.515 Finally, Fraser sometimes writes as if all injustices are two-dimensional 
but with economic and cultural dimensions of differing importance. This emerges in 
later work, where perspectival dualism treats ‘every practice as simultaneously 
economic and cultural, albeit not necessarily in equal proportions.’516 This presents 
the proportions of an injustice’s ‘roots’ in economy or culture as determined by the 
relative importance of economy and culture in bringing the injustice about.   
 
This third interpretation of Fraser’s theory is most charitable. It fits her claims that 
her culture/economy distinction is ‘analytic’ or ‘social-theoretical’ not ontological.517 
And it lets her sidestep the large amount of criticism her seemingly ontological ‘root 
cause’ talk has brought her.518 For, briefly, if Fraser’s dichotomy is ontological, her 
 
512 Fraser (1995: 70–71). 
513 Armstrong (2008: 419). 
514 Armstrong (2008: 416). 
515 E.g. Fraser (1998: 144; 2003: 23-24). 
516 Fraser (2003: 63). The ‘virtually every…’ (Fraser 1995: 70) is now dropped. 
517 Fraser (1998: 148). 
518 Armstrong (2008); Swanson (2005); Yar (2001). 
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own criticism of substantive dualism applies: perspectival dualism would 
mistakenly inscribe contingent social categories that emerge historically from 
capitalism onto the world itself, helping naturalise them. The ontological claims of 
the other interpretations are very costly for perspectival dualism’s plausibility.  
 
I interpret Fraser’s causal-ontological background theory as follows, then: as 
separating injustices along an economy-culture spectrum by assessing the relative 
importance of the injustice’s economic and cultural origins, with economy and culture 
understood as ‘historically emergent categories of social theory.’519 Though the most 
charitable, this interpretation confronts Fraser with two questions. First, how to 
determine the relative importance of economy and culture if this distinction makes 
no ontological claims whatsoever? Understandably, Armstrong wonders how an 
analytical distinction with no ontological basis can be of any use.520  
 
However, alone, I think this question need not be debilitating. Though always tricky 
to tie down the meanings of ‘ontological’ and ‘analytical’, Fraser might argue her 
distinction can work without drawing on suspicious ontological foundations at least. 
For example, we don’t always dismiss assessments of the relative importance of 
different nations’ contributions to outcomes as resting on dubious ontological claims 
about causal ‘roots’ remaining within national borders. We sometimes simply see 
nations as useful social-historical entities when theorising. In this way, perhaps 
Fraser can claim to rely only on historically emergent categories of social theory 
rather than an ontologically dubious background theory.    
 
However, Armstrong’s second question should worry Fraser: if perspectival dualism 
sees every injustice as necessarily economic and cultural, what now separates it from 
anti-dualism? I think Fraser would most likely appeal to two distinctive, 
 
519 Fraser (1999: 40). 
520 Armstrong (2008: 415).  
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interconnected features of her theory here: the economy-culture spectrum and the 
distinctive understanding of culture, economy, and their relationship. I will argue 
that both are deeply problematic, meaning that Fraser should abandon the features 
that set her account apart from anti-dualism.  
 
7.3. Challenging Perspectival Dualism 
On my reading, then, perspectival dualism asserts the need to assess the relative 
importance of economy and culture in explaining an injustice, where these are not 
ontological categories but historically emergent social-theoretical constructs. The 
economy is a ‘specialized marketized zone’, and the cultural zone pertains to laws, 
norms, meanings, and identity and status formations. My interpretation of Fraser’s 
causal ontology relinquishes one important way to distinguish perspectival dualism 
from anti-dualism. For this interpretation takes Fraser to see every injustice as 
simultaneously cultural-recognitive and economic-distributive, albeit to different 
degrees (because these dimensions will be of differing importance in bringing the 
injustice about).  
 
When Armstrong considers this interpretation, he wonders what might remain 
distinctive about Fraser’s account if we accept it. As mentioned, I think three 
interconnected aspects of Fraser’s account do keep it distinctive: her economy-
culture spectrum, along with her understanding of cultural recognition and the 
economy. However, in this section I argue that Fraser should give up on these 
features and embrace anti-dualism.  To make this argument, I draw on two of 
Fraser’s examples.  
 
Fraser uses these examples to show why we must avoid both reductive economism 
(which she associates with ‘vulgar Marxism’) and reductive culturism (which she 
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associates with Axel Honneth).521 In other words, they show why economic 
distributions are not all that matter, but nor are cultural norms and meanings.522 The 
first concerns an injustice suffered by a white worker and is worth quoting in full: 
 
Witness the case of the skilled white male industrial worker who becomes 
unemployed due to a factory closing resulting from a speculative corporate 
merger… [This] injustice of maldistribution has little to do with 
misrecognition. It is rather a consequence of imperatives intrinsic to an order 
of specialized economic relations whose raison d’être is the accumulation of 
profits. To handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond cultural 
value patterns to examine the structure of capitalism. It must ask whether the 
mechanisms that are relatively decoupled from structures of prestige and that 
operate in a relatively autonomous way impede parity of participation in social 
life.523  
  
The second example is that of the injustice suffered by an African America Wall 
Street banker who cannot get a taxi to pick him up. Similarly, Fraser writes that, ‘to 
handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond the distribution of rights 
and goods to examine institutionalized patterns of cultural value.’524  
 
The case of the white worker is meant to illustrate that not all maldistribution is a 
product of misrecognition, and I am entirely persuaded of this.525 But I am 
unconvinced that perspectival dualism, even culled of its dubious ontological 
baggage, can capture everything important about this injustice. Specifically, it 
 
521 Fraser (2000: 111; 2003: 34).  
522 For these associations, see Fraser (2000). 
523 Fraser (2003: 34). 
524 Fraser (2003: 34). 
525 I here simply assume we must avoid reductive economism and reductive culturism.   
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struggles to capture aspects of the injustice important to those of us who want to 
take the intersection of race, class and gender seriously.  
 
First, I argue that this case should persuade us to jettison Fraser’s economy-culture 
spectrum imagery and, second, her distinctive understanding of status recognition 
as only to do with subordination. Then, using the Wall St banker case, I argue that 
this does not go far enough; we should also let go of Fraser’s understanding of the 
economy as ‘analytically distinct’ from culture.  
 
7.3.1. Against the Economy-Culture Spectrum 
 
[T]his is our vision: Britain leading the global economy… drawing on the 
talents of all to create British jobs for British workers."– Gordon Brown (then 
Labour Prime Minister)526 
 
Fraser’s economy-culture spectrum situates class injustices at the far ‘economy’ end, 
race and gender in the middle, and injustices suffered by ‘despised sexualities’ at the 
far ‘cultural’ end.  The white worker case thus sits tight towards the economy end 
since Fraser sees almost all the important features of this injustice as arising from the 
economy. This appears the point of making him white, skilled, and male, for then 
few obvious claims of misrecognition along gender or race lines arise, and claims of 
class-based misrecognition are blunted.  
 
Perspective dualism holds that primarily economic injustices are such because they 
stem most importantly from the economic social order, implying the relative 
unimportance of the cultural order. This is why the spectrum is a spectrum: the more 
 
526 Brown’s first speech to Labour Conference as leader – September 2007 (as quoted in Summers 
{2009} who lists Brown's other repetitions of this phrase). The phrase is still used on the left - 
Owen Smith recently stated he had ‘no problem with British jobs for British workers as an 
aspiration’ (Shabi 2017). 
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important the economic origins of an injustice, the less important its cultural origins. 
Our worker is thus portrayed as suffering as close to an idealised case of purely 
economic injustice as is perhaps possible (given the concession that all injustices 
have some ‘dual aspect’ to them).  
 
But this portrayal is problematic. Critical race theorists have long challenged the 
assumption that the white experience is the ‘neutral’ classed experience, just as 
feminists have long challenging assumptions that men’s experiences are the ‘neutral’ 
classed experience. As Hazel V. Carby writes, ‘racism ensures that black men do not 
have the same relations to patriarchal/capitalist hierarchies as white men.’527 Our 
worker’s whiteness deeply affects the kind and shape of injustice he suffers when he 
loses his job, and thus the remedies required too.  
 
How does his whiteness affect the injustice suffered? In the UK, for example, ‘most 
ethnic groups fared worse during the [2008] recession because of higher non-
employment, fewer hours worked, lower labour-market earnings, lower self-
employment rates, lower self-employment earnings, lower investment income and 
higher housing costs.’528 Given this, our white worker will likely have experienced 
both employment and unemployment very differently to people from other ethnic 
groups. For example, he will have smaller housing costs, greater investment income, 
and also be able to translate his skills more easily into re-employment.529  
 
His whiteness likely also affects how his unemployment is perceived by the wider 
community and, in turn, the political sympathy available to him. This affects the 
support or compound harms likely to follow. The white, male working class is 
afforded attention that working-class people of colour can only wish for – attention 
 
527 Carby (1982: 212). 
528 Fisher and Nandi (2015). 
529 Chief (2016).  
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focused on differentiating them from the rest of the working class via race and 
gender, rather than on class barriers and injustices themselves. Take popular 
arguments claiming that the eclipse of class by identity politics uniquely harmed the 
white, male, working-class, as if the struggles of other sections of the working class 
can simply and neatly be transformed into class-quietist gender or race politics.530 
 
These elements challenge the implicit assumption that subordinating misrecognition 
is the only way cultural recognition importantly affects injustices.  Supposing 
cultural patterns do not importantly shape this injustice is a case of ‘methodological 
whiteness’: a failure to acknowledge how race structures the world, resulting in 
treating a limited perspective, derived from white experience, as universal.531 In 
doing so, such approaches deny their own politics of identity. The concept of 
methodological whiteness highlights the dangers of thinking we can unify and 
harmonise class politics, anti-racism and feminism by isolating them for separate 
analysis one by one and then adding our results together.532  
 
Fraser claims perspectival dualism becomes particularly important for ‘intersecting’ 
identities because, ‘for example, anyone who is both gay and working-class will 
need both redistribution and recognition, regardless of what one makes of those two 
categories taken singly.’533 True, in that if our choice is between recognising only 
‘economic’ injustices traditionally conceived, or only so-called ‘identity-based’ 
injustices, or perspectival dualism, then perspectival dualism is far and away our 
best choice.  
 
 
530 e.g. ‘White Season’ (2008); Maidment (2018); Fox (2016). 
531 Bhambra (2017). 
532 Collins (2000) likewise cautions against 'adding on' approaches. Armstrong (2008: 417) 
describes this as one of the ‘key lessons of black or lesbian feminisms.’ Young (2006) makes a 
similar argument regarding the analysis of gender and class, though aimed at ‘dual systems 
theory’ in general rather than perspectival dualism about economy and culture.  
533 Fraser (2003: 26). 
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But these are not our only options. Rather than the ‘two-pronged’ approach Fraser 
recommends, we might examine how the ‘prongs’ themselves interact: how they 
might, in fact, not be best thought of as separate prongs at all. Such a task 
necessitates a class analysis and politics not built on the examination of our white 
male worker’s experiences, presented as immune from status-based issues because 
he is not black or female, but one that recognises the significant effects of raced and 
gendered recognition in shaping all workers’ economic experiences.534  
 
More concretely, Fraser’s gay working-class person does not need redistribution and 
recognition ‘regardless of what one makes of those two categories taken singly.’535 
They need forms of redistribution and recognition that recognise how their class 
affects the homophobia they face, and how their homosexuality affects the class 
subordination they face.536 Economic remedies worked out from our straight, white 
skilled worker – our ‘purest case’ of redistributive injustice as possible – plus 
remedies worked out from a middle-class white gay man - our ‘purest case’ of 
cultural injustice as is possible – may well not fit their needs.  Perspectival dualism 
tries to untangle their experiences of homophobia and class subordination. But both 
are likely often manifest in single experiences – experiences shaped simultaneously 
by their class and sexuality. 
 
We should therefore reject this two-dimensional economy-culture spectrum, with 
class towards the economic end, race and gender in the middle, and heterosexism 
towards the cultural end. Raced recognition importantly shapes the injustice our 
white worker suffers when laid off: it affects the remedies available to him, the 
impact of unemployment (given how race affects his access to reemployment), his 
living costs, and his previous access to higher wages for longer hours. There is no 
 
534 Combahee River Collective (2005). 
535 Fraser (2003: 26). 
536 Taylor (2007). 
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race-neutral class injustice the remedy for which suits skilled white workers as 
perfectly as it suits skilled workers of colour. To ignore this perpetuates 
‘methodological whiteness’ since the status quo falls back on the white experience as 
universal. Try as we might to find a case as close to the ‘economy’ end of the 
spectrum as possible, raced recognition remains important, pulling us back to an 
approach in which cultural recognition retains a role in shaping all economic 
injustices.   
 
7.3.2. Against limiting cultural misrecognition to subordination 
This also gives us reason to reject Fraser’s unconventional understanding of status as 
an order of intersubjective subordination derived from institutionalized patterns of 
cultural value that constitute some members of society as less than full partners in 
interaction.’537 To integrate claims for redistribution and recognition we must be 
aware of status dominance as well as status subordination. This lets us see the 
subordination of people of colour and women as constitutive of a white, male social 
identity.  
 
Subordinated groups gaining ‘full participator parity’ (in Fraser’s terms) therefore 
requires recognising how participation is currently tailored towards those with 
status dominance. This means recognising that status dominance exists (not just 
status subordination), and that it is an important part of the problem. We have 
reason to let go another distinctive element of perspectival dualism: its 
understanding of status as uniquely linked to recognitive subordination.  
 
7.3.3. Against the Economy as an ‘Autonomous’ A-cultural Marketized Zone 
In response to the above, I suspect Fraser would argue I have misconstrued her 
understanding of the economic-distributive and its analytical distinctness from the 
 
537 Fraser (2003: 49). 
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cultural-recognitive. It is these understandings her two-dimensional spectrum is 
based on, after all. I now argue that we have good reason to avoid her definition and 
delimitation of the economy, through discussion of two possible responses she 
might give.  
 
Response 1: Perspectival dualism as normative framework only 
Fraser might argue that insofar as we are interested in investigating injustices, 
perspectival dualism gives an insightful account of the injustice our skilled white 
worker suffers. Yes, his experience is shaped by privileged misrecognition, this 
response would go, but the injustice is primarily one of maldistribution not 
misrecognition, and these categories of injustice remain analytically distinct and 
useful. This gives up on perspectival dualism as social theory to salvage it as a 
normative political framework. For, in recognising that the maldistributive injustice 
our worker suffers is importantly constituted by his gender, race and sexuality, 
cultural recognition is acknowledged to importantly co-constitute the experiences of 
(and practices within) the supposedly semi-autonomous, specialised ‘marketized 
zone’ of economic relations.  
 
Though this concession is welcome, it does not go far enough. By silencing the effect 
of privileged misrecognition on the injustice our white worker suffers, a space 
remains for suggested remedies that not only do not harmonise across different 
distributive and recognitive injustices but might even worsen them. To see the 
dangers of this, we need only look to the post-WWII history of English trade unions 
responding to the precarity of white workers with what John Wrench characterises 
as, at worst, ‘appalling racism and often by an indefensible neglect of the issues of 
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race.’538 He reports that in the mid-80s, a ‘colour blind’ attitude ‘was found to be one 
of the main problems that black workers had to face in unions.’539 
 
Satnam Virdee argues that, central to English trade unionist racism in the post-WWII 
decades was the idea that ‘migrant labour represented a source of cheap labour that 
threatened the economic security of ‘white’ organised labour.’540 Such a response is 
painfully familiar from the Brexit campaign.541 The danger of racist remedies being 
advocated and employed to help remedy our white worker’s injustice is alive and 
well in the current moment.  
 
Ruling our worker’s whiteness as irrelevant when thinking about how to confront 
the real and serious injustices he faces leaves room for remedies that perpetuate (or 
deepen) exploitation of people of colour. Holding that our skilled white worker 
suffers an injustice primarily of maldistribution rather than misrecognition is, on my 
current interpretation of Fraser, to say that economic maldistribution is of far greater 
importance relative to cultural misrecognition in tracing the ‘roots’ of the injustice. 
But of importance to whom? This remains ambiguous and Fraser does not discuss it.  
 
Most likely, Fraser would want us to judge the relative importance of the injustice’s 
origins from the perspective of someone looking to, in her words, ‘devise an 
overarching conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for 
economic equality and defensible claims for the recognition of difference…  
minimizing the mutual interferences likely to arise when the two sorts of redress are 
sought simultaneously.’542 Taking the whiteness of our worker into account need not 
and should not dismiss or diminish the injustice he suffers. But it might help ensure 
 
538 Wrench (1989). 
539 Wrench (1989). 
540 Virdee (2000: 551). 
541 Virdee and McGeever (2017: 5–7). 
542 Fraser (2004). 
202 
 
any remedies that perpetuate or intensify the exploitation of people of colour are 
ruled indefensible from the start, for it forces us to notice how remedies that might 
help him would affect these groups.  
 
Because of this, I am wary of this defence of perspectival dualism. But this might not 
persuade everyone; you might think we can rule out racist solutions to our worker’s 
injustice in other ways. However, this defence faces another, deeper problem, that 
the next response draws out. This is that ‘economic mechanisms’ and ‘cultural 
patterns’ are simply not ‘analytically distinct’, as Fraser claims. Correspondingly, nor 
are ‘injustices of maldistribution’ and ‘injustices of misrecognition’. With this 
distinction undermined, the spectrum imagery is irreparable and – I argue – we are 
forced to give up on perspectival dualism as a normative framework and as social 
theory.  
 
Response 2: The economy and culture as ‘analytically distinct’ zones 
Perspectival dualists might instead argue that, only insofar as our white worker’s 
injustice is traceable to the specialised marketized zone of economic relations alone, 
is it predominantly a maldistributive injustice. Insofar as skilled workers of colour 
suffer different injustices in the same lay-off, they are less economic and more 
cultural, though no less important. And if our worker’s whiteness allows him 
privileged recognition that affects his experiences, it is nothing to do with the 
economic injustice we are interested in isolating here. But (this response maintains) 
our white worker’s injustice has its most important roots in the economic zone, just 
as his position is most importantly determined by this zone.  
 
This tries to preserve perspectival dualism as social theory and as normative political 
framework: it claims the theory gives the right explanation of both how to 
understand the relations between class and status, and how the left should approach 
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this injustice. It does so by leaning heavily on Fraser’s understanding of the economy 
as a specialised and relatively autonomous zone of markets – a zone of objective a-
cultural structures and strategic behaviours, in contrast to the cultural zone’s 
‘fragmented patterns’ of ‘intersubjective’ interaction. This conception of the economy 
is the last distinctive feature of perspectival dualism and, to end, I argue we should 
steer well clear of it.  
 
Turn to Fraser’s second example: our black Wall St Banker who cannot get a cab to 
pick him up. This is meant to show that not all misrecognition is a product of 
maldistribution and, again, I think we should simply accept this; Fraser is right that 
misrecognition should not be reduced to maldistribution, nor vice versa. But this 
leaves the possibility of an anti-dualism that sees distribution and recognition as 
importantly co-constitutive wide open. I will argue that perspectival dualism’s 
understanding of the economy and its split between the economy and culture 
struggle to make sense of this injustice.   
 
To handle this case, Fraser writes, ‘a theory of justice must reach beyond the 
distribution of rights and goods to examine institutionalized patterns of cultural 
value.’543 By painting our man as a Wall Street Banker, Fraser suggests there is little 
of redistributive importance to this example; hence the need to look to the zone of 
cultural recognition. I will argue that we cannot make sense of this injustice by 
separating recognition and distribution like this and pitting their importance against 
one another. Understanding economy and culture as co-constitutive avoids eliding 
important mechanisms through which injustices like this arise and repeat.   
 
Why will taxis not stop for our banker? Presumably, as Fraser suggests, because of 
racist cultural representations. But representations do not arise from nowhere; they 
 
543 Fraser (2003: 34). 
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must be produced and reproduced. Representations of black men as bad or risky 
customers cannot be divorced from a history in which black people were portrayed 
as less than fully human – as irrational and bestial – to justify and explain European 
expropriation of black land, labour, and lives (Wynter, 2003). Colonial 
redistributions of rights and goods both relied on and encouraged production of 
racist representations from the start.  
 
Such racist representations are not just vestiges of history; their ‘afterlives’ remain 
powerful today. African Americans are frequently denied economic goods, services 
and opportunities because of these representations; our banker’s lack of a taxi is one 
instance of a wider phenomenon.544 This means that as a group, African Americans 
are poorer.545 In these ways, racist representations importantly structure 
distributions.  
 
These representations remain present and powerful because they are reproduced by 
contemporary discourses, practices, and material circuits – and, again, distributive 
injustices play a significant role in their reproduction. African American poverty is 
used to justify and reproduce representations of African Americans as bad, risky 
economic agents.546 Take Obama’s speech to a class of young black men: ‘[T]oo many 
young men in our community continue to make bad choices.’ And, he goes on to 
‘confess’, ‘sometimes I wrote off my own failings as just another example of the 
world trying to keep a black man down. But… excuses are tools of the 
incompetent.’547 This is emblematic of the tendency to represent black poverty as 
individual irrationality (‘bad choices’). 
 
 
544 Bonilla-Silva (2017: 25); Quillian et al. (2017). 
545 Long (2017).  
546 Bonilla-Silva (2017: 1, 39-43). 
547 Quoted in Coates (2013). 
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Following Sylvia Wynter, we might describe this as apparent verification by 
systemic production: racist representations pattern distributions, which are then 
taken as evidence confirming racist representations.548 The racist representations that 
leave our banker without a taxi and raced patterns of distribution across the U.S are 
co-constitutive – they co-evolve, mutually constituting and reconstituting one 
another, to maintain and reproduce a raced social order. Even if our banker 
somehow previously avoided these distributive injustices, they still play a key role 
in reproducing contemporary raced representations that leave him taxi-less. 
Perspectival dualists’ painting of such raced injustices as ‘more cultural than 
economic’ overlooks this. 
 
This co-constitutive relationship is important. First, recognising the interaction 
between representations and distributions helps explain the persistence of racism 
within the USA. Rather than weighing the importance of representations versus 
distributions in a zero-sum calculation, we can recognise that racism has persisted 
because racist representations present themselves as explaining contemporary raced 
distributions, helping cement their apparent truth, when in fact these representations 
perpetuate these distributions. We miss this if we separate the intersubjective 
‘ideological’/representational elements of racism from its manifestations in 
distributions, practices and relations, to analyse these separately and weigh their 
importance against one another.  
 
Second, and related, putting the importance of raced distributions back into the 
picture slots this example into broader social context.  Our banker’s experience is not 
representative of much contemporary anti-black racism in the USA, but nor is it 
separable from this wider story. Tracing the co-constitutive distributive and 
 
548 Wynter (2003: 326). 
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representative origins of his experience re-contextualises his experience, letting us 
better understand it. 
 
Can perspectival dualists acknowledge that representations and distributions co-
constitute one another? To end, I argue that they cannot. My argument is in three 
stages: First, I explain why their approach must divide this co-constitutive ‘loop’ into 
mutually exclusive halves, ‘analytically’ if not ontologically. Second, I argue that 
Fraser’s chosen divide is politically problematic. And, finally, I suggest that no better 
‘analytically distinct’ divide is possible, because legal structures and wider cultural 
understandings at once represent and form part of the economic structure.  
 
As mentioned, Fraser often talks of the ‘analytic distinctness’ of economic and 
cultural perspectives.549 This cannot only be an insistence that economy and culture 
mean different things, for even Butler – arch-anti-dualist in Fraser’s eyes – does not 
suggest that the terms mean the same thing, only that the line between them is fuzzy 
and unstable.550 If this was all Fraser’s ‘analytic distinctness’ was to suggest, her 
whole project would arise in opposition to a straw person. She must then retain 
some stronger sense of the ‘analytic distinctness’ of economic and cultural 
perspectives than simply that they centre different aspects of the social.   
 
More likely, Fraser means the historically contingent categories of economy and 
culture are ‘analytically distinct’ in that they divide aspects of the social into two 
mutually exclusive kinds – economic-distributive and cultural-representative. On 
this interpretation, we divide into mutually exclusive parts because we work with 
the contingent contemporary categorisations of economy and culture that are 
mutually exclusive. This retains Fraser’s distance from Butler’s anti-dualism, while 
maintaining our interpretation of her background causal ontology.  
 
549 E.g. Fraser (2003: 50). 
550 Butler (1998). 




On this reading, then, perspectival dualism splits our co-constitutive representation-
distribution loops into two mutually exclusive halves for analysis. The raced 
representations just discussed are thus themselves non-economic by definition – at 
most, ‘inputs’ to the economy. And this economy/culture split, as Fraser 
acknowledges, arises from dominant understandings of contemporary capitalist 
societies.  
 
But this economy/culture split serves a purpose within capitalism. Painting the 
economy as an a-cultural realm of objective facts, mechanisms and strategic 
imperatives sets it beyond the contingency of politics and culture, and so, beyond 
dispute. As Wynter points out, by viewing the so-called ‘strategic logic’ of homo 
oeconomicus as an objective a-cultural reality, we render it non-theorisable as a 
particularly western ‘culture and class-specific’ conception of human behaviour.551 It 
matters little whether we use this a-cultural frame because it is historically dominant 
rather than because we see deep ontological truth in it; reproducing it within our 
social theory, we strengthen its hold. This politically laden economy/culture split is 
too friendly to capitalism’s preferred colour-blind, value-neutral portrayal of itself. 
 
Perspectival dualists cannot fix this by simply altering the cut they make between 
economy and culture. For, I will argue, we cannot coherently divide these loops into 
mutually exclusive halves; economic-distributive ‘mechanisms’ are created and 
reproduced through certain representations, making these representations vital parts 
of the economic structure. Contra Fraser, cultural value patterns are not ‘beyond’ the 
structure of capitalism, but integral parts of it. To show this I again focus on raced 
representations: on how they structure ‘strategic’ economic agency and structure 
economic mechanisms through law.  
 




First, raced representations structure supposedly value-neutral, a-cultural, ‘strategic’ 
economic agency. Fraser’s example shows how economic decisions are frequently 
mediated through racist representations, structuring resulting distributions. As 
discussed, African Americans are regularly denied economic goods, services and 
opportunities on offer to their white counterparts. Each of these denials is a ‘strategic 
economic choice’, for such real-world choices are replete with uncertainties and 
indeterminacies, leaving space for raced rules of thumb to guide actions. These 
representations structure our practices, and thus come to constitute our social 
relations. These networks of relations in turn constitute our social structures – in this 
case, ‘the economy’.    
 
Second, raced representations structure many of the economy’s workings through 
law. Fraser sees law as part of the cultural social order but US law continues to 
protect what we might call ‘whiteness as property’ – whiteness as a status on the 
basis of which social benefits are allocated.552 Take recently revived arguments that 
affirmative action programmes unlawfully discriminate against whites.553 Such 
arguments have led courts to severely limit affirmative action programs, which are 
banned altogether in eight states.554 As courts have viewed the normal workings of 
the economy as race-neutral, they have often seen race-based affirmative action as 
discriminatory. They thus defend whites’ settled expectations of a greater share of 
jobs and educational opportunities as a ‘neutral’ economic baseline.555  
 
Or take the legal construction of home-carers, agricultural workers, and prison 
labourers – all disproportionately people of colour – as not proper ‘workers’, thus 
 
552 Harris (1993); Lipsitz (1995).   
553 Savage (2017). 
554 Economist (2017). 
555 Harris (1993: 1750-1790).    
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denying them standard workers’ rights.556 For example, a 2007 US Supreme Court 
ruling set home carers (disproportionately women of colour) outside the Fair Labour 
Standards Act, even if employed by a for-profit company. A Justice defended this on 
the grounds that if these carers were covered by wage and hour laws, millions 
would be unable to afford home care, so that denying home carers the status of 
workers was in the public interest.557 Home carers’ own interests are here 
systematically underrepresented, as if they do not count as part of the relevant 
‘public’. This arises from the raced and feminized nature of their labour and helps 
reproduce current economic distributions and expectations.  
 
Though it garners less critical attention, much of this also holds true for the UK.558 
UK home care workers likewise struggle to access minimum wages, even when 
employed by private companies.559 Such work is done primarily by women and 
‘increasingly by migrant women.’560 Joann McGregor found raced divisions between 
permanent and temporary caring staff, with better working conditions secured by 
predominantly white permanent carers.561  
 
The gendered and classed effects of recent welfare reforms have also channelled 
working class women into feminized professions. Emily Grabham & Jenny Smith 
detail evidence of the UK’s ‘work/welfare circuit, whereby women come off benefits 
only temporarily and, when they are in work, provide a pool of ultra-cheap labour 
with, at best, precarious conditions and few possibilities for advancement in highly 
 
556 Zatz and Boris (2013). 
557 Boris and Klein (2012: 8-10). 
558 I do not mean to suggest that all economies are raced and gendered in the same ways. To take 
just one example, in settler-colonial contexts western capitalist understandings of what 
constitutes labour are used to appropriate indigenous land in ways not applicable to the UK 
(Povinelli 1995).  
559 Merrill (2016); Plimmer (2018). Though the differential status of their work is not enshrined in 
law in the same way as in the USA. 
560 Mullally and Murphy (2015: 59). 
561 McGregor (2007: 814–15). 
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gendered occupations.’562 Given that the UK poverty rate is twice as high for BME 
groups, the racial composition of this group of women is likely highly skewed.563    
 
The UK has the largest prison population in the EU, and the most privatised prison 
system in Europe.564 Black people are imprisoned at a more disproportionate rate in 
the UK than in the US, and prisoners who work earn an average wage of £9.60 a 
week.565 The UK has one of the largest immigration detention estates in Europe, also 
increasingly privatised, and predominantly peopled by detainees of colour who 
likewise work for well below minimum wage and without the legal protections 
standardly accorded to ‘workers.’566  
 
Raced representations are therefore not best understood as ‘inputs’ to the economy. 
By patterning ‘strategic’ agency and informing the legal framework that limits and 
constitutes economic activity, they structure the economy. I focused on raced 
representations, but this argument generalises: without underpinning 
representations in the form of social norms and legal structures, there is no 
‘specialised marketized zone’. Capitalist markets cannot survive without laws 
determining who counts as an ‘employee’, or norms supporting decision-making 
shortcuts under uncertainty.  
 
Fraser’s imagined ‘fully marketized society’, then, is a fantasy: no market can exist 
without legal frameworks and social norms underpinning their function and setting 
 
562 Grabham & Smith (2010: 83). This matches my experience as a community worker: the 
working-class women who accessed our support – the majority of whom were women of colour 
– were often bounced between a disapproving benefits system and in-work poverty due to their 
extremely low-paid, precarious carework roles.  
563 Weekes-Bernard (2017). Grabham & Smith (2010: 82) write that the gendered welfare reform 
debates around getting lone parents into work ‘operate within, and arguably contribute to, 
embedded structural racism.’  
564 Bell (2013). 
565 Lammy (2017: 3); Bell (2013: 59). 
566 Bales and Mayblin (2018). For further discussion of this see Chapter 8, Section 3.2. 
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their form.567 These frameworks and norms cannot themselves be marketized on pain 
of infinite regress. The supposed ‘autonomy’ of markets is one of capitalism’s 
depoliticising myths; left-leaning, feminist, anti-racist approaches should not 
perpetuate it.  
 
Let’s bring this back to our stranded banker. Fraser is right that he cannot get a taxi 
due to racist representations. But if we end our analysis there, our understanding of 
this injustice remains shallow. To understand why such raced representations 
remain prevalent and powerful, we must look to how these representations are co-
constituted by unjust raced distributions. These distributions are taken as apparent 
verification of raced representations, when they are in fact produced and reproduced 
by them. The cultural representations and economic distributions that comprise 
systemic anti-black racism co-evolve and co-constitute one another.  
 
This leads to two problems for Fraser. First, her adoption of the dominant capitalist 
method of splitting this co-constitutive loop is politically problematic: the resulting 
split depoliticises of the economy and is too friendly to capitalism’s preferred 
representation of itself. Second, Fraser cannot improve this spilt; this loop cannot be 
sensibly divided into two mutually exclusive halves since the ‘specialised 
marketized zone’ is necessarily structured by representations. Raced representations, 
for example, structure ‘strategic’ economic agency and the legal system that 
constitutes economic mechanisms.  
 
Understanding the economy as an objective, a-cultural, partially autonomous zone, 
analytically distinct from the cultural social order is thus politically problematic and 
implausibly ungrounded. We should instead view economic distributions as 
 
567 See Anderson (2004a) and Phillips (2008) for similar arguments. 
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importantly constituted by cultural representations and vice versa. To best 
understand our banker’s experience, we must be anti-dualists. 
 
7.4. Conclusion: Moving Beyond Perspectival Dualism 
Perspectival dualism is the best form of economy-culture dualism around; it rejects 
the ‘separate spheres’ approach and refuses to pit class against identity. Yet by 
insisting on the capitalist understanding of the economy as a ‘partially autonomous 
zone’ and viewing the importance of economy and culture as zero-sum, it never 
quite manages to rid itself of the pitfalls of substantive dualism. Fraser’s attempt to 
tread a path between substantive dualism and anti-dualism ultimately fails. 
 
The insights of critical race theorists are central to illustrating the reasons for this: 
once you take seriously the experiences of working-class people of colour, and give 
up on the idea that the white experience is ‘neutral’, the picture of the economy as a 
value-free, mechanical structure, relatively autonomous from systems of racialized 
recognition quickly becomes untenable. The economy end of Fraser’s spectrum, it 
turns out, is itself constituted by cultural representations, meaning her two-
dimensional spectrum starts to look like nothing of the sort. Furthermore, examining 
how economic distributions co-constitute cultural representations deepens our 
understanding of how western economies remain raced and gendered. Of course, I 
have not yet shown that anti-dualism about economy and culture is a coherent 
position that can take seriously the intersection of gender, race and class and avoid 






8. RETHEORISING THE ECONOMY: 
FROM JODI DEAN TO SOCIAL 
REPRODUCTION THEORY 
 
The nation can now be seen as something imagined, the state as an 
indeterminate political project, the public sphere as a structure of exclusion, 
and class, ethnicity and gender as contingent and unstable constructions. It is 
unclear why the concept of the economy has not been placed in question in the 
same way. – Timothy Mitchell (1998: 84) 
 
8.1. Introduction 
Contemporary politics is shaped and coloured by the aftershocks of the worst 
financial crisis in global history and the first tremors of climate catastrophe; the 
results have taken the form of rising right-nationalism, with intensified fears around 
migration, as well as increasing left mobilisations.568 These experiences and effects 
have brought to the fore how stubbornly inseparable issues of race, national 
belonging, borders, and survival are from issues of class, ‘productivity’, and 
economic security. In this context, the resurgent ‘class versus identity’ debate is 
perhaps unsurprising. If, as argued in the last chapter, Nancy Fraser’s perspectival 
dualism cannot best guide us through such issues, where should we look instead?   
 
568 I take this characterisation of the 2008 crash from Tooze (2019), who adopts it from the Chair 
of the US Federal Reserve (and defends it). Klein (2016) deftly outlines how climate change has 
already generated water shortages and food price increases which have, in turn, fed into various 




In this chapter, I consider Jodi Dean’s contemporary economy-culture dualism to see 
if it fares better than Fraser’s in its ability to take both class and race seriously and to 
adequately theorise their intersection. Though Dean’s work shows some initially 
promising signs of having shed the methodological whiteness that dogged Fraser’s 
approach, I argue that this impression is misleading. Her dualism, like Fraser’s, 
struggles to capture the intersection of class and race.  
 
Building on lessons learned from my analyses of Fraser and Dean, I then construct 
an alternative, anti-dualist understanding of the economy. I suggest we understand 
‘the economy’ as a harmful theoretical objectification of certain practices, and 
resources – harmful because it helps shore up and naturalise raced, classed, and 
gendered relations of domination. I argue that this theoretical objectification 
systematically undervalues and overlooks certain groups’ labour and utilises a 
conception of commensurable ‘public value’ based on racially exclusionary 
imaginaries of the public. Drawing on social reproduction theory, I suggest how we 
might build a better, counter-hegemonic understanding of the economy. Animated 
by the logic of sustaining life and therefore picking out a different set of practices 
and resources, this understanding – I suggest – would invite us to rethink public 
value in anti-racist, feminist and socialist ways.  
 
The chapter ends with a consideration of the implications of Chapters 6 and 7 for 
how relational egalitarians approach distributive justice. Due to the co-constitution 
of economic distributions and socio-political statuses and identities, I suggest 
relational egalitarians ought to endorse further-reaching and deeper changes to 
economic-distributive practices than those Anderson calls for. Due to space 
constraints, in this chapter I continue to focus primarily on the intersections of race 
and class.  
 




8.2. Contemporary Left Critiques of Identity Politics: The Case of 
Jodi Dean 
Jodi Dean is part of a group of theorists who see themselves as working to 
reinvigorate a left that has wallowed in melancholia for far too long.569 She advocates 
a re-centring of class politics along with a return to the idea of communism as a 
utopian horizon to work towards.570 There is much to agree with in Dean’s work. For 
example, she argues against what she labels ‘left individualism’, singling out for 
particular criticism Charles Leadbeater’s proposal that ‘If the left stands for one 
thing, it should be this: people taking more responsibility for all aspects of their 
lives.’571 
 
Furthermore, Dean’s work theorises the importance of class while showing some 
promising signs of having shed Fraser’s methodological whiteness. She argues 
against coding the working class as white and thinks expropriation and extraction as 
well as waged exploitation constitute the basis of class struggle.572 She views her 
communism as informed by struggles over civil and women's rights, gay and trans 
rights.573 Though she does not elaborate on exactly how it is so informed, she seems 
to envisage a Communist Party (her preferred political-organisational form) working 




569 Jonathan Dean (2015) includes Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek in this group, which he labels 
the ‘new communists’. For her discussion of ‘left melancholia’ see Jodi Dean (2012). 
570 Dean (2012). 
571 Leadbeater (1988) as quoted in Dean (2016a: 51). 
572 Dean (2016b). 
573 Dean (2012: 184). 
574 Dean (2016a: 211-231). 
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That Dean is nonetheless a strident critic of identity politics should therefore worry 
those of us interested in building on the best of identity politics via intersectional 
analyses. Moreover, she connects her criticisms of identity politics to arguments that 
the left has become overly in thrall to ideas of individual choice and responsibility. 
Given that I make similar arguments (Chapters 3-6) about the need to move beyond 
ideas of individual choice and responsibility, her emphatic claim that identity 
politics can only harm class politics is worth investigation.575    
 
Dean’s arguments against identity politics come in two main strands: first, she 
rejects the individualism and depoliticised fixity of the identity categories she thinks 
it invokes. Second, she argues that while identity politics aims to create space for 
individual ‘difference’, only class struggle aims to fundamentally transform society 
in the necessary ways. I now address these arguments in turn.     
 
For Dean, identity politics is necessarily individualistic, depoliticising, and 
fragmenting – it inhibits solidarity and relies on the exclusion of class.576 She tires of 
hearing 'ad infinitum' that the personal is political, which she understands as 
shrinking politics to bids for personal value based on the unique authenticity of 
one's own experiences and excluding structural analyses.577 She decries the 'fixity' 
read into identity categories and the solidarity-undermining practices of 'calling out 
and shaming.'578  
 
Against this, Dean advocates class struggle that unites us as a collective, 'the people'.  
The people are a political - rather than an empirical - category defined by their 
shared experiences of capitalist exploitation and expropriation. This move is 
designed to block accusations that ‘the people’ is another way of invoking ‘a politics 
 
575 Dean (2016a: 50–54). 
576 Dean (2016b). 
577 Dean (2016a: 264; 2016b). 
578 Dean (2016b; 2016a: 256). 
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of identity.’579 Unlike with Dean’s version of identity politics, the people’s collective 
identity is not reducible to individual identities; it is a ‘common relation to a 
common condition of division.’580 For example, the Occupy slogan 'we are the 99%', 
'does not unify this collectivity under a substantial identity - race, ethnicity, 
nationality.'581 Class struggle but not identity politics, then, draws on political rather 
than substantial or empirical categories.  
 
Yet it is unclear what Dean means by labelling race, but not the people, a 
‘substantial’ identity. She cannot mean that race is an empirical category, given 
widespread acceptance that races are socio-political constructs not biological groups. 
Nor is it uncommon for anti-racist theory and practice to understand race as arising 
from and based on antagonistic oppressive social relations. For example, race ‘names 
a relation of subordination.’582  
 
As Barbara Tomlinson points out, for those concerned with anti-subordination, ‘the 
experience and subjectivity of specific identities is not really the focus of the 
argument but rather a proxy or tool to examine and counter structural injustice and 
subordination.’583 Crenshaw and Cho likewise argue that intersectional theorists are 
primarily interested in structural power dynamics and are attentive to identities due 
to how they arise out of and relate to such dynamics.584 This form of identity politics 
reveals how ‘the people’ are hardly the only subject produced through certain 
modes of subordination or exploitation. It also reveals how there is nothing 
 
579 Dean (2012: 80). 
580 Dean (2012, 191). 
581 Dean (2012: 200) – my emphasis. 
582 Chen (2013). See also Bonilla-Silva (2017: 9–10). On gender as a socio-political relational 
category see Haslanger (2012d: 228) and Allen (2015: 514). 
583 Tomlinson (2013: 1000). 
584 Cho et al. (2013: 796–798). 
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necessarily individualistic about this kind of identity politics, given that its primary 
concern is with structural power relations.585  
 
Dean therefore invokes classed ‘subjectification’ in similar ways to how the best 
discussions of race invoke racialised identity – and, more generally, in similar ways 
to how the best forms of identity politics invoke identities. By portraying the people 
as unique in utilising a collective, non-essentialist subject/identity category for 
political struggle, Dean unfairly caricatures too much good theory and activism. For 
these reasons, this first argument against identity politics is not convincing.   
 
What of Dean’s second argument, then? This arises from her understanding of class 
struggle as the 'fundamental antagonism through which society emerges.'586 To 
explain this, she points to her work on Žižek where we learn that class struggle 
‘operates according to a logic fundamentally different from that of identity 
politics.’587 Whereas the basic goal of feminist, gay, and anti-racist activists is 
(apparently) to ‘find ways of getting along... to translate antagonism into difference’, 
class struggle does not aim for ‘mutual recognition or respect’ but rather at 
‘transforming relations of production so as to eliminate capitalism altogether.’588 
Dean’s second reason for pitting identity politics against class thus invokes familiar 
metaphors of cultural superstructural recognition versus more fundamental 
economic relations of production.  
 
 
585 I have much sympathy with Dean’s (and Skeggs’ {2003: 19-23}) rejection of individualistic 
neoliberal identity politics. For example ‘lean in feminism’ encourages a feminist subject who 
‘accepts full responsibility for her own well-being and self-care… increasingly predicated on 
crafting a felicitous work–family balance based on a cost-benefit calculus’ (Rottenberg 2014: 1). 
‘Pull up your pants’ race (and class) politics follows a similar responsibilising logic (see footnote 
102 {p.40}). However, as argued, not all politics drawing on identities fits this mould.  
586 Dean (2012: 82). 
587 Dean (2006: 57). 
588 Dean (2006: 57–58). 
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For example, Dean states that the left, failing to confront capitalism, limited itself to 
‘small battles, policy options, and cultural interventions, victories that can be 
absorbed and defeats that can be forgotten.’589 These victories can be absorbed 
because identity politics based on gender, race, or sexuality leave ‘communicative 
capitalism's basic structure intact.’590 Only the full inclusion of 'the people' is 
theorised as capable of ‘distorting and disrupting’ the capitalist order, not the full 
inclusion of women or people of colour.591 Racism, then, is not part of capitalism's 
basic structure but part of its cultural superstructure. Hence struggles around raced 
identity – struggles whose demands end at equal recognition due to their 
superstructural limitations – can be unthreateningly assimilated. 
 
This argument about the superficiality of raced and gendered identity struggles 
strikes a warning bell that gets louder when Dean reveals the exact contours of her 
economy-culture cut. For example, ‘labour unrest’ counts as economic, but conflicts 
around ‘abortion, pornography, busing, crime, affirmative action, and gay rights’ are 
‘cultural.’592 Anti-harassment law is understood as more problematically 
individualistic and less a matter of ‘broad economic justice’ than wage and pension 
law advances.593  
 
Drawing the economy-culture cut this way – construing issues like crime as 
individualistic cultural conflicts, in contrast to collective economic organised labour 
struggles for wages and pensions – instantiates methodological whiteness. After all, 
the criminal justice system marks people of colour as ‘criminals’ and then engages 'in 
all the practices we supposedly left behind’, including limiting access to a wage via 
employment discrimination, and to economic goods like housing, education, and 
 
589 Dean (2016a: 25). 
590 Dean (2016b). 
591 Dean (2012: 80–82). 
592 Dean (2012: 63). 
593 Dean (2012: 44-45, 63). 
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food stamps.594 While incarcerated, prisoners work for below minimum wage 
without the legal protections afforded to 'employees.'595 The criminal justice system 
thus shapes the forms of exploitation and expropriation people of colour experience.  
 
This cut also instantiates methodological maleness, given how criminalising abortion 
denies women control over their own reproductive capacities and workplace 
harassment limits women’s access to a stable wage. By categorising these as an 
individualising, cultural issues, Dean reinforces the misguided representation of 
these practices as outside the basic structure of the economy. Sure, struggles around 
crime and abortion do not necessarily abolish capitalism. But nor does union 
organising for paid sick leave or unemployment support – actions which Dean does 
not hesitate to see as the people ‘disciplining capital'.596 Dean is right that ‘not all 
feminist and antiracist struggles are necessarily progressive,’ but this does not prove 
class is more ‘fundamental’ than race or gender;597 not all apparently class-based 
struggles are necessarily progressive either.598   
 
By assuming that capitalism’s basic structure is unraced and ungendered, and thus 
that political organising along the lines of raced or gendered identities is ‘cultural’, 
Dean repeats some of Fraser’s mistakes. Our legal definitions of ‘work’ and 
‘workers’ are raced and gendered, producing gender- and race-specific forms of 
exploitation and expropriation. As argued, because the raced and gendered cultural 
representations that structure the capitalist economy are both cultural and economic, 
the battle Dean draws between 'cultural' politics based on gendered and raced 
 
594 Alexander (2012: 2). 
595 Benns (2015). 
596 Dean (2012: 44). Defending his exclusion of race and gender from the logic of capital, Harvey 
(2015) similarly suggests anti-racist and feminist struggles could be ‘brushed aside or… co-opted 
and absorbed as a minor irritation as opposed to a real game changer’. Manning (2015) 
persuasively unpicks this. 
597 Dean (2006: 59). 
598 e.g. Wrench (1989). 
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identities and class struggle based on relations of antagonistic capitalist exploitation 
and expropriation is misleadingly simplistic and unhelpful.599  
 
Given this, it is unsurprising that the economy-culture dualism underlying Dean’s 
view also struggles to make sense of the intersection of race and class. Take Dean’s 
analysis of 2014-2015 riots in Ferguson and Baltimore. Dean writes that 'identity as 
an operator for politics is now itself fully saturated:' it allows for no more useful 
political work and is now only damaging, 'reducing the space of change to the 
individual' and encouraging solidarity-sapping calling out and shaming.600 She 
thinks the most striking symptom of identity’s saturation is the ‘economic rupturing 
of identity categories, that is to say, the emergence of identities as themselves sites of 
class struggle’ as seen in these riots.601  
 
It is hard to tally her claims that identity does only damage with her 
acknowledgement of the radical challenge these riots presented to the economy’s 
basic structure, for the riots happened under the banner of an unapologetically 
‘substantive’ black identity. Her economy-culture dualism cannot make sense of 
struggles that are both economic and emerge along the lines of raced identity. Like 
Fraser, Dean seems to envisage ‘cultural’ identity politics and class struggle as 
mutually exclusive categories of analysis. And, like Fraser’s, Dean’s approach fails to 
make sense of a world in which important concepts, structures, and struggles are 
fundamentally both economic and cultural. Dean’s ‘new communism’ therefore 
repeats some old mistakes.602  
 
599 By casting political struggles around raced identities as toothlessly unthreatening to 
capitalism’s basic structure, Dean also presents an over-broad caricature of such struggles’ 
ambitions (see, e.g. Wilderson 2003). Jonathan Dean (2015: 245) convincingly argues that Jodi 
Dean’s claim that ‘only radical class politics aims at wiping out the other’s socio-political role 
and function’ is absurd.  
600 Dean (2016a: 256). 
601 Dean (2016a: 257).   




8.3. A Non-Dualist Proposal 
 
‘It is unfair that foreigners come to this country illegitimately and steal our 
benefits, steal our services like the NHS and undermine the minimum wage by 
working.’ – John Reid (then Labour Home Secretary)603 
 
Key to economy-culture dualism is the assumption that the categories of economy 
and culture divide the social into two mutually exclusive kinds. Giving up this 
dualism need not force us into monism, however – we need not think the concepts 
are interchangeable or collapse into one another. Between dualistic mutual 
exclusivity and monism lies a whole spectrum of non-dualist possibilities.    
 
I now construct a non-dualist understanding of the economy. The economy, I argue, 
is an ideological objectification of particular practices and resources marked as of 
commensurable public value by dominant common sense. The imagined ‘public’ in 
question over-represents dominant groups, meaning the common-sense evaluations 
involved in demarcating ‘the economy’ likewise over-value their labour and 
interests. In this, I build on Wynter’s suggestion that ‘the economy’ is a science of 
reproducing the conditions of life for a particular kind of person – a white, upper 
class man.604 To end, I explore the implications of this for class versus identity 
debates.   
 
8.3.1. Theoretical Background  
Co-constitutive racist representations and racist distributions structure our social 
practices and so come to constitute our social relations. Above, I suggested we single 
out one network of social relations which we objectify as the social structure, ‘the 
 
603 As quoted in BBC News (2007) 
604 Wynter (2003). 
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economy.’ To build on this, I adopt Sally Haslanger’s understanding of social 
structures as ‘theoretical entities, postulated to do work in a social theory’ which are 
constituted, to an important degree, by social relations.605 Social relations are in turn 
constituted by social practices: patterns of co-ordinated behaviour that respond to 
social resources (broadly understood) as these resources are interpreted and shaped 
by cultural meanings.606  
 
For example, in UK offices the practice of making tea responds to the resources of 
tea, coffee, etc. (culturally appropriate workplace drinks), and the time and labour 
involved in making these (culturally gendered female and ‘domestic’). This practice 
part-constitutes hierarchical social relations if women workers are always tasked 
with making tea for everyone in a meeting. This hierarchical social relation would 
then constitute part of ‘the patriarchy’ – a theoretical entity postulated by feminist 
theory to objectify gendered relations of domination.  
 
The economy is a social structure in this sense – a theoretical entity that objectifies 
certain relations and the practices that constitute them, including the resources and 
cultural understandings involved in these practices. Critical theoretical entities like 
‘the patriarchy’ or ‘white supremacy’ have proved enormously helpful in theorising 
and systematising sexism and racism (these helpful theoretical entities are 
Haslanger’s focus). In contrast, the theoretical entity ‘the economy’ does harmful 
ideological work. It shores up relations of domination and subordination by 
systematically overvaluing certain resources, labour, and lives and overlooking or 
devaluing others, while presenting as a transparent, neutral representation of reality.    
 
It is controversial to call the economy a ‘social structure.’ Swanson thinks this label 
‘theoretically untenable and politically debilitating insofar as it treats social practices 
 
605 Haslanger (2016b: 114). 
606 Haslanger (2018: 245).   
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like capitalism as autonomous and relatively intractable structures and leaves their 
complexity and contingency under-theorized.’607 However, the understanding of 
social structures adopted here is designed to defang such worries. Haslanger does 
not naturalise, fetishize, or ahistoricise social structures. They are understood as only 
as intractable as the social relations that constitute them – relations which are the 
contingent results of historical processes, neither unchanging nor necessarily 
uncontradictory.  
 
Understanding the economy as an ideologically harmful objectification of a specific 
set of social relations undoes any separation of human subjects and practices from 
mysterious, ‘objective’ social structures.608 This is an important step beyond the mere 
‘addition’ of class and race: it frees us from unhelpful imaginaries that see class but 
not race as arising from an objective economic realm, setting class up as more 
objective than race’s supposedly subjective character. Just as the social system of 
white supremacy is constituted by the actions and relationships of human subjects 
(and their material frameworks), so too is the economy – no hierarchy of objectivity 
is suggested.  
 
607 Swanson (2005: 89). 
608 I have found no contemporary political philosophical work describing the economy as a 
problematic objectification. The anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (2013: 161) describes the 
economy as an objectification – I suspect that like me, Sahlins is inspired by cultural materialists 
like Raymond Williams; Williams (1977: 81) critiques orthodox Marxist understandings of the 
base/superstructure metaphor, writing that ‘“the base” has come to be considered virtually as an 
object.’    




8.3.2. Common-sense Conceptions of the Economy: What’s the Harm? 
 
Protecting our workers means reforming our system of legal immigration. The 
current, outdated system depresses wages for our poorest workers, and puts 
great pressure on taxpayers. – Donald Trump609  
[O]ur immigration system is out of control. I know it, you know it: everyone 
knows it, including the terrorists and people smugglers who make a mockery 
of Britain's hospitality. In tomorrow's Britain - in Conservative Britain - 
immigration will be controlled and strictly limited. Some people say that's 
racist. It's not. It's common sense. – Michael Howard (then Leader of the 
Conservative Party)610  
 
Which practices – responding to which resources, and interpreted by what cultural 
meanings – constitute ‘the economy’, then? The term selects according to dominant 
common-sense evaluations of which practices are important to the production, 
distribution, or consumption of resources (including labour) of commensurable 
public value, and in what ways. The economy is therefore demarcated by three 
evaluations: first, which practices are significant to the production, distribution, or 
consumption of publicly valuable resources; second, which resources are of public, 
commensurable value; third, the kinds of value/disvalue these economic resources 
are understood to have. I now turn to how this economic/non-economic demarcation 
shores up relations of domination and subordination by systematically overvaluing 
certain practices, resources, and lives while devaluing others.  
 
 
609 Trump (2017). 
610 Howard (2005); later in the same paragraph, he adds ‘It's our national health service - not a 
world health service.’ Similar sentiments flourished in the ‘Leave’ campaign, as illustrated by an 
online advert stating that ‘Britain’s new border is with SYRIA and IRAQ – Click to save our 
NHS’ (Dugmore 2018). 
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First, note that on this approach the practices constituting ‘the economy’ will always 
have a cultural dimension. Like all social practices, economic practices rely on a 
cluster of concepts, beliefs, narratives, and attitudes which make them and the 
resources they involve intelligible to participants, and therefore allow for practices’ 
repetition. For example, market exchange practices rely on culturally specific 
concepts (price, ownership, etc.), beliefs (e.g. in the value of a currency) and 
narratives about what is appropriate to exchange with whom. You won’t get far 
trying to sell an 8-year-old a car; you could sell them a snack, but if you are that 
child’s parent you break the conventional bounds of this practice by doing so. 
Acknowledging the cultural dimension of economic practices lets us explore the 
culture and class specificity of their logic.611  
 
Dominant conceptions of the economy centre practices of marketized exchange, 
understood as equal individuals with different bundles of resources and needs 
trading things of equivalent value according to pre-given utility curves. Inhabitants 
of this sphere are conceived as neoclassical homo economicus, a character so wilfully 
abstracted from social context that many economics textbooks start their reasoning 
from Robinson Crusoe.612 On this understanding, the economy is primarily 
constituted by market exchanges (along with the practices of production and 
consumption that keep these exchanges ticking over) and by the resources accorded 
(a-cultural) financial value through these exchanges.   
 
Left theorists correctly point out that this picture overemphasises formally equal 
exchange relations, overlooks relations of domination arising from differential 
 
611 Wynter (2003: 282). 
612 E.g. Basov (2016: 51); Gottheil (2013: 2013); Jehle (2010: 226); Mankiw & Taylor (2006: 50); 
Musgrave & Kacapyr (2001: 23); Varian (2014: 628-9). For discussion of the raced and gendered 
dimension of these ‘Robinson Crusoe’ figures see Watson (2018) and Hewitson (2012). This 
dominant conception of the economy has many parallels with the individualised atomism and 
abstraction from social context that marks much responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theorising – 
habits of theorising I argued against in Chapters 3-6.  
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ownership of the means of production, and overvalues and naturalises marketized 
practices as at once efficient, fair, and neutral.613 In these ways, this common-sense 
theoretical entity, ‘the economy’, helps shore up relations of classed domination.  
 
Feminists correctly point out that it shores up gendered domination by devaluing 
(under-paid) or ignoring (unpaid) practices of care and reproductive labour. It 
portrays activity in the home as of private rather than public value, since it occurs 
outside markets and does not command a wage.614 Furthermore, when the 
caring/mothering practices of working-class women are included in the economy, it 
is because they are seen as dangerously destructive of economic value; these women 
are portrayed as hyper-visual sites of public expense by dominant discourses which 
cast them as over-fecund  ‘trash’615 and 'drains on national resources'.616  
 
Similarly, common-sense demarcations of the economy ignore and undervalue raced 
labour practices and cast people of colour as of potentially destructive economic 
 
613 E.g. Marx (2008) writes that the sphere of marketized exchange is painted as one of freedom 
and equality: ‘Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity… are constrained only by 
their free will… Equality, because each enters into relation with the other… and they exchange 
equivalent for equivalent.’ Within this sphere, ‘in accordance with the pre-established harmony 
of things… [all] work together to their mutual advantage.’ Against this, it might be argued that 
economists do not make ethical claims. E.g. it is commonly thought that rational choice theories 
only present ‘innocuous formal constraints on choice behaviour (or preferences) while remaining 
neutral about any substantive issues’ (Reiss 2017: 138). However, as Reiss (2017) persuasively 
argues, assumptions like those of rational choice theory tell us which features of a choice ought 
to matter to people; such grounding assumptions are not value-neutral. Similarly, Hausman & 
McPherson (2016) discuss the ethical positions implicit in an infamous World Bank 
memorandum by its chief economist on the economic case for exporting pollution to ‘less 
developed countries’; as they argue, the memorandum’s economics is ‘saturated with ethics’ 
(2016: 19). Furthermore, many politicians and political philosophers make overtly ethical claims 
about the moral properties of capitalist markets, contributing to the common-sense view Marx 
challenges. Take the following claims from Anderson: ‘Capitalist business cycles tied the 
fortunes of everyone together’ (2004a: 352); ‘exchange on the basis of mutual self-interest can 
preserve the independence and dignity of both parties’ (2004a: 352); market prices promote pro-
social behaviour by ‘orienting people to serve others’ interests’(2008: 249); see also Tomasi (2013).   
614 Folbre (1991). This issue is analysed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
615 As quoted in Tyler (2008: 29). 
616 Hancock (2003: 44). See also Skeggs (2003: Chs 5-6). 
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disvalue. As we’ve seen, work practices raced non-white are overlooked and 
undervalued in cases like those of home-carers, prison workers, and immigration 
detainees, locking participants into relations of hyper-exploitation without basic 
legal protections. A particularly clear statement of this devaluation came when the 
UK Government excluded immigration detainees from minimum wage laws on the 
grounds that the minimum wage would not ‘reflect the true economic value of the 
work likely to be carried out.’617 As Bales and Mayblin point out, the immigration 
status of detainees determines the value of this work: 'they perform the same jobs as 
their citizen counterparts… at a rate of 13 per cent of the national minimum wage.’618 
 
Relatedly, the bounds of the economy are drawn by calculations of commensurable 
public value based on a dominant whitewashed cultural representation of the public. 
Recall how a Supreme Court Justice defended home carers’ non-worker status on the 
grounds that if these carers were covered by wage laws, millions would be unable to 
afford care, making denying them worker status in the public interest.619 The value of 
legal protections and minimum wages for home carers do not figure as a relevant 
part of this calculation of public interest because the ‘public’ involved quietly 
excludes them.  
 
Similarly, Brexit debates drew on and solidified a raced representation of ‘the 
people.’ Nationalist rhetoric – ‘we want our country back’ – represented ‘a wilful 
whitening of class identities for racist ends’ by political elites.620 Just as the gendered 
public/private divide animates common-sense understandings of the economy, so 
too do racially exclusionary imaginaries of national communities. Such imaginaries 
animate a conception of ‘public value’ that quietly elides people of colour’s labour 
and lives.  
 
617 'House of Commons Hansard Debates' (2005), my emphasis. 
618 Bales & Mayblin (2018: 200).  
619 Boris and Klein (2012: 8).  
620 Bhattacharyya (2017: 20). 




Given this exclusion from the relevant imagined communities, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that when people of colour are included in the economy, it is often 
because they are presented as involved in practices that importantly threaten or 
destroy economic value. Despite much evidence refuting a connection between 
recent immigration and crime, British people remain convinced that recent 
immigrants – especially undocumented ones – represent a serious criminal threat.621 
This is one example of how people of colour are cast as endangering economic value. 
Media photo captions in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina describing black people 
as ‘looting’ but white people doing the same thing as ‘finding bread and soda’ evoke 
a similar logic.622 Our black banker (from Chapter 7) who cannot get a taxi suffers the 
consequences of this, excluding him from equal economic participation. 
  
Therefore, as commonly used, ‘the economy’ selects a group of practices according 
to dominant common-sense evaluations of which practices are important for the 
production, distribution, or consumption of resources of commensurable public 
value, and in what ways. These evaluations systematically overlook the labour and 
interests of people of colour, and when people of colour are included in ‘the 
economy’ they are often cast as active threats to economic value. The economy, then, 
is a theoretical entity whose terms and boundaries support the illusion that white 
people sustain the efficient production, distribution, and constructive consumption 
of things of value while people of colour drain or threaten such resources and 
practices. Its methods of picking out, valuing, and naturalising a certain network of 
practices help maintain raced (gendered, and classed) relations of domination.  
 
 
621 Stansfield & Stone (2018: 604).   
622 Ralli (2005). 
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Designating a practice as ‘economic’ is therefore not an ‘ultimately arbitrary’ 
categorisation.623 To be admitted into the category of the economic is to either have 
established your practice as one that produces, distributes, or consumes resources of 
a certain kind of public value, or to have it marked as threatening this value. This 
designation is not ontological, but it is performative and powerful: once a practice, 
person, or resource is seen as valuable/disvaluable in this way it has very real 
implications. For one thing, casting people of colour as not only less productive but 
as potential destroyers of economic value helps dehumanise them and results in 
(and justifies) their subjection to greater violence in the name of securing value. Let 
me take these in turn.     
 
In our current moment, when to be human is to fit the mould of homo-economicus, 
it is unsurprising that we dehumanise those cast as dangerous to this achievement. 
The economic is intimately bound up with the contemporary category of the human; 
as Bhattacharyya puts it ‘something in the status of “worker” and perhaps “potential 
worker”… slides into the demarcation of the human under capitalism’.624 This is 
unsurprising, perhaps, given the neoliberal creep of economization and the resultant 
increased subservience of imaginaries of non-economic value to the economy.625  
 
With the dehumanisation of those deemed economic threats comes violence done in 
the name of securing economic value. So, when immigration detainee Jimmy 
Mubenga, already handcuffed, is killed by UK immigration guards on a crowded 
plane, we find that the guards sent dozens of racist messages like this one: ‘Fuck off 
and go home you free-loading, benefit grabbing, kid producing, violent, non-English 
 
623 Contra Swanson (2005: 95). 
624 Bhattacharyya (2018: 65). See also Wynter (2003). 
625 For example, while Prime Minister, David Cameron said that prisoners made to work ‘will 
contribute to the UK economy and make reparation to society’ (Malik 2012); here, social value is 
straightforwardly reduced to economic value.   
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speaking cock suckers…’626 Likewise, the unarmed child Trayvon Martin is killed for 
looking like a burglar to George Zimmerman, who saw him as one of those ‘punks’ 
who ‘always get away.’627 Martin’s dark skin was enough to transform him, in 
Zimmerman’s eyes, from an unarmed child into a dangerous threat to property; a 
threat which Zimmerman then took it upon himself to nullify. These violent actions 
are done, in part, in the name of securing ‘the economy’ – a set of practices which 
reproduce the conditions of life of a whitewashed public through exploitation, 
expropriation, and exclusion.  
 
This understanding of the economy accords with Skeggs’ argument that economic 
value and wider social values are ‘always dialogic, dependent, and co-
constituting.’628 It recognises how contemporary racist moral and socio-political 
evaluations of people of colour cannot be untangled from their economic 
demonization and devaluation.629 Common-sense economic evaluations of what 
practices importantly produce, distribute, or consume resources of commensurable 
public value are always also cultural, ethico-political evaluations.  
 
8.3.3. Reformulating ‘the Economy’: Insights from Social Reproduction 
Theory 
Economy-culture dualism still has many advocates across public and academic 
discourse – as the recent uptick in ‘class vs. identity’ explanations suggests. 
However, elsewhere moves towards theorising the co-constituting relations of class, 
gender, and race are gaining ground, as evidenced by the recent resurgent interest in 
 
626 Lowenstein (2015).   
627 Yankah (2013). 
628 Skeggs (2014: 1). 
629 I say ‘contemporary’ because during periods of slavery, racist socio-political appraisals of 
black people (as sub-human) were coupled with different economic understandings of them (as 
valuable property, almost like livestock – see Harris {1993: 1719-1720}). 
232 
 
social reproduction theory.630 To end, I explain how social reproduction approaches 
aid escape from the class versus identity impasse, and how the non-dualist 
conception of the economy outlined above harmonises with and builds on such 
approaches.  
 
The cornerstone of social reproduction theory is an expanded conception of labour 
integrating ‘reproductive’ and ‘productive’ work. For example, Camfield 
understands labour as ‘conscious, meaning-saturated activity through which 
embodied subjects relate to each other and the rest of nature and in so doing 
produce and reproduce the social.’631 Befitting its marxist feminist origins, caring 
practices – paid or unpaid – are central exemplars of labour on this approach. This 
widening of the category of work reveals the threads of hyper-exploitation and 
expropriation running through the experiences of home care workers, prison 
laborers, immigration detainees, as well as women denied control over their own 
reproductive labour or subjected to sexual harassment to secure a wage. 
 
This framework lets us talk of certain relations as both capitalist and racist; no 'pure' 
capitalist economic logic is sought beyond or behind the practices that form and 
maintain capitalist social relations. In this way, social reproduction theory offers 
important resources for escaping the class vs. identity dead end. For it lets us 
conceive of these practices of hyper-exploitation and expropriation as raced and 
 
630 E.g. Bhattacharya (2017); Bhattacharyya (2018); Camfield (2016); Fraser et al. (2018). 
Overlapping on some fronts (e.g. Bhattacharyya 2018) there is also renewed interest in theorising 
‘racial capitalism’ rather than theorising race and capitalism separately. For example, the 
introduction to a recent special issue of New Political Economy on raced markets begins with 
Fanon’s famous quote, ‘[T]he economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the 
consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich’ (quoted in 
Tilley & Shilliam 2017: 1). Virdee (2019) recently gave The Sociological Review’s Annual Lecture 
on racial capitalism, commented on by Skeggs (2019) and Valluvan (2019).  
631 Camfield (2016: 300).  
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gendered but also importantly classed forms of domination, helping undo the pitting 
of raced and gendered ‘identities’ against class.632,633   
 
However, an expanded conception of work alone is not enough to dissolve class 
versus identity debates. Recall the dehumanising violence done to those deemed 
outside the economy, and their ongoing exclusion; these ‘spaces of death may not 
present opportunities for accumulation in any straightforward sense.’634 To make 
visible the classed dimension of these practices we must return to the exclusionary 
nature of dominant conceptions of the ‘public’ which animate the economy, as 
argued for above.  
 
These violent exclusions – done in the name of protecting a whitewashed ‘public’ – 
can therefore be understood as, at least in part, a defensive shoring up of current 
class hierarchies, either by elites wanting to deflect working-class anger towards 
raced outsiders, or by those who feel it the only way to protect their limited access to 
the means of sustaining life. Both suggest the urgent necessity of a strong 
intersectional class politics, lest people of colour are left to bear the brunt of class 
pain mis-directed into ethno-nationalist anger.  
 
In his attempt to theorise gender, race, and class together, Camfield rejects a focus on 
common-sense understandings of the economy in favour of a focus on ‘the social 
relations involved in processes of producing the means of human life.’635 Building on 
 
632 So long as class domination includes relations of expropriation and exploitation, as both 
Fraser (at least in later work, e.g. 2016) and Dean (2012) agree it should. 
633 Fraser’s latest paper in fact accords with some of these ideas. Co-authored with two social 
reproduction theorists, it abandons recognition vs. redistribution language and any dualistic 
zero-sum weighing of culture and economy. They aim to be ‘right in the thick of… [class 
struggle] even as we are helping to redefine it in a new, more capacious way’ (Fraser et al. 2018: 
119). Fraser might have been hugely influential in outlining economy-culture dualism but this 
latest shift adds her considerable intellectual weight to the ranks of a more productive approach. 
634 Bhattacharyya (2018: 20). 
635 Camfield (2016: 293); see also Bhattacharyya (2018: 52). 
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this, just as social reproduction theorists’ suggest counter-hegemonic 
understandings of work we might likewise suggest a counter-hegemonic 
understanding of the economy: one animated by an expanded conception of labour 
as those practices significant to the production, reproduction, distribution, and 
consumption of the means of life, which understands resources’ public value as 
stemming from their ability to sustain life, and which conceives of the public in 
question through an imagined community free from raced exclusions.  
 
One consequence of this approach is that class struggles can take forms that might 
surprise us – like the riots in Ferguson, Missouri, and Baltimore. More generally, 
anti-racist struggles express working class needs to the extent that they organise 
around issues and demands which serve working class interests, where this 
‘working class’ includes those subjected to expropriation and exclusion from the 
means of reproducing life as well as those subjected to waged exploitation.636 And 
class struggles express anti-racist needs to the extent that they organise around 
issues and demands serving the interests of people of colour, rather than focusing on 
an over-narrow, raced conception of the constitutive injustice they suffer confined to 
traditional waged exploitation.637 
 
636 As Skeggs (2003) argues, the category of the ‘working class’ has never been a pre-given, 
neutral term but rather emerges and shifts as the result of historical political struggle. Because of 
this, and because Skeggs theorises class as always mutually constructed by categories of race, 
sexuality, and gender, her approach to class is particularly well suited to an intersectional project 
like that advanced here. Skeggs does not use the concept of intersectionality, however, and has 
voiced scepticism about the intersectional paradigm in the past. She criticised intersectionality 
for being ‘reductive’ in setting up equivalences between race, gender, and class (as quoted in 
Gressgård 2008: 28), and for being an empty gesture ‘producing nothing but a statement of no-
intent’ (Skeggs 2019: 29). Regarding the first criticism, many key intersectional theorists push 
against any such ‘flattening’ equivalences (for a summary of this debate within intersectional 
currents of thought, see Cooper {2016: 394-395}). As for the second critique, Skeggs (2019: 29) 
goes on to praise the ‘story of force, logics and entanglement, including the violence performed 
by categorization’ captured by Virdee’s (2019) account of racial capitalism; this suggests her open 
to certain forms of intersectional approaches at least.  
637 Understanding the constitutive injustice of class to be traditional waged exploitation is raced 
since access to formal waged employment is, itself, raced: people of colour are more likely to be 
shut out of formal employment altogether (e.g. Li 2014) and more likely to work in conditions 




It is certainly true that individualist, neoliberal anti-racist ‘solutions’ and campaigns 
will not have a classed component to them – and should be rejected as inadequate 
for this reason. For example, Obama telling black men to ‘make better choices’ 
contributes nothing to class struggle, as does the responsibilising ‘pull up your 
pants’ thread of race politics it reproduces. 638 Similarly, telling women to ‘lean in’ is 
problematically silent on issues of class.639 But (as argued in Chapter 2) these 
approaches shift responsibility for flourishing onto the individual, notwithstanding 
that patriarchal, white supremacist, and/or class structures can make such 
flourishing nigh-on impossible to achieve through individuals ‘leaning in’/’choosing 
well.’ As such these responsibilising modes of politics likewise contribute little, if 
anything, to feminist and anti-racist struggles.   
 
To end this section, and to explore this expanded conception of the economy, I now 
assess it against Cameron and Gibson-Graham’s critiques of feminist approaches to 
the economy. These theorists criticise feminist political economists for merely 
‘adding on’ or ‘counting in’ certain sectors to the economy (such as unpaid 
carework), while leaving intact the myth of the economy as a self-contained, 
transparent, and naturally pre-given sphere, the contents of which can be easily and 
neutrally measured.640 Such approaches, they argue, do not necessarily force us to 
think differently about the economy. For example, the neoliberal economist Gary 
Becker’s inclusion of the household in the economy does nothing to politicise the 
economy as a whole or unpaid carework specifically. Furthermore, the ‘added in’ 
sector is still theorised as both separate from the rest of the economy and as of 
subordinate importance.  
 
where, as discussed, their status as proper waged workers is denied (e.g. doing home care work 
or working in detention centres and prisons).   
638 Coates (2013) - see footnote 102 (p.40) for other examples.  
639 Sandberg (2013). 




Cameron and Gibson-Graham’s alternative solution has two main parts. First, they 
advocate understanding the economy as a ‘discursive construct.’641 On this, we agree 
– my argument for understanding the economy as a theoretical entity follows a very 
similar line of thought. Second, they advocate for reconceiving the economy as 
empty of any essential identity, logic, or organising principle; rather, it should be 
understood, they suggest, as an open-ended, pluralistic construct. To explain what 
they mean by this, they give the example of child-care, stating that ‘the diversity of 
economic relations that currently characterise childcare-giving reflects the 
unparalleled success of a transformative feminist economic project which has 
multiplied the options for how women and men raise children in our society.’642 
 
This second move advances a vison of a pluralist economy at too great a cost to 
substantive critique. My approach differs from theirs here, by insisting that most 
women are still severely constrained in their childcare options by patriarchal, 
classed, and raced economic practices, even if some have multiple formal options 
open to them.643 Throughout this chapter and the last, I have suggested that the 
economy, as a harmful ideological entity and the practices and resources that 
comprise it, are organised in ways that systematically uphold white supremacy. The 
relations that importantly determine who gets what care, clean air, wages, and 
healthy food, are also, to a significant extent, relations that reproduce and reinforce 
white privilege.644   
 
Though in this I depart from Cameron and Gibson-Graham, my approach does not 
simply ‘add on’ sectors here and there, leaving our overarching conception of the 
 
641 Cameron & Gibson-Graham (2003: 145). 
642 Cameron & Gibson-Graham (2003: 153). 
643 See, e.g. Cain (2016: 496); Grabham & Smith (2010); Lloyd & Penn (2014).  
644 In London, for example, poor and black communities disproportionately suffer illegal levels of 
air pollution (London City Hall 2016, 2019). For discussion of the availability of healthy food and 
race, see Chapter 2, Section 4.  
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economy intact. Rather, it necessitates a fundamental reconception of the logics 
through which we draw ‘the economy.’ This is because it changes the metrics by 
which we decide which practices are deemed significant and which resources 
deemed valuable/disvaluable to what public, and why. Rejecting the notion of life in 
service to financial value, the counter-hegemonic reconception suggested here puts 
the economy in service to life.645 It invites anti-racist, feminist, and socialist 
rethinkings of labour and public value, and recognises the need to connect these to 
concurrent rethinkings of the category of the human.  
 
8.4. Relational Egalitarian Implications 
 
Material rationality is thus a representation in monetary terms of a subjacent 
set of meaningful relationships among persons and the objects of their 
existence. – Marshall Sahlins646 
 
In Chapter 6 I argued that the place and significance of economic distributions was 
not always clear within relational egalitarian currents of thought. While both 
Anderson and Schemmel agreed that distributions mattered insofar as they affected 
equal relations and statuses, there was disagreement over to what extent 
distributions did affect equal relations and why. Furthermore, the sufficientarianism 
of Anderson’s early work led to some conservative economic-distributive moments 
where she theorised socio-political status as, to a large degree, independent of 
economic distributions.  
 
To end this chapter, therefore, I briefly explore two implications of the arguments of 
Chapters 7 and 8 for relational egalitarian theorising about distributive justice. First, 
 
645 Bhattacharyya (2018: 39-70). 
646 Sahlins (2013: 170). 
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I argue that the relational need to integrate the demands of equal recognition with 
those of equal distribution must go beyond perspectival dualism to theorise patterns 
of recognition and distribution as importantly co-constitutive. Second, I argue that 
critical work on the co-constitution of race and goods like money and property 
suggests ways to theorise economic-distributive goods in more relational ways. The 
topics involved are large, however; the remarks that follow are only initial thoughts. 
 
Anderson is clear that economic distributions matter for equal social relations, but 
only instrumentally; unequal distributions are problematic only if and insofar as 
they threaten to cause, are caused by, or embody unequal political relations.647 I do 
not dispute this. Rather, in Chapter 6 I questioned Anderson’s assumption that 
economic distributions are at least partly uncoupled from socio-political status 
hierarchies. For example: she uncouples wages from ‘social appreciation’, arguing  
that low-waged workers warrant more social appreciation but only moderate 
minimum wage increases; the accumulation of ‘vast fortunes’ are fine as long as they 
are accompanied by generous social insurance programmes; differences in market-
based ‘success pay’ do not threaten equal relations since they ‘apply only at the 
enterprise level, not that of the basic structure’; and exploitation is to be understood 
without reference to distributive issues.648 The arguments of Chapters 7 and 8 can 
help highlight problems with this approach and suggest alternatives. 
 
What does it mean for relational approaches to distributive justice that economic 
practices constitute economic relations, and that economic relations co-constitute 
wider relations of political status and socio-political understandings and values? 
First, it is worth emphasising that co-constitution is not determination: I am not 
proposing a form of economic determinism whereby the egalitarianism (or 
 
647  Anderson (2008: 263, 267; 1999: 326). 
648 Anderson (1999: 325; 2008: 256; 2008: 253; 2010:13). For a fuller discussion of Anderson’s early 
work on relational egalitarianism see Chapter 6, Section 3.  
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inegalitarianism) of economic relations fully determines whether egalitarian political 
relations manifest. Rather, I have argued that these economic relations are 
inseparable from wider political and ‘cultural’ relations because they importantly 
constitute them – and are constituted by them in turn.  
 
Putting this in Anderson’s own terms, we have our first relational egalitarian lesson: 
the economic relations which make up society’s ‘enterprise level’ cannot and should 
not be separated from society’s ‘basic structure’.649 Wage differentials within the 
enterprise level, for example, are always informed by and inform wider political 
identities and hierarchies of social status. Economic value and wider socio-political 
values are always in dialogue with one another.  
 
Like Perspectival Dualism, Anderson’s understanding artificially separates economic 
practices and distributions from socio-political recognition and status in ways 
unhelpful for understanding the reproduction of socio-political hierarchies of race, 
gender, and class. The arguments of the last two chapters show the importance of 
recognising that economic value co-constitutes social and political values: low wage 
levels, for example, are often closely associated with labour practices tainted by their 
association with women, people of colour, and the working classes. As with the case 
of UK immigration detainees, their political status – specifically their hyper-
vulnerability and their raced identity – cannot be untangled from the value of their 
labour at the ‘enterprise level’.  
 
By calling for an attitudinal-recognitive change - greater ‘appreciation’ for such 
labour without substantive accompanying change in practices of labouring and 
reward, early Anderson overlooks how social attitudes are not simply voluntary 
decisions or educational gaps – matters of just reminding ourselves to show more 
 
649 Cf. Anderson, 2008: 253. I first discuss this claim in Chapter 6, Section 3.  
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appreciation for low-wage workers. Rather, these attitudes arise from social contexts 
marked by unequal access to the means of life – contexts of unequal access that both 
legitimise and are legitimised by certain cultural-ideological understandings, attitudes, 
and statuses. 
 
Unequal economic distributions legitimise certain cultural understandings because 
such distributions are not only end points; unequal distributions of wealth and 
employment, for example, are also the starting point for many socio-political stories 
about which people are worthy of respect and which are not, and about who  
‘contributes’ and who ‘takes advantage’.650 These distributions of economic resources 
relate to these cultural understandings in ways similar to how the matter of a statue 
relates to its form: these distributions constitute part of the ‘matter’ which helps give 
rise to particular ideological ‘forms’ – our raced, gendered, and classed stories of 
social respectability and standing.651  
 
Given this, talking about changing attitudes towards low-wage workers without 
changing the practices of waged reward underlying these attitudes is the political-
economic equivalent of ‘thoughts and prayers’: certainly better than nothing, it 
recognises a problem and regrets its existence, but it does not substantively interrupt 
some of the mechanisms central to reproducing classed, raced, and gendered 
hierarchies of social standing.  
 
Interesting further relational egalitarian work could be done investigating how the 
practices important to the production, distribution, and consumption of the means of 
 
650 I have argued this with respect to race (Chapter 7); see Skeggs (1997) for a compelling 
argument of the centrality of ‘respectability’ to class and gender.  
651 See Haslanger (2012b: 463-464). Haslanger (2016a) calls herself a ‘moderate materialist’; cf. 
Anderson (2018 - Q&A), who states that she is not a materialist because ‘ideas matter.’ However, 
as my arguments suggest, it is important to recognise that material structures, economic 
distributions, and cultural representations, affects, and ideas all matter – we need not and should 
not choose only one.  
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life shape, and are shaped by, socio-political identities, power hierarchies, and 
political statuses – and exploring how alternative, more egalitarian economic 
practices might be possible. I suspect (though it would take far more work to show) 
that these investigations would lead to far more ambitious relational egalitarian 
distributive programme than small minimum wage increases and maternity 
benefits.652  
 
Furthermore, if my arguments are right, such a programme would need to be 
broader as well as deeper: it could not be confined to changing the conditions of 
waged work and narrow social benefits enabling parental care for the very young. 
Rather, on the counter-hegemonic understanding of the economy suggested above it 
would need to range far further afield, demanding reformed economic practices 
around, as Bhattacharyya puts it, ‘not only housework but also water. Not only care 
but also air.’653 
 
In sum, then, if relational egalitarianism is to ‘integrate the demands of equal 
recognition with those of equal distribution’ as Anderson rightly wants it to, then it 
must go beyond perspectival dualism – it must theorise patterns of recognition and 
distribution as importantly co-constitutive.654  
 
Second, insights by critical race theorists on the mutual histories of making race and 
making property open new ways of conceptualising economic-distributive goods, 
suggesting that certain goods are better understood in relational terms. Take Cheryl 
Harris’ argument that US law continues to protect ‘whiteness as property’ – 
whiteness as a status on the basis of which social benefits are allocated.655 This 
 
652 Cf. early Anderson’s (1999) foundational articulation of relational egalitarianism.  
653 Bhattacharyya (2018: 61). 
654 Anderson (1999: 314). 
655 Harris (1993). I draw on and discuss this argument in Chapter 7, Section 3.3.    
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argument (and similar ones invoking the ‘wages of whiteness’656) are not meant to 
flatten the relationality of race into dead, individualised distributions of some 
mysterious stuff, ‘whiteness’. Rather, by likening whiteness to a kind of ‘status 
property’ and by insisting that ‘racial identity and property are deeply interrelated 
concepts’, they call on us to rethink distributions of money and property in terms 
other than that of static, individualised distributions.657 Given the relationality of 
race, they suggest a corresponding relationality of property and financial goods.  
 
Understanding distributions of financial wealth as relational is firmly within the 
bounds of contemporary economic theory. The ‘credit theory of money’, which 
views money as a credit relationship, is one of the preeminent contemporary 
theorisations of money.658 Some theorists suggest that money is constituted by social 
relations of credit-debt, or ‘the promise to pay’, for example; while agreeing that 
money is a social relation, others focus on relations among commodity owners 
engaging in exchange – relations through which money comes to monopolise the 
ability to exchange directly (i.e. to ‘buy’).659   
 
Distributions of property, too, can be viewed through this relational lens. The 
distribution of cars, for example, is not like the distribution of stars in the sky – the 
former represents a specific social network of rights which stipulate which people 
hold what kinds of control over which cars, and which people are denied access to 
them. These property relations are, in turn, constituted by legal practices of 
conventional ownership, and political-legal-economic practices of criminalising 
certain transgressions of these norms, among others. Thus, as David Graeber puts it, 
‘the way economists talk about “goods and services” already involves reducing what 
 
656 Roediger (1999) who takes the term from Du Bois (1999). 
657 Harris (1993: 1714, 1709).   
658 For an overview see de Bruin et al. (2018).  
659 Ingham (2001) argues for the former view, Lapavitsas (2005) for the latter.  
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are really social relations to objects.’660 This approach opens further avenues for 
relational egalitarian investigation of traditional distributive issues.  
 
It also offers a way to square some puzzling tensions in work that could provide a 
valuable foundation for these investigations. For example, Iris Marion Young’s 
writings are a valuable source for egalitarian work on exploitation.661 Yet Young 
argues that money is not a form of power but rather a resource – ‘a kind of stuff 
possessed by individual agents in greater or lesser amounts.’662 For Young, money is 
not a relational good but a divisible thing possessed by individuals. 
 
However, Young’s insights into capitalist exploitation and unequal power relations 
stand in some tension with this theorisation of money. For example, she suggests we 
understand exploitation through structural power relations. She writes that ‘through 
private ownership of the means of production, and through markets that allocate 
labour and the ability to buy goods, capitalism systematically transfers the powers of 
some persons to others, thereby augmenting the power of the latter.’663 The problem 
with this is that the social relations governing the ‘ability to buy goods’, as Young 
puts it, sounds a lot like the distribution of money. Understanding money in 
relational terms allows us to explain how money is ‘a primary medium of power’ in 
contemporary capitalist societies in a way in which Young’s non-relational 
understanding of it struggles to capture.664   
 
660 Graeber (2001: 9) 
661 Cf. Anderson (2010: 13) who thinks understanding exploitation relationally requires doing 
away with the involvement of money and economic distributions. For discussion see Chapter 6, 
Section 2.2.  
662 Young (2011a: 31). 
663 Young (2011a: 49) – my emphasis.  
664 Fraser (2014: 62). Such an approach could also explain, in ways that Young’s (2011a: 15-38) 
wariness of the distributive paradigm make difficult, why accounts of race drawing on 
distributive metaphors are not necessarily politically regressive:  the ‘wages of whiteness’ or 
‘whiteness as property’ for example. In such work, distributive metaphors illuminate the relative 




Anderson’s recent work has in fact turned somewhat towards the two directions I 
have just flagged as promising. First, she has begun to theorise how unequal 
economic distributions relate to unequal socio-political relations: in her book on 
racial segregation she explores (among other things) why ‘inequalities in material 
resources’ as well as inequalities of ‘rights, privilege, power, and esteem typically 
track social group identities.’665 Though the specificities of her answers do not always 
accord with my arguments in Chapters 7 and 8, this is a welcome and exciting 
development.666  
 
And, though Anderson has not yet theorised economic goods like money in 
relational terms, in her latest published work she acknowledges that the ‘the amount 
of respect, standing, and autonomy… [workers] get is roughly proportional to their 
market value.’667 This suggests recognition of the important connections between 
distributive goods and socio-political power relations. As one of the most influential 
contemporary theorists of egalitarianism, her moves in this direction are sure to 
advance these conversations within political philosophy.   
 
 
attempts to individualise distributions of money and property into socially inert, static piles of 
‘stuff’. 
665 Anderson (2010: 11). 
666 My main differences with Anderson (2010) are threefold. On my disagreement with her 
attempt to strip the concept of ‘exploitation’ of its distributive dimension, see Chapter 6, Section 
2. Second, though in this work Anderson similarly argues that social relations are constituted by 
social ‘processes of interaction’ (e.g. 2010: 16), she calls special attention to segregation as a 
‘principle’ or ‘fundamental cause’ of group inequality (2010: 2). I am unsure of the status of this 
‘fundamentality claim’ (for critical discussion see Shelby 2014: 260-263). Third, Anderson (2010: 
18) writes that certain distributions embody unequal relations, while others cause unequal 
relations; I do not rely on such a distinction as I am not clear on how Anderson intends us to 
draws this line. Nonetheless, on other points my work is compatible with Anderson (2010); in 
particular, Anderson similarly argues that social relations are constituted by social practices 
(2010: 17).  
667 Anderson (2019: 138).  
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8.5. Conclusion: A Different Approach to Economic-Distributive 
Issues 
We urgently need intersectional analyses that insist on the irreducible intermingling 
of race, class, and gender; with inequality intensifying and fractures appearing along 
overtly raced lines, we lack the luxury of rehearsing another decade of identity 
versus class debates. As my analysis of Jodi Dean’s work suggests, contemporary 
iterations of these debates remain underlain by economy-culture dualisms which 
instantiate methodological whiteness and struggle to analyse the intersections of 
race and class.  
 
In place of these dualisms, I proposed an analysis of the economy as a harmful 
ideological objectification of certain practices, selected for their supposed importance 
to the production, distribution, and consumption of resources of commensurable 
public value. The theoretical entity, ‘the economy’, does harmful social theoretical 
work, shoring up and naturalising raced, classed, and gendered relations of 
domination. This economy is importantly structured by both cultural concepts, 
meanings, and understandings, and by material and immaterial resources and 
distributions. I suggested that social reproduction theory can help dissolve class 
versus identity debates and used insights from this theoretical current to inform a 
counter-hegemonic understanding of the economy – one which, among other things, 
calls on us to properly recognise the lives and labour of people of colour. 
 
Finally, I explored the implications of this for relational egalitarian approaches to 
economic-distributive issues. Relational egalitarians should re-attach economic-
distributive patterns and practices to issues of socio-political status hierarchies and 
power differentials, I argued. One of the ways this re-attachment might work is by 
thinking about certain economic goods (money and property in particular) in more 
thoroughly relational terms. At first glance, economic-distributive issues can seem to 
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concern the division of static, inert ‘stuff’ between individual agents; rather than 
accept this framing, we can look under its hood to investigate the relational bases of 
such divisions.  
 
Jodi Dean is right that we need to take class injustices extremely seriously, just as 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarians are right about the political importance of 
distributive justice. But recognising this need not come at the cost of neglecting 
issues of race or gender, nor by abstracting away ‘culture’. Anderson is right that we 
need to focus on equal political relations – but we cannot do this by looking to issues 
of recognition or norms of ‘social appreciation’ alone.  
 
By combining cultural understandings and distributions in the idea of an economic 
practice, and by calling attention to how economic relations always affect, and are 
affected by, wider social and moral relations, we can better hold all the pieces of this 
puzzle together. Doing so begins to demystify the economy in ways that can help us 






9.  CONCLUSION 
 
I aimed to formulate an egalitarian approach to distributive justice appropriate for 
tackling injustices of race, gender, and class. As so much public political argument 
and liberal egalitarian theorising about distributive justice starts from the idea of 
choice, I began there too. I suggested that the strong symbolic value accorded to our 
equality as active choosers was closely entangled with ideas of the national good and 
the economy.  
 
The spiralling effects of choice – where distributive outcomes are understood as 
‘chosen’ and thus come to represent certain groups in certain ways – illustrate how 
choice functions as an important mediating bridge between political distributions 
and representations. Real-world political choice-discourses function as an effective 
smokescreen for structural injustices, encouraging us to chalk them up to bad 
choices/actions of disadvantaged groups rather than to racist, sexist, or classist social 
structures.   
 
Why is the concept of choice able to play this inegalitarian role so well? Stuart Hall 
argues that ideologies ‘work most effectively when we are not aware that how we 
formulate and construct a statement about the world is underpinned by ideological 
premises.’668 So it is with political appeals to choice/agent responsibility: underneath 
the innocuous common-sense veneer of statements about which agents choose what 
outcomes lie complicated tangles of normative political judgements. These are 
hidden by choice-statements’ deceptively simple framing: our intuitive selection of 
 
668 Hall (2002: 19).  
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agents; the maps of actual social causation guiding our sense of which actions matter 
for producing which outcomes; and our corresponding sense of reasonable 
foreseeability.  
 
The assumption that choice statements express only descriptive (perhaps 
metaphysically puzzling) statements about the world is part of what makes them so 
tempting; their apparent apolitical nature gives us a sense that we base our 
arguments on solid foundations rather than on messy, disputed, value-laden politics.  
But the politics that sneaks in unnoticed is too often sexist, classist, and racist. 
Therefore, it is worth egalitarian theorists who want to use these concepts taking 
time to investigate contemporary mechanisms of structural injustice.  
 
Furthermore, rather than focusing on cases where we adjudicate between two needy 
individuals, I suggested we refocus critical attention on discovering which social 
practices matter most for the reproduction of raced, gendered, and classed 
inequalities (of status, power, and resources). Doing so ensures we set the right 
egalitarian priorities: widespread problematic social practices rather than individual 
mistakes or adjudication between the ‘deserving and undeserving’ poor. This shift 
requires moving far beyond the theoretical tools of choice and agent responsibility – 
and therefore beyond the confines of responsibility-sensitive egalitarian thought.      
 
Relational egalitarianism looks a prime alternative, given its less individualistic, 
more structural approach, and its acknowledgement of the politics of socio-political 
representation and status. Yet Elizabeth Anderson’s repudiation of a focus on choice 
came, at times, with an underemphasis of the political significance of distributive 
issues. Even if distributions matter only insofar as they bear on political relations of 
equality, we still need to know to what extent they actually do bear on such 
relations; gaps and puzzles remain in relational egalitarian answers to this. 
 
9.  CONCLUSION 
249 
 
Nancy Fraser’s perspectival dualism is a rich resource for egalitarian investigations 
of these puzzles. However, problems remain in perspectival dualism’s handling of 
economic-distributive issues. The theory’s residual economy-culture dualism means 
it struggles to theorise the spiralling distribution-representation loops so important 
to contemporary racism, sexism, and classism. The practices that make up the 
economy are just as reliant on and structured by cultural meanings, representations, 
narratives, and concepts as the practices of any other sphere of life.  
 
To move beyond the problems of economy-culture dualism, I suggested that the 
term, ‘the economy’ picks out and groups together certain social practices and then 
objectifies this group as a thing. A practice is commonly counted as economic if 
dominant views understand it to be important to the production, distribution, or 
consumption of things of public commensurable value. But these dominant logics by 
which practices’ importance and resources’ public value are determined are not 
gender-, race-, or class-neutral.  
 
How to discuss economic-distributive justice, then, without framing the issue in 
ways which reproduce raced (/gendered/classed) ideas about what practices, 
resources, and lives are of public value? Here, ideas from social reproduction theory 
can help inform a counter-hegemonic understanding of the economy by, first, 
expanding our concept of labour to integrate productive and reproductive work. 
And, second, by insisting that the economy must serve the life of all members of 
society, rather than lives and wellbeing sacrificed in service to the economy. On this 
basis, I suggested an alternative understanding which groups together all those 
practices important to the (re)production, distribution, and consumption of the 
means of life.  
 
This redefinition is designed to work with and facilitate two further steps: First, to 
make room for reforms to our economic evaluative practices so as to recognise the 
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importance of people of colour’s, women’s, and working-class peoples’ labour to the 
production and reproduction of the means of life. Second, to encourage the 
formulation of a racially-inclusive ‘public’ to shape evaluations of what – and who – 
count in imaginaries of public value. This analysis does not merely ‘count in’ or ‘add 
on’ bits to the economy but aims to facilitate the reformulation of its fundamental 
animating logics.  
 
This work has implications for relational egalitarian theorisations of distributive 
justice. First, to fully integrate the demands of recognitive and distributive justice 
within a relational egalitarian framework, we ought to theorise them together rather 
than through a dualist lens. And second, it suggests ways to theorise certain 
economic-distributive goods like money and property in more relational terms: not 
as static, socially-inert piles of ‘stuff’ held by individuals but as representations of an 
underlying set of socio-political relationships among people and ‘the objects of their 
existence.’ 669       
 
Thematic Contributions 
(i)  Rethinking Choice 
Relative to how often political philosophers draw on the concept of choice, they have 
scarcely investigated how it functions in unequal social contexts.670 To remedy this, I 
built on feminist work to show its central relevance to issues of neoliberal 
responsibilisation on terrains of race and class as well as gender. I explain how 
choice has successfully functioned as a conceptual trojan horse, bringing 
conservative and inegalitarian norms into prominent strands of egalitarianism. If a 
concept of agent responsibility is to have a place in egalitarian thought – to help 
outline feminist, anti-racist, and left theorisations of socio-political productivity and 
 
669 Sahlins (2013: 170). 
670 Feminist political theorists provide important exceptions here (e.g. Bartky, 1988; Chambers, 
2010).  
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exploitation, for example – it should be carefully decoupled from its individualist 
and inegalitarian histories of commonplace use. 
 
(ii)  Rethinking Distributive Justice 
The topic of distributive justice is often approached through the use of idealised 
thought experiments light on social context and heavy on individualistic 
assumptions. But this topic must not be siloed from issues of recognitive, epistemic, 
or cultural justice (nor from debates about political-philosophical methodologies and 
ontologies). Similarly, a focus on fostering equal political relationships need not 
exclude or minimise distributive issues. Socio-political relationships are constituted 
through social practices and an important subset of these practices are economic-
distributive (on both the dominant and my alternative understanding of this label). 
Recognising this opens relational egalitarian ways to confront conservative 
naturalisations and depoliticisations of the economic realm.    
 
Critical theorists like Fraser and Jodi Dean talk about the economy as if this label 
needs little explanation. However, unequal power relations shape the concept of the 
economy and its division from the non-economic – a performative divide with 
extremely harmful consequences for those relegated to the wrong side. My definition 
of the economy does not restrict the term to markets nor legitimise economic 
practices and distributions as natural outcomes of individual free choice arising from 
pre-political indifference curves.  
 
Centring the notion of an economic practice helps overcome distributive-recognitive 
dualisms. Economic practices have both distributive and cultural aspects, but these 
aspects are best understood holistically: the distributive patterns that result from 
these practices are comprehended and reproduced via cultural meanings, values, 
narratives and concepts. And economic distributions, understood as always both an 
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end point and a starting point for the next round of economic practices, are 
something like river-bed landscapes – they help illustrate the direction, power, and 
flow of past currents of thought and action and influence the direction, power, and 
flow of future currents too (though they do not determine them). This approach 
helps dissolve any simplistic pitting of identity politics against class, for economic-
distributive issues importantly shape political identity formations and vice versa.  
 
(iii)  Classic Feminist Problems; New applications  
Debates about carework and productive labour, the line between public and private, 
the androcentricity of key political concepts, and the responsibilities of the state as a 
collective political agent can seem outdated: more relevant to times when women 
were stuck in the home without a wage and before decades of neoliberal reforms 
had eroded the idea of collective goods provision.  
 
Granted, the public-private divide has mutated in recent decades, as neoliberalism 
has (re)privatised and (re)commodified some of the public services created by 20th 
century welfare states. This wearing down and wearing out of unconditional public 
services (along with women’s entrance into the paid workforce) has changed how 
the divide operates but not decreased its political significance. The case of low-paid 
and unpaid carework illustrates how dynamics of race, gender, and class still rely on 
problematic divisions (and gradations) between public/productive and 
private/unproductive activity.  
 
Analyses of carework can also serve as a gateway into a host of other urgent 
questions. As Bhattacharyya argues, ‘in the division between productive economy 
and natural resources, the labour of those subordinated by race or gender can be 
transformed into the stuff of nature.’671 This ‘naturing’ of work done by people of 
 
671 Bhattacharyya (2018: 46). 
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colour and women is not a new story: it has long gone in hand with their 
representation as somehow slightly less human, less rational. Like those who 
perform feminized, racialised labour, nature’s capacity to support life and renew 
itself is taken as merely part of the causal background of human endeavours, not 
recognised as an actual cause of our achievements.672 Recognising this reveals 
potential connections between the politics of ecological crisis and the politics of 
reproductive crises – of carework, teaching, health, education, and so on.673  
 
(iv)  Methodology Revisited 
Critical theory can provide extremely useful tools for political philosophers. Political 
philosophers sometimes seem to think critical theory’s methodology somehow less 
‘rigorous’ than philosophy’s dominant methodology - perhaps because critical 
theorists abstract away less of the messiness of real life, meaning that their 
arguments are not as easily condensed into neat linear premises, implications, and 
conclusions.674 Though this messiness may foreclose clinically linear arguments, I 
have attempted to show how carefully we must assess the political effects of paring 
down the world to this terse, idealised elegance. Critical theoretical approaches have 
increasingly begun to filter into political philosophical work – particularly work on 
gender and race.675 These approaches can bear fruit applied more widely and, in 
particular, to traditional political philosophical topics like that of distributive justice.   
 
 
672 See Fraser (2014: 63). 
673 Fraser et al. (2018) argue that we are currently living through crises of reproduction as well as 
of nature.  
674 Even those working on the boundaries of critical theory and political philosophy sometimes 
feed this trope. For example, Mills (2014: 87) claims that the metaphysician Sally Haslanger’s 
version of ideology critique contains ‘far greater theoretical sophistication’ than that of her 
Marxist and feminist predecessors; though I agree that Haslanger’s work is wonderful, this 
pronouncement is puzzling given how deeply indebted she is to these schools of thought. 
675 E.g. Chambers (2010); Haslanger (2012e). Though these approaches have long had a presence 




In his justification for the series, commissioning editor Klein explained that 
the BBC-sponsored research had discovered that the deepest dissatisfaction felt 
by white working class Britain stemmed from their sense of betrayal by New 
Labour. Despite this finding, the series underlines the more sensational 
dynamics of race as the key to understanding their disillusionment. – Vron 
Ware, on the BBC’s ‘White Season’676 
 
Our ability to theorise economic-distributive issues matters. Otherwise, it is all too 
easy to frame class-based anger as stemming from crises of threatened masculinity 
and race-based resentment. This deflects attention from classed injustice and puts 
women and communities of colour in increased danger. Politicians have been 
continually busting the supposed ‘taboo’ of having racially-loaded conversations 
about the ‘problem’ of immigration for over a decade now, and we are living 
through the consequences: a stoking up of racism and a hardening of nationalism 
while economic inequalities stagnate and public services struggle.677 Given this, our 
ability to theorise economic-distributive issues in ways that recognise the 
intersections of race, class, and gender matters enormously.  
 
There are reasons to think that this ability will become yet more important as 
ecological crises intensify. If stable and affordable food supplies, clean water, and 
safe places to live become increasingly unreliable, the temptation to exclude 
 
676 Ware (2008).  
677 Foucault (2012b) argues that though we assume discussion of sexuality to be taboo in our 
society, this supposed taboo actually functions to intensify, multiply, and reorient discussions of 
sex and sexuality. A similar process has been at work within racially-laden discourses about 
immigration: politicians begin by asserting that it has become taboo to speak about immigration 
concerns (e.g. Yvette Cooper {2013}; Andy Burnham {Hutt 2010}; David Cameron {2011a}). The 
breaking of this supposed taboo casts them as ‘straight-talking’ as they go on to legitimise the 
idea that one of the major political problems we face is that of out-of-control immigration 
threatening our culture, jobs, and public services.   
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racialised populations from access to these resources, to free-ride on exploitative 
gendered and classed labour practices, and to double-down on raced, classed, and 
gendered legitimations of these exclusions and devaluations will likely only 
increase. This makes intersectional work on distributive justice critical.  
 
Yet distributive theorising has been dominated (within political philosophy) by the 
supposed normative significance of individual choice and (within certain strands of 
critical theory) by problematic economy-culture dualisms. The silver lining of 
political ruptures like Brexit and Trump must be the room they open for different 
thinking on the issues which fuelled them – issues like race, gender, class, national 
belonging, and the economy.  
 
Recently, Satnam Virdee encouraged left social movements to ‘wilfully entangle 
demands for economic justice with antiracism’ (and, I would add, feminism).678 I 
hope to have contributed to the theoretical resources needed for such an entangling. 
Within political philosophy, distributive justice can seem like an outdated topic – a 
game where most of the major moves happened decades ago. This could not be 
further from the truth: non-ideal work on distributive justice must be an important 
part of egalitarian political philosophy if we are to speak to our current political 
impasse.  
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